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Falin Discusses United Germany, Treaty

AU0204111790 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 2 Apr 90 p 3

[Report by Rainer Nahrendorf: "Valentin Falin Insists on the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty"]

[Text] Moscow, 1 April—In an interview with HANDELSBLATT, Valentin Falin, Germany expert of the CPSU Central Committee, supported the idea of a German-Soviet economic conference in order to discuss the possibilities of fulfilling the GDR economy's obligations concerning the delivery of goods and the future economic cooperation between a united Germany and the Soviet Union.

Such a conference, in which both German governments and the Soviet Union should participate, could be convened soon. For the Soviet Union, the GDR economy's meeting its deliveries is not linked in any way with the USSR's attitude toward the process of the unification of the two German states. Falin: "Linking two things always indicates a policy that is trying to evade a solution. However, it is in our interest to replace the provisional solutions which have existed for 45 years, that is, since the war, with a stable solution."

A reorientation of the GDR economy toward the West would be a hard test for the Soviet Union, Falin said. The GDR is the USSR's biggest trading partner. Between 10 and 12 percent of Soviet imports are spare parts for machinery and equipment that had been delivered earlier. There are also obligations within the framework of the division of labor and specialization in CEMA. Some CEMA countries have renounced the development of their own production for which the Soviet Union's East German partners had better preconditions. If the GDR economy is oriented toward the West, then there is the question of whether corresponding industries have to be built up in the Soviet Union.

Products of the GDR economy have also been produced jointly with the economy of one or more of the other CEMA states. Falin asked how long and under what conditions such cooperative projects should be continued. In addition, the GDR is able to produce certain products meeting world standards as a result of licenses and know-how, which were partly made available by the Soviet Union for free. Another problem results from the fact that the Soviet Union owns parts of certain sectors. Falin referred to the Soviet-German Bismuth Stock Corporation (SDAG).

The Euphoria Over the Election Results Will Pass

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has carried out many reforms in implementing the Potsdam Agreement. Instead of transporting reparation goods to its country, as one of the victorious powers it first seized some factories on the territory of today's GDR, but later handed them over to the German state. Falin: "The Soviet Union is not indifferent to what will happen to such property."

There have already been talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl on some aspects of German unification, in particular on the GDR economy's obligations in terms of deliveries. During his visit to Moscow the chancellor showed understanding that the USSR's economic interests should also be taken into account. Falin: "We assume that this will happen."

Falin: "The euphoria over the election results in the GDR will pass. As soon as the everyday, detailed work of the internal unification process starts, the Germans will know themselves relatively soon what can happen immediately and what will happen in two, three, or five years." Questions involving the conversion of money and the social and psychological adjustment of the two German societies have to be cleared up. Not all things in the GDR are so bad. Many good things have been created, for instance in culture, science, and sports, Falin said.

The low labor productivity in the GDR, which is 40-50 percent lower than in the FRG, is not only the result of worse machinery but also partly the result of a deliberate policy. The exploitation—to use a harsh word—of man in the FRG has not always been compatible with the social values, which, until recently, were in the foreground in the GDR, Falin said.

After a stormy start, things will become more quiet. The GDR's taking over the DIN [German Industrial Norm] could happen soon and monetary union could be implemented within a year, perhaps even more quickly; but for the renewal and expansion of roads and the communication network and for the introduction of a new economic infrastructure, dozens of billions of Deutsche marks and more time will be needed.

The Soviet Union accepts the election results in the GDR. It proceeds from the premise that the new government of the state will also fulfill its international obligations and will respect the rights and interests of the Soviet Union to their full extent. If this were different, this would create considerable problems. This would be the case with every nation, no matter what its name. The application of the law is in the interest of the stability of international relations.

In the past there have already been—mostly at the initiative of the Soviet Union—talks, for instance with Ulbricht in 1963-64, with Kadar in the mid-sixties, and with Gomulka in 1970, on conducting CEMA trade at world market prices in convertible currencies. However, friends of the Soviet Union preferred to stay with the old price and calculation system in transfer rubles.

During the CEMA meeting last year it was noted that at world market prices the Soviet Union could have received about $7-7.5 billion more than it really got in its foreign trade with all CEMA countries in 1989. The Soviet Union sells its raw materials and its oil mostly at prices that are lower than world market prices and often buys finished goods in CEMA countries at a price that is twice or three times higher than world market prices.

while the goods are of even lower quality. There is hardly any other "empire" that pays more and does not get any advantage from that.

For an All-European Security System

Poland and Hungary basically agree that CEMA trade will be conducted at world market prices on a dollar basis as of January 1991. However, it seems that Warsaw wants to have all debts to the Soviet Union abolished as an advance move. The CSSR wants to start this change in only five to six years. Even though the GDR would lose $1.5 billion or more, the GDR Government has been willing to effect the change as of January of next year.

Falin came out in favor of developing an all-European defense system out of the two military alliances. Germany is to find its place within the framework of this new system. It must still be discussed what this all-European security system is to be like, but for him it is the only optimum solution.

However, he is not particularly amenable to checking on Germany, which would be direct or indirect discrimination in the long run. In order to reassure the medium-sized and smaller neighboring states of Germany and to give them the assurance that unification does not infringe upon their security, some sort of control will be needed for a transitional period.

This could, for instance, be effected through a symbolic representation of troops of the four powers on German soil. In the long run, no combat units of the four powers should be stationed on German soil, no nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, and no attack weapons in general.

Later on, when the all-European security system works completely, personnel of other countries will be present in all participating states in order to verify the disarmament and military self-restriction measures. For instance, there could be German representatives in the Soviet Union and Greek representatives in Germany who exercise the function of observers in the respective countries. He does not rule out that one day there might be more soldiers involved in verification measures than in the armies.

However, NATO is not only a European alliance. It is also a global factor in the constellation of power of the United States with the Soviet Union. The same goes for the Warsaw Pact to a certain extent. In an all-European security system neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could use European potentials against the other side.

Even though it will not be possible to implement a European security system within two or three years, Falin does not see this as a factor that collides with the desire of the Germans for quick unification, at least none that could not be avoided with reason. However, verifiable steps must be set down within the framework of a peace treaty or an all-European settlement. Then everyone would know what is to happen in 1992 and what will happen two or five or 10 years later. Such a step-by-step settlement could stimulate the process of mutual confidence-building.

What we are measuring in decades in our current timeframe could probably also take place within shorter periods. We simply lack positive experiences. However, if such a positive experience develops in the wake of Germany's new unification and all states assure themselves that this new unification will not harm anyone, all constructive and creative processes in Europe could take place more quickly.

Step-by-Step Settlement Stimulates Confidence-Building

When all sides start work within the two-plus-four process quickly and with a lot of goodwill, the most important principles could be settled and the foundations for the building of a Europeans security system could be completed by the end of the year. However, there are some complicated problems; one of the most complicated of which being the military status of a united Germany.

The Soviet demand for the neutralization of a united Germany has been interpreted incorrectly. From the very beginning, the Soviet Union has not demanded a political and ideological neutralization, but only a military one. Military neutralization simply means that German territory must not be used either by the Germans or by others in a way that would make danger to other states emanate from it.

The second group of problems refers to the borders. One has to work out settlements so that no nation need be afraid for the stability of its borders. The border question is not only the German-Polish question. The FRG and the GDR have nine neighboring countries. Bilateral agreements have led to, first, the fact that border issues were not solved uniformly and, second, the raising of the question of whether the FRG and, perhaps, also a united Germany shies away from the final solution of these border questions in the form of a universal peace treaty. If this question is not answered definitively and without reservation, for Falin this would not be the best of the possible and necessary settlements, which the border questions require and deserve.

There are expectations of and demands for compensation by citizens of some states and also by some states from the German nation and from the future united German state. These expectations should be cleared up in one form or another. There are also such desires among the Soviet people, because millions of them worked as forced laborers in Germany during the war and some of them have been total invalids since then. However, today there is not yet an answer to the question of whether the Soviet Government will demand such compensation.

However, a peace treaty is important not so much because of material desires that cannot be excluded. It primarily plays a political and psychological role. It would be a symbol for the fact that an epoch is coming to an end and a better one is beginning. For the Soviet people, who suffered the most, this would be of particular value. He doubts that the Soviet public would be satisfied with some kind of substitute declaration for a peace settlement.

In his view, there should be not a classic peace treaty between victors and vanquished, but a treaty with multilateral obligations, which are to make peace inside and outside Europe secure. Falin: "Germany's renouncing of force in all forms would be the new expression of this desire for peace."

He would prefer to have the working out of such a peace treaty take place parallel to the two-plus-four process and to have the two German states play an active role in this. It will not be a treaty that is to be forced on the German states. Everyone should participate in the creation of this document with equal rights. The treaty would then be signed by the all-German government.

Concerning the proposal that overall Germany should belong to NATO but that there should not be any NATO troops on today's GDR territory, which is supported by the FRG Government, Falin said that this is not a variety for compromise but a one-sided shifting of the balance of power and the balance of interests in the West's favor. In order to stress this standpoint, Falin made the following counterproposal: The GDR should remain a member of the Warsaw Pact and the territory of the FRG should be integrated in the Warsaw Pact only politically; no Warsaw Pact soldiers should be stationed in the West. Would this be acceptable to the West? Falin answered his rhetorical question himself: "The West would see this as a revision of the existing structures with strategic consequences for the Western world." Therefore, the West should also understand the concerns of the Soviet Union.

Until an all-European security system is established, one needs a transitional period, which must not be too short for technical and other reasons. About five years are needed to withdraw the foreign troops from the GDR and the FRG. In the end, the duration depends on the strategic conclusions that are drawn by both sides from the new situation.

Falin: The West Took the First Step Toward Division

Falin recalled that at the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's, the West had stated that the later membership of the FRG in NATO and its rearmament was necessary in the struggle against the Soviet Union. At that time, Adenauer advocated the thesis that "neutralization means Sovietization." Many documents of the Western allies, which have since been released—Falin quoted from a document of the British Foreign Ministry, which had been kept secret for a long time—prove who took the first step toward the division of Germany and why this was done. The arguments used by the Western allies at that time have basically not lost their topicality even today. It was formulated differently, but basically the way of thinking is still similar.

Falin does not expect that, in view of the Lithuanian conflict, there will be hardening of the Soviet position at the two-plus-four talks about the external preconditions for a unification of the two German states. Concerning the conflict with Lithuania, Falin said, among other things: "In order to start a quarrel, one only needs one side; in order to come to an understanding one needs both sides." Moscow does not look for conflict.

The central government of the Soviet Union is trying to settle the legacy of the past with sensible democratic methods. The extent to which this is possible also depends on those circles in Lithuania, which have created—partly with manipulations—the current atmosphere of nervousness and nationalism. Falin: "In my view, the most important thing is not to lose one's head." One literally has to ask oneself every hour and every minute what would happen if one side or the other made a mistake.

German Ultra-Right Threat Assessed

PM0304123190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[V. Obukhov article: "All Colors of the Brown Spectrum, or the Strength of Extreme Right-Wing Feelings Among the Germans"]

[Text] The specter of "the fourth reich" has constantly roamed the pages of English and French publications in recent years. However, a veritable tornado of emotions connected with the situation's possible development in this direction descended on readers from the columns of the newspapers when the question of German unification arose. London's THE SUN, for example, portrayed Hitler extricating himself from the ruins of the Berlin Wall. "Isn't it time for me to see the light of day?" the fuehrer inquired. There was a drawing of a child holding a globe in NEWSWEEK. The caption declared: "Greater Germany. Baby Want Czechoslovakia." Alarm can be detected in what the Poles, the French, the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Czechs are saying.

New reich, new fuehrer, old ambitions? To what extent are the fears of the future Germany's neighbors justified as regards a growth in extreme right-wing moods among the Germans?

Let us turn to official West German statistics. The FRG Interior Ministry annually publishes a report by the federal department for the protection of the Constitution, which registers the activity of right-wing and left-wing extremists. More often left-wing. In the last such

report, traditionally only 42 out of 264 pages of documentation were devoted to "right-wing radical tendencies." Are the left-wing extremists in the FRG really more dangerous than the right-wing extremists? Not at all.

We learn that 69 right-wing organizations operate in the country (around 80,000 members) and, of these, 20 are overtly neo-Nazi. In 1988, 955 criminal offenses were committed by left-wing extremists, while the "brownshirts" committed nearly twice as many (including acts of terrorism, arson, bank robberies, and the formation of weapons dumps). Sixteen publishing houses, which publish millions of copies of inflammatory periodicals, work for the "brown brotherhood." Official statistics manage to "overlook" neo-Nazi associations and groups operating illegally or disguising themselves as all kinds of innocuous "shooting clubs" or sporting societies. This is the result of traditions. Blindness "in the right eye" is an old and deep-rooted ailment in the FRG authorities' political and legal institutions.

In 1983 an extreme right-wing party—the "Republicans," headed by former SS man V. Schoenhuber—emerged and began to grow rapidly in the country. The question arose of categorizing it as an organization hostile to the Constitution. Yes, it arose—and died down. The authorities' explanations were simple: It is not officially in solidarity with the neo-Nazis, it even refuses to have anything to do with them, and, furthermore, it is committed to "respecting" the Constitution.

It stands to reason that there are no offensive or compromising slogans or overtly profascist appeals to be found in the policy directives of the "Republicans." Their leaders are people who are not so primitive, who understand that you will not get far with the "trappings of the past." But if you cast aside the vocabulary and examine the aims.... At a recent congress, the "Republicans," despite cleaning up their program and removing the most extremist definitions, kept their former aims: Germany within its 1937 borders, with its own weapons (the scale and volume of weapons are not specified), and free from domination by foreigners. In fact the neo-Nazis are demanding the same thing. Both rely on jingoism ("I am proud to be a German"), the superiority of the German nation over all others, hatred of "non-Germans," and the desire to reanimate the defunct "Third Reich."

The "Republicans" are the most numerous of all the extreme right-wing organizations in the FRG, and they have some chance of getting into parliament. If their leaders are to be believed, the party now has 25,000 active members. At the same time, in the past few months the "Republicans" have obtained unexpected support from the GDR. After November's "peaceful revolution," when the seemingly unshakable SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] regime fell, right-wing tendencies among the country's young people were not just revealed—they started growing before one's very eyes. I happened to be in the GDR this January and I talked with many people who were observing with unease the appearance and development of the "brownshirt syndrome." Here is a summary of my interlocutors' explanations of the reasons for this phenomenon.

"Strictly speaking, there has been no proper antifascist education in the GDR. In 1945, I was 11 years old," I was told by a journalist I know. "All schoolchildren were members of Nazi youth organizations at that time. And then the old ideology was declared criminal overnight and new teachers came, but what had changed? There was the same drill to the beat of the drum (only the songs were different), the same oaths of inviolable allegiance (no longer to the old regime, but to the new one), the same faith in the leadership's infallibility, the same petty regimentation of life and the impossibility of a critical interpretation of reality. To some extent it was easier for our generation. Ideological manipulation was carried out on prepared ground, and only the signs changed: Minuses changed to pluses. But for subsequent generations, who could see that real life was moving further away from the proclaimed ideals as the years went by (this became particularly noticeable in the 1980's), the official lie became a canker that eats away at the soul. And, as a protest, some young people started to seek other ideals. And where were they to be found? Only in the "heroic" past....

The brown bacillus is transmitted through the air. Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate clearly between neo-Nazis and "ordinary" right-wing extremists. The dividing line between fanatical advocates of the "greater German" ideology and outwardly quite decent burghers (who believe that there is nothing wrong in a Germany solely for the Germans, and that its "historical" borders should be restored—not by force, God forbid, but by some kind of free consensus)—is very fluid and arbitrary.

Should eminent politicians from Bonn's cabinet be considered extreme right-wing if they state that "the 'German reich' did not perish with the capitulation of 1945" and that the "East German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse are part of the German question"? The list of such politicians would be imposing. This is how they explain their behavior in private conversation: Of course we understand that no one will return these lands to us, but we are obliged to take into consideration the mood of the local people. Those who are demanding the return of Silesia and Kaliningrad Oblast. There are 2.5 million officially registered members of their parent organization—the "League of Expellees."

To what can we ascribe the numerous groups of young people—such as "skinheads," punks, and other such groups—who do not hide their aggression toward Turks and other foreigners who come to the FRG to earn some money and compete with Germans in the labor market? Or the radically minded young people who see as their enemies all those with more left-wing views than their own? And citizens who do not want to hear about

neo-Nazism but who demand that Germany be purged of "foreign filth"? And also the potential supporters of the right-wing extremists?

There is no simple answer to this question. One thing is clear: At the moment, the majority of the FRG and GDR population supports parliamentary democracy rather than totalitarian dictatorship. In the FRG, the voter demonstrates this by action, by worrying about the political balance: The votes at elections to the Bundestag are distributed in such a way that none of the parties can become the individual leader. And the same is true of the GDR today. That is the situation at present.

Purely hypothetically a sharp swing to the right at some future turning point in history is not ruled out. But for that to happen would require the simultaneous disappearance of several "safety factors," including the main one—the level of prosperity enjoyed by most Germans. A radical deterioration in living conditions, crisis-induced poverty, and—as a consequence—domestic instability and chaos are all factors that could activate the "floating bacillus" and awaken in the mass of ordinary people a longing for a "strongman" who would "restore order." And what kind of "strongman" and what kind of "order" would be very much a secondary issue for them.

Harmful microbes live, as is well known, not only in the human organism but in the social organism too. They can lie dormant for years and decades. Healthy organisms do not allow them to develop; disease attacks when the organism is weakened. It is from this standpoint, in my view, that we should approach the question of just how topical is the threat of the Germans engaging in "brownshirt backsliding."

United States & Canada

Shevardnadze Arrives in Washington 3 Apr

LD0304201190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Washington, 3 Apr (TASS)—Eduard A. Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR minister of foreign affairs, has arrived in the U.S. capital on a working visit. At Andrews Air Force Base Washington he was met by Lawrence Eagleburger, U.S. deputy secretary of state, and other U.S. officials. Among the welcoming party were Yuriy V. Dubinin, USSR ambassador to the United States, and John Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the USSR.

On Wednesday 4 April the first private meeting will be held between Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Secretary of State James Baker. It is planned to hold two such meetings. During the visit there will also be three rounds of talks with a small number of participants in which there will be discussion of a broad range of questions of Soviet-U.S. relations, in particular problems of disarmament and arms control, and regional, humanitarian, transnational, bilateral, and economic questions.

On 6 April in the White House the USSR foreign minister will meet with U.S. President George Bush. That same evening Shevardnadze will leave Washington.

Shevardnadze Views Aims of Visit

LD0304212890 Moscow TASS in English 2118 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 4 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who arrived in Washington on a working visit on Tuesday, made a statement spelling out the aims of his visit.

The minister pointed, above all, to the preparation for the forthcoming Soviet-American summit. "Extensive work is going in all directions. Much work has been done to prepare relevant documents on cutting nuclear strategic weapons. There is impressive progress, but there is also need to work more."

Secondly, Shevardnadze pointed to the need "to hold consultations on how to accelerate Vienna talks on conventional weapons and stability issues in Europe.

"There is also need to hold consultations on how to accelerate work and to complete preparations for a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Great headway has been made in this respect."

Shevardnadze singled out another area of our Washington talks—regional conflicts. "A very interesting and encouraging trend has shaped up in the recent past, a trend for interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States in various areas of the world," he said.

Asked about Lithuania, Shevardnadze said: "We shall act within the Constitution. That is within the fundamental law of our country, for which the Lithuanian people voted, together with our peoples...

"Our main weapon in settling any issue inside the country and in relations with other states is a dialogue. An honest dialogue. We bank precisely on such a dialogue in relations with the Lithuanian people and the Lithuanian leadership."

Correspondent Views Agenda

LD0304140590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, arrives in Washington for an official visit today. He will hold talks with U.S. Secretary of State Baker. A meeting will also take place between the Soviet minister and U.S. President Bush.

The main aim of this visit is to set the final date for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

I asked Vladimir Zvyagin, our correspondent in New York, to talk in more detail about the agenda for the talks and about the opinions U.S. observers are expressing in this regard. Here is New York on the line:

[Begin Zvyagin recording] Prominent U.S. observers consider that problems such as the following will be raised at the meeting in Washington: Conclusion of a Soviet-U.S. treaty on a 50-percent cut in strategic weapons; elimination of stockpiles and banning of chemical weapons; the development of the situation in Central Europe, and in particular the issue of the projected unification of Germany; and also conclusion of an agreement on cutting conventional forces and weapons in Central Europe. In the expectation of all sorts of surprises, hundreds of journalists from various countries have converged upon the U.S. capital. The situation is being heated up, too, by calls from some of the figures from the Capitol, who are calling on the White House to make a direct link between the progress of consultations and Moscow's position on the latest events in Lithuania. However, having come out several times with a call to strive for flexibility, dialogue, and mutual accord in resolving this problem, the leaders of the U.S. Administration have set the tone for the round of meetings between the foreign ministers of our countries which is just starting.

It is also important to note that immediately before the start of the Shevardnadze-Baker meeting, a group of prominent U.S. military and civilian specialists issued an appeal to the White House to reexamine the present U.S. position in regard to reducing the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe. The United States currently maintains 305,000 men and officers there. In accordance with President Bush's plan, in the event of an appropriate agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union being signed, this level will fall to 225,000 men.

This group of specialists insists that the number of U.S. troops in central Europe could be brought down to 70-80,000 men by the mid-1990s, without any risk of damaging the security of the United States and its NATO allies. The very fact that these authoritative personalities came forward with their computations precisely before the start of a new round of Soviet-U.S. consultations undoubtedly testifies to new moods in U.S. sociopolitical circles, in favor of further relaxation of tension and improvement in the international climate. [end recording]

Meeting With Baker Previewed

LD0304200290 Moscow TASS in English 1924 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Commentary by TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker will begin their seventh meeting in Washington on Wednesday.

The meeting is held two weeks after Shevardnadze and Baker met in Windhoek where they participated in Namibia's independence celebrations.

The agenda of the talks traditionally includes a wide range of issues, but the main item will be the last preparations for the forthcoming meeting between Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, scheduled to be held in Washington in June.

The Moscow talks between Shevardnadze and Baker in February removed many obstacles to the signing of two major treaties this year—on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive armaments and on the reduction of conventional armed forces.

The signing of these treaties, possibly at the forthcoming summit, would be the most important event at the end of this century.

No doubt, Shevardnadze and Baker, as well as experts on both sides, will pay special attention to efforts towards the completion of the treaties.

Other important items on the agenda include Soviet-American relations and preparations for a 1990 meeting of the leaders of 35 countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The two sides agreed in principle on such a meeting during their Moscow talks.

The Shevardnadze-Baker meeting, which will continue until April 6, will be held in conditions that are the cause of concern not only in the Soviet Union but also in the United States.

The unconstitutional and unlawful actions by Lithuania's leaders have aggravated the tension in the region. There are forces in the U.S., including the Congress, that seek to use the current situation in Lithuania in order to cast a shadow on Soviet-U.S. relations.

The Soviet Union regards the current dialogue in Washington as an important intermediary stage on the way to the Soviet-American summit.

The summit not only should improve relations between the two countries, but should also confirm the contribution of the Soviet Union and the United States to the consolidation of positive trends in world politics.

Commentator on Visit, Upcoming Summit

LD0304213990 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his U.S. colleague James Baker will have talks in Washington on Wednesday through Friday. More on this from Yuriy Solton:

These talks mark a responsible stage of preparations for the Soviet-American summit scheduled for next June. The summit, as Mikhail Gorbachev said on the day when he was elected president, will discuss an impressive package of problems, those of disarmament, Soviet-American relations, European security and cooperation to settle regional conflicts.

Experts and government ministers have been pressing for the summit to produce not only political declarations. It would be wrong to attach purely applied significance [as heard] to the Shevardnadze-Baker talks. The world events are developing an acceleration that produces sudden problems every day, and these require consultations and an exchange of views. At a recent meeting with Senator Edward Kennedy of the United States, President Gorbachev underscored the importance of avoiding the temptation of using the stormy and complicated world process to anyone's detriment. This truth is universally recognized in words, but actions sometimes speak louder.

What is disturbing for one is the fact that the events in Lithuania are stimulating conservative groups in the United States. The American Senate has adopted a resolution which cannot but be sized up as interference in Soviet internal affairs. There have been calls to exert pressure on this country, apply economic sanctions against it, and even cancel the forthcoming Soviet-American summit. The current campaign is nothing new. I firmly believe, writes Yuriy Solton, it will not affect Moscow's strategy of cherishing everything the Soviet Union and the United States have already achieved. The Kremlin wants to continue its political dialogue with the White House, a dialogue between two equal partners and free from pressure and dictating.

I hope the White House understands an attitude of this kind and shares it to some extent. At any rate the U.S. Administration spokesman has repeated more than once

over the past few days that preparations for the Soviet-American summit have been going according to schedule.

Foreign Affairs Official Receives U.S. Charge

LD0304150790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1355 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 April, (TASS)—Boris Chaplin, the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, has received John Joyce, the U.S. temporary charge d'affaires in the Soviet Union, at his request today. Questions of the improvement of the conditions of stay for the diplomatic representations of both countries in each other's territories were discussed.

E. Kennedy Comments on Visit to USSR

PM0304155190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Kennedy on His USSR Visit"]

[Text] London, 1 Apr—M.S. Gorbachev is confidently leading the USSR along the path of reforms, and the United States is facing the task of "finding spheres for the easing of tension in bilateral relations." This was declared in an interview with Britain's TV-AM television company by eminent U.S. politician Edward Kennedy, chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, who made a brief stopover in London on his way home from the USSR, where he was on a three-day visit.

Answering a question about his impressions from the results of his meeting with the Soviet leader, the senator stressed: "He gave me the impression of being confident. He understands the nature of the problems that have to be solved." Having announced that much attention in his talks with M.S. Gorbachev had been given to an examination of the situation in Lithuania, E. Kennedy pointed out that he was convinced of the Soviet leadership's intention to solve this problem without any use of military force. "Gorbachev clearly declared that a threat to people's lives would be the only justification for the use of troops in this republic," he said. "I have no reason to doubt that this is really so."

The senator noted that all representatives of the Soviet leadership whom he met during his visit gave him the impression of being competent and committed to the policy of perestroyka. "I do not think that the Soviet Union could turn away from this path," E. Kennedy concluded.

Secretary Baker's Dallas Speech Reported

PM0304153790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unnamed TASS correspondent dispatch: "U.S. Secretary of State on Country's Foreign Policy Concept"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Mar—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker spoke Friday at the Dallas World Affairs Council, setting out the foundations of the U.S. foreign policy course at a period when, in his words, "the time has come to create new democracies." "U.S. foreign policy," he stated, "should reflect democratic values."

Touching on the processes taking place in the USSR, J. Baker said: "We are interested in a perestroyka which would be something larger than a geopolitical factor. If as a result of perestroyka a more democratic and open Soviet society emerges where individual human rights and economic progress are ensured, the impact of reform on Soviet foreign policy in the long term will be exclusively useful. Democracy in the Soviet Union, in my opinion, is the best guarantee of a constructive approach by the USSR to international problems."

Noting that the United States is prepared to help the East European countries, the head of the foreign policy department made this help conditional, as he put it, on "adoption of the concept of holding free elections." President George Bush, he pointed out, has proposed that this condition be approved as a program condition by the 35 CSCE countries.

Second, J. Baker continued, "we are working with our allies and the Soviet Union to cut the armed forces confronting each other in Europe." "Third, we are giving economic support to the process whereby the countries of the region are making the difficult transition to free market systems." Baker expressed the hope that not only the United States but its allies in Europe and Japan as well as international economic institutions "could successfully cooperate to help these countries achieve progress."

Dwelling on the position in the planet's "hot spots," the secretary of state advocated that a stop be put to regional conflicts and that national reconciliation be achieved. Welcoming the appearance of a new independent state in Africa—Namibia—he expressed the opinion that free and fair elections could play the same role in "securing national reconciliation in Angola and southern Africa." Turning to the Arab-Israeli conflict, J. Baker stressed that the United States considers elections in the Israeli-occupied Arab territories to be the catalyst that could bring about a "constructive Israeli-Palestinian dialogue leading to peace, which is so necessary for the peoples of Israel and the Arab countries."

As for Cambodia, J. Baker said, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council see free and fair elections there as the best way to resolve the dispute over what government that war-torn land should have.

Baker devoted a considerable part of his speech to recent events in Central America—specifically, the Nicaraguan elections. In this connection the secretary of state paid tribute to the Soviet Union's position, which, in his words, has been conducive to a normal electoral process in Nicaragua. This position, he stressed, shows the

Soviet Union's obvious willingness to "create a spirit of cooperation in settling regional problems."

Obminskiy on Commitment to 'Serious' Trade Talks

LD0304182690 Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ernest Obminskiy confirmed the Soviet determination here today to conduct serious talks with the United States and other Western countries on expansion of economic cooperation.

He told TASS that "the Soviet side is conducting talks with many countries on establishing a contractual-legal basis for updated relations".

Broad economic cooperation is impossible without a permament and stable investment process, Obminskiy said. "Therefore, we take measures for the Soviet market to be appealing to the business communities in various countries, including the United States."

Obminskiy noted that "there are several legislative barriers raised by the United States in the way of business cooperation with the USSR". "Various credit limitations prevent businessmen to conduct a full commercial dialogue with Soviet partners," he stressed.

They can be lifted by concluding a treaty on mutual encouragement and protection of investments, the first round of talks on which was recently held in Washington. According to the deputy minister, there is a "positive sign of general changes in Soviet-American economic relations".

Speaking of drafting a new Soviet-American trade agreement, Obminskiy said that it is "fundamental", since the expansion of even traditional forms of trade is unthinkable without the most favoured nation treatment which "should be mutual and unconditional".

In his opinion, the agreement would pave the way for other understandings in the sphere of mutual relations.

The Soviet and American sides actively "discuss and agree positions", and "look for conditions of commercial activities, mutually acceptable to both economies", the diplomat said.

"The process of drafting the agreement is dynamic and positive," he stressed. "Everything is being done to prepare it for signing at the forthcoming suymmit in Washington."

Stressing the importance to conclude the trade agreement, the deputy minister noted that Soviet-American trade amounted to 3.4 billion roubles in 1989. This volume of goods turnover and its structure "do not conform with the two countries' potentials".

"Order books of American and Soviet businessmen have many agreed projects which cannot be realised due to export controls," Obminskiy stressed.

"The implementation of even some of them could sharply boost mutual trade," he concluded.

Pentagon Eases Curbs on Exports to E. Europe

PM0404083590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "United States: Computer Exports Without Pentagon Permit"]

[Text] Washington, 1 Apr—The Pentagon is abolishing the practice of scrutinizing licenses for the exportation of a series of goods to the USSR and East European countries. The U.S. Department of Defense announced Friday [30 March] that permits for the exportation of several IBM computer models, medical equipment including equipment for the treatment of cancer, and industrial and telecommunications equipment will henceforth be issued—after the appropriate evaluations—by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Under the new rules which come into force immediately, the Department of Defense will not be concerned with the shipment of goods which might form part of exhibits at trade fairs in the USSR and East European countries.

At the same time, the Pentagon reserves its right to monitor the exports of so-called "dual purpose" goods which could have both civilian and military applications, as well as of high-tech products like supercomputers.

U.S. 'Invasion' of Cuban TV Airwaves Viewed

LD0204151190 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] After a short break the United States resumed test broadcasts by TV Marti to Cuba. Anti-Cuban telecasts began at 0327 and ended at 0645 local time. Cuba again used jamming and within a few minutes the [word indistinct] picture disappeared. Direct telecasts without consent of the country they are beamed to, notes our observer, run counter to international agreements on the media, and so naturally Havana has strongly protested to UNESCO, demanding an immediate stop to the anti-Cuban action.

Nevertheless Washington does not intend, as things seem to indicate, to give up its plans for the invasion of the Cuban television airwaves. The U.S. action evokes growing protests on the island. The chairman of the Cuban University Students' Federation Felipe Perez Roque has called the TV Marti broadcasts a violation of Cuba's sovereignty. In an interview to the press he rejected claims by Western propaganda that the Cuban young people are opposed to Fidel Castro. He said we realize that we don't have all we wish to have, but that depends on ourselves and on our own efforts.

The anti-Cuban action is denounced in the public quarters of other countries. The launching by the United States of special telecasts to Cuba, notes the Korean

newspaper NODONG SINMUN, is a gross encroachment on a country's sovereignty and dignity and amounts to unceremonious interference in its internal affairs.

TASS on TV Marti Broadcasts

LD2803085490 Moscow TASS in English 0626 GMT 28 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Berezhkov]

[Text] Washington March 28 TASS—The U.S. Administration confirmed on Tuesday [27 March] that a trial had taken place of the Spanish-language TV-Marti station beamed to Cuba. According to White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater. The trial was a success. Cubans jammed the programme, but the U.S. intends to continue broadcasting.

The Cuban Government has stressed that it regards the broadcasts as an American aggression. It also warned that it would jam TV-Marti programmes, which could lead to a war of airwaves in which legitimate U.S. domestic services would be disrupted.

The trial is expected to last for three months and to cost some 7.5 million dollars.

U.S. supporters of the TV-Marti programme believe that the beaming of U.S. programmes to Cuba will weaken the position of the Cuban Government and admit that the main task of the TV station is to promote the development of the opposition in Cuba.

Brian Walsh, head of a Catholic charity organisation in the Cuban emigre stronghold Miami, stressed that the organisers of Radio-Marti and now TV-Marti base their conclusions on a myth that Cuba is a hermetically sealed society. This is a mistake, however, because one can receive programmes of 40 radio stations in Cuba, including BBC Spanish programmes.

The CNN TV company pointed out that, contrary to the statements of U.S. Administration officials, some American experts are questioning the legitimacy of beaming TV programmes to Cuba, because it is planned to beam programmes on the frequency of the 13th Cuban television channel intended for domestic programming. The use of such channels for broadcasting by foreign countries is prohibited by international telecommunication agreements.

Karpov Receives Canadian Arms Control Chief

PM2903115390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 90 Moscow Edition p 3

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] V.P. Karpov USSR deputy foreign minister, received G. Noble, chief of the Canadian Foreign Ministry International Security and Arms Control Administration, and V.G. Turner, Canadian ambassador to the USSR, 24 March at their request.

China

RENMIN RIBAO on 'Purity' of CPC Ranks

PM2903145390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Tomilin report: "For Purity in the Party Ranks"]

[Text] Beijing, 27 Mar—Maintaining the organizational unity of the CPC, ensuring stability and cohesion in the country, combatting bourgeois liberalization and corruption, improving the style of party work, and forming an "honest and incorruptible apparatus" are the tasks, RENMIN RIBAO writes today, which determine the main avenues of the activity of CPC commissions to check discipline at all levels.

Major progress, according to the testimony of the CPC Central Committee organ, has been made in the struggle to ensure purity in the party ranks. Last year a total of more than 197,000 instances of serious violations of party discipline were examined, and particular attention was given to an analysis of abuses by cadre workers. About 159,000 CPC members received various penalties, and 33,400 of them were expelled from the party.

Work with the population was noticeably stepped up. Almost 1.5 million letters from citizens were investigated within one year. The main emphasis here is on solving "questions which provoke the most sharp reaction from the masses"—preventing the organization of banquets and the construction of personal apartments at public expense, illegal commercial activity by the children of prominent officials, and nepotism. All this, the newspaper writes, helped to strengthen party building and to eradicate "weakness and amorphism" in this sphere.

Soviet, Chinese Geologists Sign Agreement

LD0204135590 Khabarovsk Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Summary] An agreement has been signed between Dalgeologiya and the Directorate of Geology and Useful Minerals of Heilongjiang Province. Specialists will organize joint expeditions this year to look at little-studied geological problems in the Amur area and in northern China and draw up a set of geological and tectonic maps. A joint report will be made recommending rational areas for survey work. The Chinese side wants to visit the Kimkan iron and Khingan manganese deposits, tin deposits in the Komsomolsk area and the brucine deposits in Kuldur. The Soviet side will visit iron and polymetallic, lead and zinc and copper deposits in the

PRC. They intend to work the border strip by means of joint geoecological research.

USSR-PRC Border Navigation Talks Held

LD0204183690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1223 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 2 April (TASS)—A conference of the joint Soviet-Chinese commission on navigation along the border sections on the rivers of the Amur basin has taken place in Harbin (PRC) from 16 to 30 March. Plans for navigation routes that would help to improve navigation conditions along the routes in the border waters were agreed upon by the two sides. Questions about a further improvement of navigation safety for vessels were also discussed. An appropriate protocol on the conclusions of the conference has been signed.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Statements on Soviet Policy 'Unrealistic'

SK0304114890 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Article by station commentator (Igor Lebedev)]

[Text] The statements by some official Japanese figures on the Soviet policy for the Asia-Pacific region often have some illogical unrealistic aspects. For example, Nishihara Seiki, deputy director of the Administration Department of Japan Defense Agency, claims that the reforms that are taking place in the Soviet Union and the world are giving birth to anxiety and instability. Therefore, Tokyo is essentially ignoring the Soviet proposal to include the issue of reducing the level of military confrontation in the agenda of the bilateral talks. In this connection, (BUIENE), French magazine, states that Japan is continuing to arm itself in a self-possessed manner, criticizing the growth of Soviet military strength in the Asia-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, Soviet leader Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, in a speech delivered in Vladivostok several years ago, proposed that the countries in the Asia-Pacific region jointly explore ways to constructively reform the relations of this region and promote peace, security, and cooperation, and this proposal was later followed by many specific undertakings.

For instance, the Soviet nuclear potential is reduced in the Asia-Pacific region. In compliance with the INF treaty, our country has been abolishing 436 medium and intermediate range missiles in the Asian region. Also, the Soviet Union has unilaterally suspended the augmentation of the ground nuclear force in the area east of the Urals since 1984, and has stopped increasing the number of planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons in this region since 1986.

As you know, the Soviet Union has unilaterally decided to reduce 500,000 of its troops, of which 200,000 will be reduced from the Asian region of our country, of which 120,000 will be reduced from the Far East. Also, 12 army divisions will be reduced in the Far East, 11 Air Force regiments will be disbanded, and 16 warships will be abolished from the Pacific Fleet. Therefore, the units of the armed forces remaining in the Far East will be given a defensive role across the board. We may add to this the fact that Moscow and Ulaanbaatar have recently signed an agreement on complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia.

Toward the end of last year, we began to reduce the Soviet troops from the Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. MiG-23 and Tu-16 military planes were withdrawn from there, and only the air force unit consisting of 6 to 10 (?planes) remains there.

These are the facts Tokyo is unwilling to admit.

Directors Comment on Joint Venture With Japan

OW2303003790 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 20 Mar 90

[From "Friendship and Good-Neighborliness" program; interview with (Nikolay Vshiniyakov), representative director, and Yukihide Hashimoto, vice director of Sonico, a Japanese-Soviet joint venture, by unidentified Moscow Radio reporter]

[Text] First, a Moscow Radio reporter asked: Two years have already passed since Sonico was established. What business achievements has the company scored during these past two years? Answering this question, Mr (Nikolay Vshiniyakov) said as follows: [(Vshiniyakov) remarks in Russian heard briefly, fading into announcer's Japanese translation; announcer translates and paraphrases remarks by (Vshiniyakov)] Looking back over the past two years, we have faced difficulties and made mistakes. At long last, we are now able to bring about positive results. Sonico has been engaged in the business of catching fish and processing it in the small village of De-Kastri in Khabarovsk. We have come to realize that it is not proper to carry out business by catching only [word indistinct] in a relatively small area. Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that it is indispensable to increase the number of participating enterprises in the joint venture. At first, we began business with the Fish Consumption Cooperative in Khabarovsk. Now, the fisheries kolkhoz in the Maritime Kray is our business partner. In the past, we simply thought of catching fish and primary processing. Now, however, as a major business goal, we plan to fully process fish. We are also planning to construct fish processing plants in coastal areas. We have already concluded a series of agreements with the kolkhoz in the Maritime Kray for the construction of fish-processing complexes. Under these agreements, one fish-processing complex will be built near Nakhodka. We also plan to participate in activities designed to develop the free economic zone in Nakhodka. We have plans to participate in the construction of refrigeration plants and fish-processing complexes, Mr. (Vshiniyakov) said.

Asked if the Soviet Far East region will be a strategic business point for the joint venture, Mr. (Vshiniyakov) said that, as far as the catch and fish-processing are concerned, the Far East Region, Khabarovsk and the Maritime Kray, are principal fisheries areas for the Soviet Union. However, we are expanding our business to the Soviet European region. For example, we are providing assistance to kolkhoz engaged in fishing business in coastal areas of the Baltic Sea. We are helping the kolkhoz catch and process fish. Last year, with our assistance, the fishing gear of 26 trawlers was renovated. Their catch has substantially increased since their gear was renovated. In addition, our joint-venture company is providing repair service for imported communications apparatuses and electronic fishing gear. We have opened this sort of service center in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Khabarovsk. In the near future, we are are preparing to open a service center in Sochi, Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok, and Nakhodka. In the future, we plan to set up service centers across the Soviet Union, Mr. (Vshiniyakov) said.

Asked why Japanese enterprises are cautious about setting up joint ventures with the Soviet Union, Yukihide Hashimoto, vice director of Sonico said: A Japanese company called Nissoboeki [Japan-Soviet Trade Company] is one of the first Japanese companies to have formed joint ventures with the Soviet Union. This is Sonico. Nissoboeki [words indistinct].

Hashimoto said: Regarding the indication that Japan enterprises have thus far formed only a small number of joint ventures with the Soviet Union, Japan in general has been forming many joint ventures with foreign nations, but formation of joint ventures with foreign nations is small compared with the United States, Germany, and other nations. I think there is some reason why Japan cannot go out for foreign business. In that sense, although Japanese enterprises have made business inroads into foreign nations, including the Soviet Union, they remain small compared with Europe and the United States. I think there are various reasons for this phenomenon. As I mentioned a while ago, I feel that the there is a strong factor for this trend in Japan compared with Europe and the United States. On the other hand, you asked if there were any problems or difficulties in carrying out joint-venture business in the Soviet Union. The most difficult thing facing, not only Japanese and other nations' businessmen [word indistinct] is laws and regulations. In Japan, for example, we have no problems if we fully understand them. In the case of the Soviet Union, it has very different system, and we need to read a large volume of documents. This is very difficult for us. Therefore, in general, there are many difficulties for foreigners doing business in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Nissoboeki has four joint-venture businesses [words indistinct]. I think a joint venture, in which I have recently been engaged, will grow into a large business. Nissoboeki has abundant experience of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. In that sense, although there is risk, we have the intention, and have already decided to do business in the Soviet Union.

CPSU Greets Japanese Socialist Party Congress

PM0404101790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[CPSU Central Committee undated greetings message to 55th Japanese Socialist Party Congress]

[Text] To the 55th JSP [Japanese Socialist Party] Congress

The CPSU Central Committee greets the delegates to the 55th JSP Congress.

Your forum has gathered in a situation of profound changes which the world community is experiencing. Dialogue and talks are becoming the dominant factor in international relations. Preconditions are emerging for a new upsurge of the socialist movement on a modern basis and for cooperation among all trends and shades of socialist thought.

The many years' positive experience of CPSU-JSP relations confirms the reality and fruitfulness of such a prospect. The bonds of comradeship between our parties serve mutual understanding and good-neighborliness between the peoples of the USSR and Japan, the shaping of a secure and stable world order, and constructive processes in the Asia and Pacific region.

We wish your congress success.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee.

Mongolian Premier Thanks Ryzhkov for Message

PM0404090590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 7

[Mongolian Premier Gungaadorj undated message thanking USSR Premier Ryzhkov for congratulations on his appointment]

[Text] To Comrade Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

Deeply esteemed Comrade Ryzhkov,

I am cordially grateful to you for your warm congratulations and good wishes.

We are sure that the traditional relations of fraternal friendship and all-around close cooperation between the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] and the USSR will continue to develop and strengthen on the basis of equal rights and mutual advantage for the good of our two peoples. I will make every effort to attain this lofty goal.

I take this opportunity to wish you great successes in your responsible activity in the name of progress and the prosperity of the Soviet Union and its peoples and in the interests of world peace.

With respect,

[Signed] Sh. Gungaadorj, chairman of the MPR Council of Ministers.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Vietnamese Workers in USSR Not To Increase

PM0404094590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[B. Vinogradov dispatch under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment": "'Son Tay' Breaks Off Contract"]

[Text] Hanoi—At present more than 270,000 Vietnamese workers are working abroad under bilateral intergovernmental agreements, including in the Soviet Union, in the countries of East Europe, and in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. But whereas this sphere of cooperation used to be considered "quite successful," now it is increasingly attracting critical attention from the local press here.

Thus, TIEN PHONG, which provides consistent and regular coverage of this subject, notes that crisis phenomena, along with the deterioration of the economic situation in a number of East European countries, are having a definite effect on the situation of SRV citizens working there as hired labor. The latest illustration of this was the tale of the 150 Vietnamese girls who went to Poland last year under a contract with the private "Topmart" factory signed by Hanoi's "Son Tay" sewn garments association. Trouble with accommodation and job placement began as soon as the recruits arrived on site. The newspaper reports that, in breach of many of the terms of the contract, the factory owners failed to fulfill a whole series of pledges they had made. The girls were not provided with suitable housing and a sufficient amount of work in their speciality; hence many were only given work for two or three hours a day or were idle altogether. Naturally this method of organization also affected their wages.

The Vietnamese seamstresses wrote in their letters that, given the general high cost of living in the country and the constant rise in the price of food, their earnings were sometimes barely enough to feed themselves, let alone buy manufactured goods. A commission arrived from Hanoi to check out these complaints, but was unable to change anything. The "Son Tay" association therefore was recently compelled unilaterally to break off the contract with "Topmart's" owners and demand that all 150 workers be sent home.

This is not the only case where Vietnamese workers have found themselves in such a poverty-stricken humiliating situation abroad. The newspaper cited similar examples at enterprises in other countries.

Of course, I was told at the SRV Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, problems arising from the export of manpower are not solely confined to the aforementioned adverse phenomena. There are often people among the Vietnamese abroad who breach labor discipline and the laws of the country of residence. Faced with an alien lifestyle, young people often get involved in speculation or just commit criminal offenses, hiding from local bodies charged with the preservation of public order. Mindful of all these facts and taking a realistic view of the prospects, a number of SRV National Assembly deputies have demanded a considerable reduction in the number of Vietnamese workers abroad or at any rate that there be no increase in their numbers before the scheduled dates.

As for Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, Tran Dinh Hoan, minister of labor and social welfare, pointed out during a conversation with me, it has been decided by a mutual accord to keep the number of Vietnamese workers in the USSR this year at the previous level—approximately 84,000—rather than increase it further. These business ties between us were previously seen as "assistance in cadre training and vocational instruction." Now it is customary to describe it more accurately as "cooperation in use of manpower." Tran Dinh Hoan stressed that it is based on mutual advantage and mutual responsibility.

Filipino Court Rules on U.S. Base Jurisdiction

HK0404050990 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Commentary by Anatoliy Aleksandrov]

[Text] The Philippines' highest tribunal, the Supreme Court, has issued a ruling on the matter of jurisdiction over the American military bases and their personnel and civilians. Prior to this Supreme Court decision, American servicemen in the bases did not come under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court in the Philippines, hence their immunity from prosecution. Philippine laws were flouted whenever these men committed crimes or misdemeanors.

In the past, whenever crimes like ordinary and sexual assault were committed by the American servicemen in their bases in Olongapo and Angeles, the men went scot-free. Reports were that American servicemen often engaged in assault and battery, particularly against Filipinos who happened to be inside the bases.

Those Filipinos who reported these acts to the authorities only met problems and headaches. This was confirmed in an article in the MANILA TIMES which reported an incident where a U.S. mobile patrol burned down some houses near the bases.

A Philippine-American Commission has been set up because of increasing violations of Philippine law by American servicemen. At the commission's first meeting, discussion centered on which local court would try servicemen who committed crimes outside the bases. This matter [break in transmission] by the head of the military base.

Another problem involves the use by the servicemen of special certificates stating that they are on certain missions. In this way, they can claim immunity.

Because of the injustice experienced by victims of crimes committed by American servicemen, several have filed cases in the Supreme Court. One decision passed by the Court stated that international justice should benefit all citizens of the country. When Filipinos in the United States commit crimes, they face American courts; hence Americans should not be immune from similar justice.

Therefore the decision passed by the Supreme Court is the right one—a logical and practical ruling.

Near East & South Asia

Commentary Criticizes Husayn Statement on Israel

LD0304153790 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Excerpts] President Saddam Husayn of Iraq has stated that his country possesses effective chemical weapons and in the case of an Israeli attack would be ready to commit half of Israel to the flames. Aleksandr Pogodin has this commentary:

Enough has been said about the conflicts and tense situation in the Middle East. [passage omitted] Each situation has its specific features and its solution calls for specific ways, but the experience of the past few years shows that settlement of regional conflicts must be based on a single universal principle, that is a desire for a dialogue, a search for a compromise, and a display of reserve by all sides. On that basis, good progress has been made in the Middle East. [passage omitted]

But the progress made is still uncertain. That is why the sides must spare no effort to preserve their achievements and move forward. Clearly, it's very easy to give way to one's emotions, especially when daily statements and actions by Tel Aviv prompt you to do so.

I'm in no position to advise the leaders of other nations, Aleksandr Pogodin concludes, but in my view, the statement by Saddam Husayn is not in the spirit of our times and could impede the Middle East settlement process.

Lukyanov Interviewed Before Departure for India

LD0304165790 Moscow TASS in English 1602 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Anatoliy Lukyanov departs from Moscow for New Delhi this evening on an official visit at the invitation of the Indian leadership.

He will be accompanied by Yuriy Platonov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Construction and head of the Union of Soviet Architects, Yuriy Skokov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the Economic Reform, Valentin Pokrovskiy, president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, and Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy foreign minister.

In an interview with TASS given before the departure, Lukyanov stressed that it is the first Soviet top-level visit to India for talks with its new leadership.

Lukyanov will visit India between April 4 and 8.

Arrival in India Noted

LD0404054890 Moscow TASS in English 0411 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] New Delhi April 4 TASS—Supreme Soviet chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov arrived here today on an official visit at the invitation of the Indian leadership.

At New Dehlhi's airport, Lukyanov was welcomed by Rabi Ray, speaker of the Indian parliament's lower house, and other officials.

Voronov on Jewish Emigration, Cypriot Situation

LD0304222490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1836 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Nicosia, 3 Apr (TASS)—The Mediterranean basin remains one of the hotbeds of tension and does not, in effect, share in the positive processes that are now gathering strength in the world in general and on the European Continent in particular. This was stated by Yu.P. Voronov, a USSR people's deputy and secretary of the board of the Writers' Union, a member of the Soviet delegation, while he was addressing a session of the commission on political matters, international security, and disarmament within the framework of the 83rd conference of the Interparliamentary Union, taking place in the Cypriot capital. Soviet proposals on the issue, put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, remain in force and are of a long-term nature, he stressed. Their objective is to lower the level of military confrontation and to turn the Mediterranean into a zone of lasting peace and international cooperation. The Soviet parliamentarian indicated that the continuing bloodshed in Lebanon and Israel's plans to use the immigrants, including those from the USSR, who are arriving in that country, to settle the occupied Arab territories are currently the focal point of events in the Middle East.

Touching on the Cyprus problem, he declared that the Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, actively supports the persistent efforts to settle the Cyprus situation that are being made by that international organization and its secretary general.

Sub-Saharan Africa

USSR Fueling Ethiopian War Through 'Inertia'

PM3003152790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent G. Ustinov dispatch: "Ethiopian Version. How Our Cooperation Is Developing in the Military Sphere"]

[Text] Addis Ababa—There are many fewer of them, of course, than our "Afghan" POW's There are only three of them. But 18 March marked the second anniversary of their captivity. They are said to be alive and well. It is just not known when they will be freed.

They are Lieutenant Colonel Ye.I. Churayev, Lieutenant Colonel Yu.P. Kalistratov, and interpreter A.V. Kuvaldin. On the night of 17-18 March 1988 an Ethiopian mountain infantry division command post in the village of Kemechiwa near the city of Afabet was captured during a surprise attack by Eritrean rebels. Three of our officers who were there at the time were taken prisoner.

There might have been far more Soviet POW's at that time in March. During that same Eritrean attack another 13 of our compatriots were cut off from their men. They were mustered by Colonel V.S. Nosenko. The group hid safely in an inaccessible place. It was decided to send a messenger with a request for aid. Junior Sergeant K. Gopkin, a radio operator by specialization, made his way back to base over three days without food and water. When he arrived, he could not even speak, he could only point to a point on the map where the men were hiding. Mi-8 combat helicopters were sent to the area right away. They landed with difficulty, under fire from the Eritreans. One helicopter was burned out, but it proved possible to get everyone out—both the Soviet and the two Ethiopian servicemen who had found themselves surrounded.

But let us return to our prisoners. Like all Soviet people working in Ethiopia, I have of course known of their story for a long time. I have sat down at my typewriter on several occasions to write about them... "Then you'll have to admit our military presence in Ethiopia," I was told. However, this objection recently disappeared...

Throughout this time the USSR Foreign Ministry has been insistently trying to help the "Afabet three." But Isaias Afewerki, leader of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF], who promised in principle to return the POW's, is setting more and more conditions. First, he demands that we cease our military shipments to Ethiopia, then he claims that he cannot settle this question independently without an EPLF plenum, although there have been several of these plenums. Another condition is that the three officers be exchanged for Eritreans in Ethiopian jails.

At any rate the question is still open. That is the "Ethiopian version" of Soviet POW problems to date.

Of course, the reader asks: What in fact are our military men doing in Ethiopia? Incidentally, the U.S. BOSTON GLOBE asked this same question recently and tried to answer it. An article published this March claims that there were 15,000 Soviet military specialists and advisers on Ethiopian territory last May but thast their numbers have dropped and there are now 7,000 of them "according to Western officials' figures."

Let me be blunt and say that these figures are more than just a little too high. The number of our advisers in Ethiopia has never run into thousands. Only hundreds. But they are there. I have written in IZVESTIYA (No. 55) about Soviet-Ethiopian military cooperation. It is based on a bilateral agreement and is designed, according to the official wording, to help build the Ethiopian Armed Forces with a view to repulsing foreign aggression. The advisers are part of this assistance.

The history of this question dates back to 1977 when war broke out between Ethiopia and neighboring Somalia. Both countries were our friends, both favored the socialist path of development and had received political, economic, and other support from us. The USSR then supported Ethiopia. It was given urgent military aid: Weapons consignments, specialists. Real aid. In February-March 1978 Ethiopian troops ousted the Somalis from the territory of Ogaden, which they had occupied.

I must say that not only the Soviet Union but also Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Poland, and Bulgaria came to Ethiopia's aid at that time. Perhaps that is why the war was short-lived and—although an Ethiopian-Somali agreement was only signed in 1988—there were effectively no more combat operations between the two countries.

Military aid to Ethiopia, however, continued. Our MiG's, Mi-8's, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, small arms, and munitions went there. Military specialists also went along. The agreement in this specific sphere was long-term, and we thoroughly fulfilled our pledges.

Although our military cooperation is no secret to anyone in the West, it was always taboo in our press. But last year the situation changed radically. Headlines like "Excessively Generous Aid and "Secret Paragraph in the Budget" began to appear in our newspapers. An article entitled "Unique Document. Whom We Gave 85.8 billion (R) on Credit" appeared in IZVESTIYA 1 March. A table containing a list of our debtors took center stage. Last on the list—alphabetically but by no means in terms of the size of its debt—was Ethiopia.

What was the cost of our military aid to that country—cautiously described as "assistance"? The table submitted by the USSR Ministry of Finance did not mention this outright. But the simple calculation can be done. Ethiopia owes us a total of R2.8605 billion. Military outlay occupies the lion's share of this sum.

Thus, I repeat the official wording: Soviet-Ethiopian military cooperation is designed to assist the building of the Ethiopian Armed Forces with a view to repulsing external aggression. There has been none of this external aggression for a long time now. But our aid continues.. Of course, it would be very hard for the Ethiopian Army to put up a fight in the struggle against the EPLF and TPLF [Tigre People's Liberation Front] without it. But

nonetheless the bilateral agreement does not make provision for our involvement in an internal conflict that has dragged on for years....

The results of this involvement are extremely distinctive. The government's army and combat groupings from the opposing sides are now fighting one another using the same weapons—Soviet weapons. During the large-scale offensive operations of recent years Eritreans and TPLF fighters have captured whole arsenals of arms and munitions from Ethiopian troops. Apart from aircraft, they have everything that the regular Ethiopian Army has—tanks, guns, missiles.

During the two-week war this February the Eritreans, according to their statements, which have been confirmed by Western agencies, seized or destroyed more than 50 tanks. The insurgents recently shot down two of our fighters belonging to the Ethiopian Army. Possibly using our missiles?

The Ethiopian Army previously lost fewer tanks. The tank operators were Cubans. But last year Cuba withdrew all its military specialists from the combat zone and from the periphery altogether. Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Bulgaria, and Poland put a stop to most of their aid to Ethiopia. What about us?

Of course, it cannot be said that nothing is changing in this sphere. It is said that our advisers and specialists have been withdrawing from the combat zone—and from the periphery altogether—for more than a year now. Their numbers have been cut—extremely considerably, moreover—THE BOSTON GLOBE was not mistaken on that point.

Well, if that is the case, it is high time. I am one of those people who believes that arms dealing is evil. But if arms are sold, it must be with clear realization of why and for what interests—political or economic. A simply stunning situation is developing at present sometimes. For instance, Israel recently conducted a favorable financial operation here. It sold Ethiopia 100,000 of our Kalashnikov submachineguns. They were captured as a trophy in the seven-day war with Egypt in 1967. The Israelis mothballed them and the submachineguns have now come in handy. It is said that these weapons will be paid for in cash, in hard currency.

As for our aid, every Soviet person working in Ethiopia knows that we will hardly receive anything from there in exchange for our military assistance. Our Ethiopian partners count on our disinterest and internationalism.

That is how things stand with the economic side of the question. As for the political aspect, there is food for thought here. It would, of course, be irresponsible to call for an unthinking severance of existing alliances and the destruction of current ties. No self-respecting state would act like that. But we should hardly continue an extremely ruinous and not very effective war automatically through force of inertia.

How should we build our relations, our cooperation with Ethiopia (and with other developing states, moreover); in what volumes and in what form should our military support be offered—all these questions demand new answers in a new era.

East Europe

Honeckers Moved to Soviet Military Hospital

LD0304165690 Hamburg DPA in German 1607 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—According to a report from the BILD newspaper, Erich Honecker, former chairman of the GDR Council of State, and his wife Margot were taken to a Soviet military hospital this morning. According to this information, the couple was taken by a Soviet military convoy from the pastor's house in Lobetal, north of Berlin, to the Soviet sanatorium in Beelitz. The move, BILD reports, took place at Honecker's personal request. His state of health has continued to worsen.

Article Examines Struggles of Polish Communists

PM2903153590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent V. Runov dispatch for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "Bitter Fruit. Rank-and-File Communists Must Pay for the Party Leadership's Passiveness"]

[Text] Warsaw—Speaking on the evening television news last January in an unremarkable interview about her creative success, the well-known Polish actress Joanna Szczepkowska, suddenly—at the end of her two-minute monologue—congratulated the viewers with childlike ingenuousness on the end of the communist era in Poland, and it became clear that this statement was no accident.

One might not have attached great significance to this event, since what the actress said with great pathos was as far-removed from common sense as the shining ideals of communism are from Polish reality. But it turned out that she was not hitting out at a "philosophical weight" but at specific people—those people who were members of the 2 million-strong Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] until quite recently.

The fate of more than 10,000 party officials, 8,350 of whom have lost their jobs, is now taking a dramatic turn. Most of them have been trying since February just to sort out their lives somehow, but all their attempts have proved to be in vain. The problem is getting complicated by the fact that Leszek Miller, general secretary of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], successor of the PZPR, was forced at the beginning of March to issue a statement in which he announced that people whose views are akin to those espoused by

left-wing forces have been persecuted, citing alarm signals from primary organizations. According to him, dissent is more and more frequently becoming an object of organized persecution, slander, and attempts to discredit the professional qualities of former PZPR members, which is in most cases the pro forma excuse for refusing many of them employment.

You do not have to look far for examples. An old friend of mine, a former senior staffer on the PZPR Central Committee who previously worked at Warsaw University and was, under existing legislation, considered to have been posted to party work, was refused a job in his old place of work. The university rector said that he could put his former teacher back in the job but that he would be dismissed the following day. The letter of the law was observed, the rest is of concern to no one.

It is still not clear who will defend the rights, honor, and dignity of those citizens who have not renounced their convictions. The SdRP is still very weak; the new left-wing party is being established under complex conditions. It has still not assumed its own personality. It now numbers approximately 50,000 persons in its ranks. The SdRP may be said to have taken its place among a host of small parties of various hues, which are now emerging in Poland in their droves. Barely more than 50 people work in the central apparatus and voivodship committee staffs number 3-5 persons each. The SdRP inherited a debt of 25 million zloty [Z], which it must pay back to Poland's Finance Ministry; in addition it must spend another Z6 billion from the party budget by way of compensation to party officials who have been dismissed.

A very complex situation is developing in connection with former PZPR property which has been inherited by the SdRP. A large proportion of party buildings have turned out not to have been registered in law as PZPR property and, therefore, all this real estate has automatically been transferred to the state. Thus more than 1,600 facilities have been lost, along with furniture and other equipment which could have been sold or leased for a sizeable amount of money. Of more than 2,000 buildings belonging to the PZPR, only approximately three dozen were registered as its property. Even the vast PZPR Central Committee building in the very center of Warsaw, which was built from Communists' donations, has to be handed back to the government since it stands on land leased from the state. It is also too big now for the new party's central apparatus.

It has become quite obvious at this time that left-wing forces in Poland are experiencing a serious crisis—they no longer exert a significant influence on the development of the situation in the country. The "Solidarity" leadership which came to the "roundtable" with the Communists realized that the PZPR's main aim was to elaborate an agreement that would enable the Communists to retain their positions and at the same time to hold the country back from a social explosion. The party could only have achieved this by succeeding in rapidly adapting to those rules of play which it itself suggested during the "roundtable" talks. "Solidarity" only accepted these conditions because the Army and the security service were at that time behind the party. As a result of the accords the PZPR gained time to restructure itself but it has virtually disappeared from the country's political map after failing to do this in an opportune manner.

It only took a few months for the evolutionary process of PZPR disintegration to end in its self-disbandment. After spending the agreed time at the last congress, Polish Army delegates failed to put in an appearance at the SdRP constituent congress, thus demonstrating that they refused to prop up left-wing forces in the political struggle. Professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Civil Parliamentary Club and a prominent "Solidarity" ideologist, admitted frankly that its leaders were not ready to take power so quickly, they were expecting a transitional period which should have ended by the time of the elections to organs of territorial self-management. According to opposition calculations, this period would have resulted in tens and even hundreds of thousands of people becoming more politically active and taking part in the evolutionary process of forming a new system of power,.

However, everything went differently. Last September Prime Minister Mazowiecki quickly formed a government and embarked on radical reforms of the political system. Today virtually all the key posts within the state apparatus are held by "Solidarity" representatives. There was no explicit purge of the lower echelons of power, possibly because there was no clear opposition to the changes taking place in the country. But new masters have long since taken their seats in the largest and most spacious offices, in particular the Council of Ministers.

Malgorzata Nezabitowska, the new authorities' press spokesman, now works in an office which was formerly occupied by Jerzy Urban, the PZPR government press attache. This young energetic woman mastered her new role very rapidly. She gave a purely female answer to a question about the kind of political system the new authorities intended to build: "I regard socialism and capitalism as being equally unsympathetic." However, when the conversation turned to specific matters, the minister clearly outlined her government's intentions. According to her, the authorities are trying to create a system of "parliamentary democracy" based on Western models, the cornerstone of which will be local self-management bodies. A free market will rule supreme in the economy. The authorities intend to carry out extensive privatization of fixed capital.

What place is there for left-wing forces in this system? The Polish Sejm, which adopted an unprecedented decision to wind up the "Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch" workers publishing cooperative, which the SdRP inherited from the PZPR, and to sell off the property belonging to it, answered this question quite convincingly a few days ago. This publishing concern with a staff of 40,000

people comprised dozens of editorial offices and printing houses. The SdRP has, as a result of its liquidation, lost a major source of revenue; it brought in approximately Z100 billion in profit every year. The adoption of this law provoked a vehement protest among left-wing forces. The SdRP Central Executive Committee immediately published a statement, pointing out that "Solidarity" has once again used the law as an instrument to achieve its own political ends, adopting an extraordinary law with flagrant disregard for the opinion of the cooperative's shareholders. The statement stresses that it is above all a question of eliminating newspapers which wrote critically about rising unemployment, declining output, and lack of confidence among the population in the future.

"I personally will take care to ensure that TRIBUNA—the SdRP organ—does not cease to exist, since we need an opposition," T. Mazowiecki promised in an interview with this newspaper.

The question journalists ask is: "How will the rest of the opposition press fare if the premier does not have enough time or inclination to show them mercy?"

Slovaks Upset Over New Name for Czechoslovakia

PM0404100790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 3 Apr 90 pp 1,6

[Stanislav Vtorushin dispatch under the "Abroad" rubric: "Unexpected Conflict"]

[Excerpts] Prague—One would hardly have thought that a national conflict could arise owing to just one hyphen in a word in Czechoslovakia.

But this is what happened after Federal Assembly delegates adopted a law on the new name of the republic. It has already been announced that the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is now to be called the Czechoslovak Federative Republic. In Bohemia the word "Czechoslovakia" is written as one word, while in Slovakia there is a hyphen between the "Czecho" and the "Slovakia."

Is it that important, one would have thought, how this word is written. Especially since the Federal Assembly's coordinating commission proposed—and deputies accepted this—that every republic would write the word "Czechoslovakia" in accordance with the grammatical features of the native language there. Both titles have equal legal force. But the compromise solution for the name provoked a vehement protest among some of the Slovak population. They saw this as national discrimination and violation of the rights and dignity of the Slovak people.

Straight after the Federal Assembly session—it ended late in the evening—groups of protestors began to gather in Bratislava. The next day a crowd of several thousand people gathered outside the republic parliament building—the Slovak National Council. A petition was read out, saying that the Czech people do not recognize the Slovak people's existence before the rest of the world and this was allegedly confirmed once again by the Federal Assembly decision. The demonstrators demanded that all Slovak deputies who voted for the parliament's decision be recalled immediately and urged the Slovak National Council to begin discussing the question of full sovereignty and independence for the Slovak people. [passage omitted].

It must be said that most of the population of Slovakia are not involved in the disturbances. However, certain forces in this republic have exploited the situation that has arisen and are endeavoring to reap political capital from it. It is the right moment since parliamentary elections will be held in the country in just over two months.

In order to achieve their aims and drive a wedge between the two peoples, they are putting about most varied fantasies. For instance, it is claimed that, when industrializing Slovakia (before the war it was the most backward and the poorest region of the country), it was specially done so that mainly primary processing of raw materials developed here. And manufactured output, above all machine building output, was produced in the Czech Republic.

The country's largest metallurgical combine, which operates, incidentally, using Soviet ore, has indeed been built in Slovakia. However, many electronics industry, modern chemistry, and machine-building enterprises are also concentrated here.

But the conflict has revealed one thing very clearly: There are considerable problems in relations between the two peoples, including mistrust and mutual suspicion. If an incipient crisis situation has arisen owing to the way one word was written, what turn may events take if the country really suffers difficult ordeals?

The conflict was the first serious test of the new Czechoslovak leadership for endurance and statesmanship. Ways are currently being sought to solve it.

Progress of CPCZ, 'Velvet Revolution' Viewed

LD3003200890 Moscow International Service in Czech 1500 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] As you know, the report of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee concerning the objective evaluation of the events of 1968-69 and subsequent developments in Czechoslovakia has been published. This is what Valentin Aleksandrov, Moscow Radio commentator writes in this connection:

I consider the thesis of the report of this commission as very important at the present time. It examines almost the whole of history of the CPCZ, especially in the period following 1968, and to a certain extent it has set out its political line within the overall democratic movement. It is no secret that the CPCZ and its Central Committee,

the primary organizations and individual communists must now work under quite difficult conditions. For them the velvet revolution means moral pressure, being made redundant for their political conviction. This campaign, as you know, is increasing, and is continually harder.

Why is this? It would seem that the political opponents of the CPCZ have achieved what they wanted. The party no longer plays the same role as before. The criticism of the CPCZ and its policy appears to be more and more a settling of accounts. In this respect, the speech of Czech Premier Pithart on television is significant. He accused the CPCZ of not yet admitting its responsibility for the mistakes in the management of Czechoslovak society. Does this statement correspond to the truth? Judging by the published thesis of the commission, of course not. The party rejected those political concepts and those who held them; those concepts caused considerable damage to life in the country and deeply discreditted the ideal of socialism in Czechoslovak society. Is this criticism of the CPCZ not well known? It should be, just as it should be known that the CPCZ has rid itself of those who bear responsibility for the erroneous political course, for misusing power and official position. Now people with new thinking have entered the leadership of the CPCZ. They are energetically undertaking restructuring in the party; they are decisively bound by democratic principles in their activity. Restructuring in the CPCZ is already bearing fruit. Its undermined positions are strengthening. Many leading officials of the country are clearly concerned about this, for them somewhat unexpected, process. Parliamentary elections are not far away and Civic Forum is embroiled with conflicts. For this reason they are concerned, as they are unsure of the outcome of the elections. This is the reason for a further wave of attacks on the communists. Despite this, the CPCZ is consistently undertaking steps of fundamental change, as stated in the thesis, and it is gradually changing into a contemporary left-wing party which wishes to become a part of a new domestic political system.

Anticommunist 'Witch-Hunt' in CSSR Noted

LD0204184990 Moscow International Service in Czech 1500 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Commentary by Valentin Aleksandrov]

[Text] A vendetta or a dubious political game? However paradoxical this may sound, the time that has passed since the well-known events in November has turned the velvet revolution into something much more crude. Where are the students' posters of those days which were warning "Eye for eye and the nation will weaken"? They have gone and are no longer seen in the growing anticommunist bacchanalias.

I would like to remind you of what the student weekly BULVAR wrote in the article "The Communist World—A Threat to All Mankind". It is a great evil, the weekly shouts hysterically, for which an effective antidote can only be found with great difficulty. It can be compared with AIDS. All its carriers should be isolated in some kind of a hidden corner, where all Lenin's statues should also be taken.

Thus says the student weekly BULVAR. Do not these ideas and expressions remind you by any chance of speeches in Munich beer halls shortly before the Nazis came to power? All this could be regarded as a silly joke of extremist-minded youngsters if the facts did not exist and these facts are mentioned in almost every third or fourth letter sent to Radio Moscow by our listeners.

For instance, Rudolf Volny from Vyskov writes bitterly: You apparently know how Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] members are being persecuted today. For our listeners' information: We are aware of this, how could we not, because there have been far too many such cases involving people dismissed from their job who have no chance of finding another one.

Everything communist must be liquidated; such is the policy of the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, which proclaim democracy, freedom, and equality for all and fraternity only, and only, in words. The reality is however different.

Vladimir Kostiha points out that because of the mistakes of the former leadership, rank-and-file communists are now persecuted, and there have been many such letters.

The question cannot but arise, is this a spontaneous explosion or are these actions being deliberately directed by someone's hand? The former CPCZ leadership did really commit mistakes. There were abuses of power. But there also existed positive aspects, above all in the social field, which the bourgeoisie was formerly unable to boast about. Communists had enemies but also numerous friends among people without any political affiliation. Could all of them have now become their implacable enemies? One could hardly believe this.

There naturally exist examples of settling personal accounts, of vendettas. I would, however, rather look at the political motives in the anticommunist campaign, in the deliberate witch-hunt against the CPCZ and its members. Certain groups in the leadership of Civic Forum and Public Against Violence cannot disregard the fact that now, after casual members have left the party, the CPCZ has more than 1 million members. And how many are there who sympathise with it? How many are there who believe in the ideals of socialism? It is a solid force which is able to manifest itself in the coming elections, and this is apparently the real reason for the artificial fanning of anticommunism.

West Europe

German Professor on German Reunification Terms

PM0304105190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Doctor of Philosophy Professor Fridrikh Kumpf under the rubric "'For' and 'Against' United Germany": "Is It All That Simple?"]

[Text] In an interview under the heading "'For' and 'Against' a United Germany" in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 February 1990, Professor D.M. Proektor examines possible problems connected with the unification of Germany or, to be more precise, their absence. According to his viewpoint, this most serious political process in postwar Europe is not attended by substantial contradictions. This interpretation cannot but perplex me. What follows does not concern the question of being "for" or "against" unification. I fully agree with Prof. Proektor that there is no alternative to the creation of a united Germany in the historical situation which has specifically taken shape. The German people have the same rights to national self determination as other peoples and there is no longer any doubt that in their majority they are expressing themselves in favor of a united German state.

Nor do I have any disagreements with Prof. Proektor regarding the real military threat. If the point of his article is that the unification of the two German states which is taking place does not contain the direct danger of a new war for the re-partition of Europe, then I can agree. But the serious complications accompanying this process do not rule out undesirable consequences. And in this respect Prof. Proektor's replies seem excessively simplified.

As for the first question, it is not difficult to predict that as a result of unification and consequently the collapse of one postwar border many Germans will alter their view of the state of modern borders in general. In recent decades the population has grown accustomed to them and come to terms with them as the inevitable and unshakable result of the war. The same applied to the partition of Germany. Only a year ago no one could seriously suppose that overcoming this partition would be a reality of the immediate future. But the situation has changed drastically. With the destruction of the "Berlin Wall" the usual view of postwar European borders has also collapsed. It has turned out that they can be changed quite easily.

This cannot fail to influence the feelings of some Germans, and not only those who nurture revanchist illusions. A skillfully inserted spark can cause a raging conflagration of new German nationalism based on territorial claims.

I predict that Prof. Proektor will object, using words in his interview: "I have a negative attitude toward such predictions... I have known and know the Germans not only from the war years." I do not doubt that he has rich experience of communicating with the Germans. Indeed, in the past 40 years the Germans have changed substantially. Unfortunately, this gratifying fact, which can indeed have fundamental importance for future events, does not rule out two other circumstances, which cannot be dismissed.

First, these changes in national awareness have affected people's individual awareness with varying degrees of depth. And the nationalist wave raised by the process of unification can, where the changes have not been particularly deep, easily wash them away. This wave will be all the stronger the more rapidly the unification process proceeds. As a result a certain section of the population of both German states may be very receptive to new nationalist ideas.

Second, it is essential to consider the many centuries' history of the nationalities question in the world in general, including the Soviet Union. It has turned out that the nationality as an objective social quantity has far greater weight in people's consciousness and practical deeds than it seemed to many people.

National problems can at any time in appropriate circumstances move from a concealed form to a form of acute conflict. To think that for the population of Germany, which as a result of Hitler's criminal policy was deprived of a considerable part of its former territory, this problem does not exist in concealed form means to be profoundly in error. Of course, it may happen like that or some other way. But the main thing is that this possibility is entirely real and real possibilities must be considered in politics. Tomorrow's Europe may be perturbed not so much by the question of its own integration as by the territorial claims of one EC member on other members.

If this possibility cannot be ruled out, it is essential to display a very circumspect approach toward the elaboration of the terms for Germany's unification and not to dismiss the problems which arise, as Prof. Proektor does.

For instance, I cannot understand why the professor treats so lightly the FRG federal chancellor's persistent reluctance to give a firm guarantee regarding the eastern border of the future Germany. He says this is of no importance since talks on the subject still lie ahead. Of course that is so and in the past few days the situation has already changed somewhat because of the fact that H. Kohl, to judge by newspaper reports, has, under pressure from various forces, reviewed his resistance to the idea of the simultaneous recognition by both German parliaments of the inviolability of the border along the Oder and Neisse. But that in itself does not remove the actual problem. The prolonged resistance of such an influential politician shows that the attitude toward this border is far from the same even among FRG ruling circles.

Another argument is also being heard: Germany can give a firm guarantee of the inviolability of its Eastern

borders only after unification. And if it does not give this guarantee? No one will be able then to force the new state in central Europe to do so. Here we must bear in mind that on the wave of national euphoria which inevitably accompanies unification the future all-German government may be in an even more difficult position on this matter. But Prof. Proektor sees no reason for anxiety! Surely he remembers the story of Germany's unguaranteed Eastern borders after World War I?

We have come to the second question, concerning the future Germany's military policy status. At present this question comes down primarily to whether or not the future Germany should be in NATO. Prof. Proektor admits that its membership of NATO could lead to certain difficulties. But, he believes, they are rather on the moral and psychological plane. In other words, the problem is that people may emerge, including in the Soviet Union, who are not prepared to welcome this decision. For his part he does not object to the idea that the future German state may be a NATO member on condition that the present territory of the GDR is not occupied by the allies' troops and subunits of the Soviet Army remain on it. Although this option, approved by Prof. Proektor, has a number of influential supporters and several undoubted advantages, I think it is unsuited to practical implementation. The stationing of NATO troops in just one part of Germany will hardly substantially alter that country's position and importance within the framework of the bloc. The presence of Soviet troops on the territory of a NATO country is hard to imagine as a possibility.

I also assess skeptically the statement that the proposed 1992 change in the nature of state borders between the European countries automatically removes the importance of the borders in East Europe, including those between Germany and its Eastern neighbors. Recent experience attests that where the principle of national statehood has not fully exhausted itself any attempts to consign it with its national borders to historical oblivion is only the fruit of unjustified illusions. I doubt whether in the countries in question this stage of national development has yet arrived.

If it is ruled out that the future Germany will be a NATO member and if the withdrawal of both its parts from military-political blocs in the very near future is not feasible, then we must obviously find a solution which—as long as military blocs exist in Europe—would enable the FRG and the GDR to remain in NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively. That would mean that unification would not take place at all levels simultaneously. It is essential to find a path for unification which would make it possible to implement unification initially in the political, economic and financial, and cultural respects. On the military policy plane both parts of Germany must retain a certain independence or autonomy for a while, including membership of, respectively, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This requires a solution in the political and legal respect which is probably without precedent. It is here that politics can show itself as a creative discipline. The future Germany's membership of both blocs does, of course, presuppose the presence of NATO and USSR troops on its territory. It is these troops which could serve for this time as a guarantee of the military-political status quo in Germany and on its borders.

This situation can, of course, only be temporary. Specific deadlines can be determined by the process of Europe's unification or at least by the creation of a reliable (and not paper) system of European security. A solution is also possible within the framework of a United States of Europe, but the path toward this may be too long.

A transitional settlement could also have beneficial influence on the unification of Europe. After all, the latter is feasible only when there is not the slightest fear or suspicion in relations between the European countries.

The proposed path is, naturally, only one of the options which is being considered, but its advantage is that it considers the interests of all sides.

Latin America & Caribbean

Cuba Rehearses Economic 'State of Emergency'

PM2903114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Kamorin dispatch: "Cuba: 'Special Period' Rehearsal"]

[Text] Havana—Fidel Castro first mentioned the "special period in peacetime" in January this year at the Cuban trade union congress. Since then this term can be heard in Havana literally at every step. It describes the introduction of a state of emergency in the economy necessitated by a partial or total discontinuation of vitally important deliveries to Cuba from East European countries.

These countries account for some 88 percent of the country's foreign trade turnover, with goods from the USSR totaling more 70 percent of this. According to the Cuban leadership, the cutback in economic relations with East European partners which has begun, largely as a result of a cooling of political relations, spells trouble for Cuba. The "special period" will come into force on the island in the event of a substantial reduction of deliveries from the USSR.

I should recall that the Soviet Union fully covers Cuba's requirement for petrochemical products and that the resale of surplus Soviet petroleum on the world market makes up a substantial part of the republic's foreign currency revenue. Grain, flour, mineral fertilizer, metal, textile raw materials, and refrigerators—these are just some of the many goods of which the Soviet Union is the main or only supplier to Cuba. Some 80 percent of the transport facilities used in the country and 70 percent of its machine tools are Soviet-made.

Of late the cooperation mechanism has begun to falter, and this is having a painful effect on the Cuban economy. However, on the whole, the mechanism continues to function and in the sphere of Soviet committments the plans for 1990 are being met. It is true, however, that the current year is the final year of a five-year program for bilateral cooperation, and the negotiations on a plan for the next five-year period are not going as smoothly as in the past, largely as a result of the growing "incompatibility" of economies of which one is developing toward a market system, while the other rejects the market as a "concession to capitalism." Nonetheless, both goverments have declared unambiguously that they intend to maintain a high level of cooperation. So where is the danger? Fidel Castro cites two circumstances as the cause for Cuban concern. First, the threat of the emergence of serious difficulties in the USSR, and second, the possible rise in influence of forces in the Soviet parliament and society as a whole which, in the words of the Cuban leader, are "unquestionably connected with reaction and with imperialism and favor ending this type of economic relations."

The Cuban strategy for overcoming future difficulties is not yet known in detail. However, judging by appearances, it relies once again on the Cubans' enthusiasm, patriotism, and self-sacrifice. F. Castro has emphasized in his speeches that in "special period" conditions the implementation of social programs would be suspended—that is the construction of housing and medical and children's institutions. Production of consumer goods and purchases of these goods abroad would be radically reduced. However, even in these circumstances, Castro claims, "what little we have, will be distributed equally. Even during the 'special period' there will be no beggars."

On the other hand, following the slogan—"Development, Not Just Survival!"—programs designated as priority programs are to continue to develop at the former pace. They include the food program, which incorporates a large-scale land improvement scheme. Construction of new hotels for foreign tourists is continuing, as is the development of prestigious, science-intensive sectors such as genetic engineering and biotechnology. A few days ago the Cuban leader included the preparation and holding of the 1991 Panamerican Games in Havana among the priority programs.

In various parts of the country "rehearsals" for the "special period" are already under way—one-day trial runs of a state of emergency in the economy. In the capital of the republic such an experiment was carried out 15 March. Outwardly the city looked as usual; however, there were noticeably fewer trucks on the streets and water and electricity supplies were somewhat reduced in certain areas. At enterprises shortages of spare parts and fuel were simulated: Factory canteen kitchens and even some metallurgical shops switched to burning wood. At enterprises and construction sites auxiliary mechanisms were installed and many operations were carried out manually. In order to avoid a fall in productivity, management and engineering and technical staff helped out on the shop floor. In agriculture a census of oxen, mules, and manual plows is under way; they will replace tractors during the "special period." At livestock units special attention has been focused on the collection of manure, which is to replace mineral fertilizer if the latter runs short. According to Jorge Lezcano, first secretary of the capital's Communist Party committee, the rehearsal was successful and not only did all the enterprises participating in the experiment fulfill the plan, in a number of cases, the daily targets were even exceeded.

Foreign Ministry on Cuban Human Rights Record

PM2703152290 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 12, 25 Mar 90 p 6

[Interview with USSR Foreign Ministry Department of Humanitarian Relations and Human Rights head Yuriy Reshetov by Aleksandr Makhov: "The Last Manifestation of Double Standards?"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Two events relating to Cuba have come into the media's focus of late. At its session the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva has passed a resolution, criticizing the situation in that Caribbean republic. In its wake, eight people—heads of a group calling themselves the Cuban Party for Human Rights—were arrested in Cuba. MN asked Yuriy Reshetov, in charge of the Department for International Humanitarian Relations and Human Rights of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to comment on these events.

MN: Poland and Czechoslovakia are known to be among the countries that have condemned in their resolution the lack of human rights in Cuba. Bulgaria and Hungary supported the resolution. The USSR and the Ukraine, as they have in the past, voted against the resolution. Why this disagreement with our allies?

Reshetov: First, each country votes the way it feels right. There should be no pressure—such is the Soviet position. Second, it was the fourth discussion of the Cuban topic. The issue took on a confrontational nature in the Commission which couldn't but make a political impact on the resolution and the atmosphere in which it was passed. Besides, we proceeded from the fact that Cuba actively cooperates on human rights with the UN.

MN: But the resolution cites some specific things like the fact that, despite the guarantees it had given the UN, Cuba used reprisals against citizens who had testified before members of the Commission.

Reshetov: In our experience there are frequent exaggerations in such matters. For example, the other day Western representatives handed us another list of so-called Soviet prisoners of conscience. On careful review, there are only 90 persons out of the original list of five hundred. We believe that similar exaggerations can also be true in Cuba's case.

MN: But the official press in Havana also reports arrests of human rights activists (referring to the arrested as counter-revolutionaries). Do we believe, as we did before, that Cuba does not restrict human rights?

Reshetov: You can see for yourself that what happens on that island is being viewed here not so uniformly. There have been some publications in the newspapers...

MN: You have in mind the position of the press. I would like to know what the official Soviet view is.

Reshetov: Many aspects of our foreign policy are being actively revised. There is a gradual revision of that policy as regards the observance of human rights in other countries, including those friendly to us. Going back to the Geneva situation I can say that the Soviet delegation firmly stated in the Commission that it voted the way it did primarily on the strength of the above facts. We are against violations of human rights wherever they happen: in Cuba, the USSR, the USA or any other countries.

Foreign Ministry Official on Guatemala Talks

LD0304202690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1410 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)—The USSR regards in a positive light the holding of a meeting between representatives of the Guatemalan national revolutionary unity [as received] and the government commission for national reconciliation of Guatemala. Yan Burlyay, deputy chief of the directorate for Latin American countries, told a TASS diplomatic correspondent about this today.

This meeting took place in the capital of Norway, Oslo, from 26-30 March. Its main result was the accord on the need to begin talks between the rebels and the Government of Guatemala with the participation of socio-political organizations and the Church in order to put an end to the civil war in that Central American country.

"The fact that the Guatemalan Army not only supported the idea of holding the meeting but for the first time did not demand the disarming of the rebels as an indispensible condition for the start of dialogue deserves to be assessed positively," Yan Burlyay stressed.

"Of course, it is still too early to talk about any great success in the normalization of the situation in the country or the achievement of national reconciliation," the high-ranking Soviet diplomat stated. "However, one would like to hope that the spirit of democratic changes which is becoming established in Central America and the example of the Nicaraguans in holding democratic and free elections and entering into the process of handing over power to the opposition will have the appropriate influence on the opposing sides in Guatemala and will spur them on to engage more actively in seeking political methods of resolving the problems of their country."

USSR-Argentine Commission on Trade Imbalance

PM2603135990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Yu. Smirnov dispatch: "Joint Quest"]

[Text] Buenos Aires—Argentina is our major trading partner in Latin America. In certain years it has accounted for up to 60 percent of Soviet trade with Latin America. However, despite the fact that Argentina has become a major importer of Soviet equipment, our country's considerable purchases of grain, wool, and other agricultural goods have created a tangible imbalance.

The local authorities' strict control over state companies' import operations is carried out under the slogan "Buy Argentine!" This makes Soviet goods dependent on the mood of local officials and sharply limits the initiative of entrepreneurs themselves. However, certain changes are now being recorded.

Realizing that in the long term our bilateral relations cannot be based on a trade imbalance, the Argentines are agreeing to the need to seek new forms of collaboration. It is to that end that a routine session of the Soviet-Argentine Joint Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation has been held in Buenos Aires. This is the first session with the country's new government, which has initiated wide-ranging privatization of the state sector. Both sides devoted a great deal of attention to the development of progressive methods of cooperation such as industrial production sharing, the creation of joint ventures, and the strengthening and expansion of business ties with companies in the Argentine private sector. The development of contacts between Soviet union republics and Argentine provinces was recognized as a promising area for work. In particular, work was done on the possibility of organizing comprehensive cooperation between the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the provinces of Mendoza and Cordoba. An attention-grabbing event was the opening in Buenos Aires of a branch of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, whose activity should promote the introduction of new forms of financial ties between our countries.

As Domingo F. Cavallo, minister of foreign affairs and worship, stated, his country's leadership makes a highly positive assessment of Soviet-Argentine trade and economic cooperation at the present stage. At the same time, thinking about the future, his country's leadership is interested in giving even greater impetus to this cooperation. In this context numerous opportunities are being opened up by the restructuring of trade and economic mechanisms in the Soviet Union and the Argentine Government's essentially similar reforms in decentralizing the economy and entitling the provinces and private entrepreneurs to actively take part in implementing economic plans, enter external markets, and engage in international economic ties.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow TV Carries Soviet of Nationalities Session

Secession Draft Law Discussed

LD0304195590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 3 April begins carrying a recording of the 3 April sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers in the Kremlin in Moscow. The recording begins with the Soviet of Nationalities session, chaired by Nishanov, which is discussing the draft law on secession.

The first speaker is Deputy Tarazevich, who reports on the procedural stages through which the bill has passed. He says that he intends to speak about the amendments that have been put forward, rather than about the bill itself. The amendments concern the procedure for holding a referendum relevant to intended secession; the possibility of inviting UN observers to a territory to monitor the voting; and the nature of the transitional period between the choice of secession and its actual implementation--which constitution is then operative? Other amendments relate to the time scale between referendums: If the first on secession is negative, the next one can only be held after 10 years; pension arrangements; provisions for repeat referenda. The commission and working group refused to accept a number of amendments, including Deputy Kim's suggestion that, if there is no positive outcome to a referendum on secession, then the local Supreme Soviet should resign.

At 1814 GMT Deputy Bolbasov and another deputy ask two procedural questions. Nishanov answers. The second deputy goes on to ask about the degree to which parliamentary issues are discussed by the Supreme Soviet bodies and by the Council of the Federation. Tarazevich replies.

At 1818 GMT Deputy Doga asks about the status of a territory during the transitional period. Deputy Prokushev asks about the position of people who registered in the territory just before the referendum. Deputy Igityan asks about the position of an autonomous republic which does not wish to secede if the union republic of which it is a part does not wish to secede. Nishanov says that the autonomous republic can remain part of the USSR.

At 1823 GMT another deputy asks about the position of the citizens of a seceding republic who are not resident within that republic. He calls for more specific detail.

At 1824 GMT Rakhmadiyev calls for a clarification of the situation regarding repeat referendums. Tarazevich says that referendums are very unsettling. Nishanov adds that referendums are not being imposed by anyone. The deputies themselves are formulating the possibility of holding them.

At 1828 GMT Deputy Kogan makes the point that it was previously agreed that the transitional period should last until the mutual obligations of the USSR and the seceding republic have been met. Why does this stipulation not feature in the draft law, he asks? Tarazevich says that it was not found possible to include it. Kogan goes on to ask what will happen if there is "sabotage" by one of the parties involved. Tarazevich says that it is not helpful to use terms like "sabotage."

Debates Held, Law Approved

LD0304200490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1831 GMT on 3 April continues its recording of the 3 April USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities session in the Kremlin.

At 1831 GMT Deputy Ishanov asks a minor question followed by Deputy Hallik who asks about the commission's deliberations relating to registration for residence.

At 1835 GMT Deputy Komarov asks what happens if an autonomous region wishes to secede while the republic of which it forms a part does not wish to secede. Nishanov says that the purpose of the debate is really to deal with secession at union republic level. Not every "i" can be dotted straightaway.

At 1838 GMT Deputy Kostishin says that, during a referendum campaign, both sides should have an equal right of agitation. There must be full glasnost. Tarazevich says that this right already exists.

At 1841 GMT Deputy Chernyak asks about the guarantees of contractual agreements between the parties that will operate during the transitional period.

The questions end at this point, and the debate proper began.

At 1843 GMT Deputy Isayev suggests that at least 50 percent of the Soviet citizens residing in a seceding republic must agree to its secession. Deputy Buachidze says that, after a referendum, normal talks must proceed to agree to the practical details. Deputy Igityan believes that the Supreme Soviet should anticipate problems rather than follow in their wake.

At 1848 GMT Deputy Shevchenko points to the high cost to the union of the republic's seceding—as much as the Chernobyl disaster, Maslyukov once said. Each republic's wealth results from the efforts of the whole union and cannot be appropriated by just one republic. There is also the complication that, for example, many Unkrainians live in Kazakhstan. What is their position to be if one of the two republics secedes? The issue is highly complex. We should really be directing our efforts toward strengthening the union rather than demolishing it, she adjures. The twin issues of federation and secession must be examined in harness, she concludes.

At 1853 GMT Deputy Kogan says that, of course, each people has its own particular characteristics, but there is also the question of human rights in general. He adds

that it would be a great failing not to adopt the law today, since it is the enemies of the union that have sought to delay it.

At 1856 GMT Nishanov thanks those who have spoken for contributing to the debate. There have been sensible proposals as well as some emotion, he says. The issue is wrapped in triumph and tragedy. I do not agree with Buachidze when he alleges that we are preparing a law designed to prevent a union republic from seceding; he explains; we would like to preserve our union.

The vote is held: 163 for, 13 against, four abstain. The law is passed. This is followed by a vote on putting it into practice: 163 for, 13 against, 13 abstain.

The Soviet of Nationalities session ends.

Moscow TV Carries Soviet of the Union Session

Laptev Voted Chairman, Secession Law Passed

LD0304211190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1900 GMT on 3 April, in its recording of the 3 April USSR Supreme Soviet chamber proceedings in the Kremlin, begins carrying the proceedings of Soviet of the Union session today. Lukyanov chairs the session.

An unidentified deputy suggests that Mokanu's candidacy for chairman of the Soviet of the Union should be discussed. Mokano takes the floor praising the qualities of the other candidates; they are all better than me, he says.

Guskalov and Kim put forward Laptev's candidacy. The voting begins: 169 are for the proposed voting procedure, 20 against, eight abstain. Mokanu's candidacy is voted on: 34 for, 163 against; Lubenchenko's candidacy is voted on: 54 for, 142 against; Laptev's candidacy is voted on: 127 for, 62 against.

During the second round of voting Laptev is against Lubenchenko. Lukyanov says that all this voting is something he has never done before and it is good training for someone in his position as chairman of proceedings.

Laptev wins the vote to become chairman of the Council of the Union, replacing Primakov, with 141 votes in favor, 52 against. Lubenchenko loses the vote with 59 votes in favor and 133 against.

At 1914 GMT Laptev takes the floor. He expresses his thanks and says: We must work to increase our prestige. He will spare no effort to this end. Laptev takes Lukyanov's place but asks Mokanu to chair the proceedings for a bit because he has to take it all in.

At 1916 GMT Golik reports on the work on the law on the legal conditions of states of emergency. The draft law is specific on the position of the president with regard to the introduction of a state of emergency. The republican authorities can declare a state of emergency in union and autonomous republics, but the Supreme Soviet must be informed. Direct presidential rule can be defined further by a separate law if necessary. Articles dealing with the safety and security of those engaged in work to eliminate consequences of natural or manmade disasters provide for necessary conditions to enable them to get on with their work.

At 1922 GMT questions begin. Kim is the first to ask whether certain amendments to specific points can be made. Reshetnikov asks whether the Supreme Soviet's consent is essential for the president to continue direct rule. Reply: Once the Supreme Soviet endorses the president's decision to inaugurate this kind of rule, it is not necessary to seek this consent again. Yusupov asks for a definition of mass disturbances and liability for this kind of behavior.

At 1928 GMT the Soviet of the Union passes the law on the legal regime of the state of emergency: 179 for, nine against, five abstain.

At 1929 GMT Sebentsov outlines what further work has been done on the draft law on secession. Article 10 is new: the time interval between referendums is 10 years. As for military facilities and border issues relating to a seceding republic, it will be up to the president to deal with such matters. Various other articles have been amended and issues relating to ownership have been settled or been made more precise. The seceding republic has to defray the costs of citizens who have been compelled to move. The decision to secede need not be irreversible: Article 19 deals with this. During the final year of the transition period a repeat referendum may be held just once more to ensure that the republic really does wish to get out. The decision must subsequently be endorsed by the Congress of People's Deputies. Work on the new Treaty of the Union will proceed.

At 1943 GMT Zelinskiy recalls that he proposed that the referendum should be binding only after three-quarters have made their views known—if the figure is two-thirds has anyone given a thought to how many refugees we will then have to cope with? Sebentsov says it is all much of a muchness, but if we adhere to the 75 percent level it could give an erroneous impression that we are trying to keep the republic in, to prevent it from seceding. Zelinskiy is interested in what will happen if the republic secedes, but an autonomous formation therein has no wish to do so. It will be up to the Congress to deal with this. Kazamarov asks what will happen to USSR citizens in the seceding republic? Their rights will be guaranteed by laws fully in keeping with international laws.

At 1952 GMT Tarazevich speaks praising the draft law and drawing parallels with the arrangements Quebec has with Canada. Voting on the draft law on the procedure for settling issues connected with union republic seceding from the USSR takes place: 164 for, 13 against, five abstain.

Voting on putting it into effect takes place: 166 for, 12 against, one abstains.

At 1955 GMT the recorded relay ends.

Paper Notes Adoption of Secession Law

PM0404100990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondents A. Petrovskiy and V. Shishlin: "New Laws Adopted"]

[Text] The second reading of the law on the procedure for resolving questions connected with a union republic's secession from the USSR was held 3 April at separate sittings of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers. The document they approved will enter into force the moment it is published. According to the law, the question of secession from the Soviet Union is decided by a referendum in which all USSR citizens permanently resident on the republic's territory take part. At least two-thirds of their votes are required for the adoption of a decision on secession. After this the Congress of USSR People's Deputies establishes a transitional period not exceeding five years during which property and financial and credit relations with the union and individual republics must be settled.

The draft law submitted to the deputies took into account most of the remarks made by deputies during the first round of the debates. In particular, the article on the transitional period after the referendum, during which, according to the draft, the union constitution and laws operate on the republic's territory, has been made more specific. According to the new version, if, on the basis of the results of the referendum, a decision on the union republic's secession from the USSR is not made, a further referendum on this question can be held no earlier than 10 years after the previous referendum. On the other hand, there is provision for holding a repeat referendum to confirm the decision on the union republic's secession on the initiative of the republic's supreme organ of state power or at the insistence of one-tenth of the USSR citizens permanently resident on its territory and possessing the right to vote. Campaigning during the holding of a referendum is prohibited and the results of the poll in areas where there is a dense population of ethnic groups are listed separately.

The debates in the chambers showed that the draft suits by no means everyone. Some deputies are unhappy at the excessively compromising and mild nature of the document while others, conversely, regard it as excessively rigid. In the opinion of T.P. Buachidze, who warned that the Georgian deputation would vote against the draft, it is a question "of a law on republics' non-secession from the USSR." Deputy G.S. Igityan believes that the discussion of the draft law testifies for the umpteenth time that parliament is trailing after events and is not in control of the situation. Haste in elaborating a document on republics' secession in conditions where there are no laws laying down the basic principles of new relations within the federation, in his opinion, is contrary to elementary logic. This law is indeed late, agreed Ye.V. Kogan, who believes that it is precisely this fact that necessitates rapid and resolute action.

This day also saw the end of the three-day "election marathon" in the Soviet of the Union. The chamber finally acquired a chairman. He is IZVESTIYA Chief Editor I.D. Laptev.

The members of the chamber held the second reading of the draft law on the legal status of states of emergency. It was approved by the Soviet of Nationalities the previous day. After an article-by-article vote, this legal act was adopted. It, too, will enter into force as soon as it is published.

The members of the Supreme Soviet will again meet for separate sittings of the chambers Wednesday.

Further Details of Law Revealed

LD0304111990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1010 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr TASS—TASS legislative correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The Soviet of Nationalities (one of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet) today approved the draft law on the procedure for dealing with matters connected to the secession of a union republic from the USSR at the second reading. It is expected that the Soviet of the Union will discuss it this afternoon or tomorrow.

Under the draft, the matter of secession from the Soviet Union is decided by a referendum in which all citizens of the USSR who are permanently resident on the territory of the republic take part. No less than two thirds of the vote is essential for a decision to secede to be adopted.

Following this, the USSR Congress of People's Deputies sets a transitional period of no longer than five years, during which property, financial, and credit relations with the union and with individual republics are to be settled. In addition, the status of territories which did not belong to the seceding republic at the time of its accession to the USSR is to be agreed upon, as is that of places densely populated by ethnic groups which make up the majority of the population of the said location (the results of the referendum are to be counted separately in these places).

In the event that a decision on the secession of a union republic from the USSR is not adopted as the result of the referendum, a new referendum on the issue can be held after a period of no fewer than 10 years.

In a union republic in which there are autonomous republics, oblasts, or okrugs, the referendum is to be held separately for each autonomous formation. The peoples of autonomous republics and formations retain the right to decide independently to remain in the union or in the seceding republic.

During the transitional period a repeat referendum may be held once in the final year of the transitional period on the initiative of the supreme body of state power of the seceding republic, or at the request of one tenth of the citizens permanently resident on its territory, to confirm the decision to secede from the union. If fewer than two thirds of the citizens of the USSR who are permanently resident on the territory of the republic vote to confirm the decision to secede, it is regarded as having been rescinded.

The USSR Congress of People's Deputies meets at the end of the transitional period or at such times as all matters which need to be agreed have been settled ahead of schedule. The secession of a union republic from the union is considered to have been effected from the moment at which the USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopts a decision confirming that the process to reach agreement on the interests and to satisfy the claims of, on the one hand, the seceding republic, and on the other, the USSR and union republics, as well as the autonomous republics, oblasts, okrugs and ethnic groups, has been concluded.

Deputy Bisher Comments on Secession Law

LD0304133290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1030 GMT on 3 April broadcasts a nine-minute report by correspondent Andrey Nikiforov from the Kremlin where the Supreme Soviet session is under way. Noting that the Soviet of Nationalities has approved the draft law on the secession of a republic from the USSR, he says that after the Soviet of the Union has adopted it, the law will become a reality of Soviet life.

Nikiforov goes on to interview Ilmar Olgertovich Bisher, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who says that there has been a need for such a law for a long time, although there is an inconsistency in this field because the issue of secession has been dealt with before the issue of joining the federation has been solved. The law on secession should have been adopted as part of other relevant laws. Bisher remarks that the draft has been considerably improved since the first reading but he argues against the provision stipulating that a republic can hold a second referendum on secession only ten years after the first referendum. He maintains also that the provision stipulating that the issue of the territories included into the republic after it had joined the USSR should be necessarily examined contradicts the Helsinki agreement. In Bisher's view, while elaborating the draft law, deputies were unable to abstract themselves from the specific situation in Lithuania, something that did not have a positive effect. The time limit of five years for the transitional period has not been thoroughly thought out either, but Bisher hopes that this issue can be settled in each individual case.

Deputy Criticizes Delay in Secession Law

LD0304111190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0830 GMT on 3 April in its "Vremya" newscast carries a two-minute report by Correspondent V. Tsygankov at the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin.

Tsygankov says the bill on the procedure for resolving issues related to the secession of a union republic from the USSR is going through its second reading this morning at the Soviet of Nationalities. He continues, saying that Georgiy Stanislavovich Tarazevich, chairman of the Commission on Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, read a short report on the work that had been done on the bill by the commissions and committees. Tsygankov says there was "a lively exchange of opinions" on alterations to and amplifications of some of the 20 articles which the bill currently contains, after which debates were held, participants in the debate included Deputies Isayev, Buachidze, and Shevchenko. Deputy Kogan also spoke, and Tsygankov plays a recorded excerpt from his remarks:

Kogan says: "I should like to remind you that it is precisely those forces who dream of the country's disintegration that have been most active in slowing down the adoption of this law. They have set in motion all kinds of tricks, amendments, and delays. I believe that the fact that the adoption of this law has been delayed for so long is precisely the result of the actions of those delegations, some of whom have already left our hall or have stated that they will only be here as observers. In this connection, I think it would be a very profound error if we were to fail to adopt this law today and gave a green light to that mounting anarchy and those processes which are threatening to turn into great problems for the country and into a tragedy for specific living people. I, therefore, call upon you to think very carefully about it all, to weigh everything up, and to vote keeping in mind that you are taking upon yourselves the responsibility for hundreds of thousands of human lives."

Tsygankov concludes, saying that the deputies have begun article- by-article voting the bill.

Laptev Elected Soviet of Union Chairman

LD0304124890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1220 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Report from the Kremlin by TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)—The Soviet of the Union, one of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, today elected Ivan Laptev, editor in chief of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, as its chairman. Yevgeniy Primakov, who previously held this post, asked to be released from parliamentary duties in connection with his selection as a member of the Presidential Council.

It only became possible to elect the chairman of the chamber on the third attempt, in view of the fact that neither on 28 March nor yesterday were any of the nominated candidates (among them Ivan Laptev, and Moscow lawyer Konstantin Lubenchenko, who had been voted on in previous rounds), proposed again. Aleksandr Mokanu received the least votes and retired from further competition, and according to the results of the second round of voting, Ivan Laptev (141 votes for, 52 against) was victorious over Konstantin Lubenchenko (59 for, 133 against).

Law on State of Emergency Detailed

LD0304150490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1400 GMT 3 Apr 90

["USSR Supreme Soviet: the Law on the Legal Functioning of States of Emergency Adopted:—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 3 April—TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

Today the Soviet of the Union of Soviet parliament approved in the second reading the Law on the Legal Conditions of States of Emergency. The second chamber—the Soviet of Nationalities—did that yesterday. Thus, the law has been adopted by both chambers.

In accordance with the document, state of emergency can be declared in the interests of ensuring USSR citizens' safety when natural calamities, major disasters or catastrophes, epidemics and mass disorder occur. On the territory of a union or autonomous republic or in individual localities, it is introduced by the Supreme Soviet of the corresponding union or autonomous republic or by the USSR president. A state of emergency on the country's entire territory is declared by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In the conditions of a state of emergency, the organs of state authority and administration are empowered to introduce a special regime of entry and exit, temporarily confiscate weapons and ammunitions from citizens and organizations, ban the holding of meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations, and also strikes, and establish controls on the media. They can also introduce a curfew, suspend the activity of political parties, public organizations, and mass movements, ban the creation and activity of those armed formations of citizens which are not envisaged under the USSR legislation, and carry out a number of other measures.

In cases when in the localities where a state of emergency has been declared the bodies of state security and administration do not carry out their functions in the proper way, the USSR president may introduce provisional presidential rule whilst observing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the union republic.

The law will come into force from the date of publication.

Chambers To Discuss Bill on Economic Relations

LD0404083190 Moscow TASS in English 0709 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 4 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent from the Kremlin:

The two chambers of the Soviet parliament—the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities—will in separate meetings today discuss the second reading of a bill on fundamentals of economic relations between the union, union and autonomous republics.

This bill is expected to considerably expand the authority of union and autonomous republics in the fields of finance, taxation, investment policy and uses of nature.

The republics receive the right to independently carry out foreign economic activities and planning, form the budget and even suspend decisions by union bodies if republican rights are violated.

Political & Social

Maslennikov Appointed Presidential Press Secretary

LD0304112990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1100 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow 3 Apr TASS—TASS legislative correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

The press service of the USSR President has started functioning in the Kremlin. 58-year-old Arkadiy Maslennikov has been appointed as its head—the press secretary. The first briefing of the press secretary of the head of the Soviet Government will take place today.

Arkadiy Maslennikov is a well-known Soviet journalist and publicist, a graduate of the Economic Faculty of Moscow University and a candidate of economics. He has devoted a quarter of a century to journalism, and for a long time was a PRAVDA correspondent worldwide. His last foreign post was Great Britain. Then he worked for two years as the editor of the capitalist countries section of that paper, and since the summer of 1989 as head of the press center of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Maslennikov Gives First Briefing 3 Apr

LD0304150390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1414 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 3 Apr TASS—TASS legislative correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

Arkadiy Maslennikov, USSR presidental press secretary, reported that the problem of speeding up the shift to a planned market economy is at the top of the list among the numerous tasks facing Mikhail Gorbachev. He spoke today in the Kremlin at his first briefing as head of the president's press service.

Maslennikov said that two special sittings of the Presidential Council will be devoted to matters of radicalizing economic reform. Yuriy Maslyukov, member of the Presidential Council and chairman of the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] of the USSR, will give a report at the first of them, which will be held within the next few days. The second sitting will be devoted to land reform.

The press secretary noted that the president may set up special groups of council members to coordinate work in specific areas, for the purposes of the more effective preparation of issues, said Arkadiy Maslennikov. [as received] One such group has already been set up to strengthen the fight against crime, comprising Aleksandr Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB; Vadim Bakatin, USSR minister of internal affairs; and Veniamin Yarin, USSR people's deputy.

From Mikhail Gorbachev's international activity in the first 18 days as USSR president, the press secretary singled out his conversations with prominent U.S. political figures. He recalled that over this period Mikhail Gorbachev received William Crowe, former head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Senator Edward Kennedy. Today, according to Maslennikov, "a very important visit" to the United States is beginning for Eduard Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister and member of the Presidential Council. This all underlines the importance of the U.S. area of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, said the press secretary. [passage omitted]

Presidential, Federation Councils

LD0304205890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] A briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents by Arkadiy Afrikanovich Maslennikov, leader of the president's press service, took place in Moscow today in the Malyy Zal of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He told journalists about the first steps of the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation and about forthcoming events and replied to questions. Here are some excerpts from the recording:

[Begin Maslennikov recording] Last week both the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation held their first sessions, that is to say they began their practical work. Both sittings were free and open discussions and, despite what would appear to be such an informal start, they became very notable events in our country's political life. The Presidential Council members' attention was focussed on the question of ways and means to further accelerate the democratic reforms in our country. Assessing the situation that has arisen and the prospects for the country's development, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev expressed the conviction that the success of the policy of perestroyka can be ensured upon a basis of consistent implementation of the course toward deepening the development of democratic processes in our society.

In this regard he emphasized the need for radical processes and for serious amendments to be made to policies, methods, and pace of the reforms that have been implemented.

As a result of an intensive exchange of opinions at the sitting of the Presidential Council—and it went on for several hours—those taking part in it unanimously supported the priorities put forward by Gorbachev in the area of the radicalization of the democratic reforms. In this respect the need for accelerating economic reforms was put into first place, just as it was in the report: These have as their ultimate objective the creation of a plan and market economy or the controlled changeover to a market economy, as it was stated in Gorbachev's speech.

Two special sittings devoted to economic issues will be held. The first of these, which is going to take place in the next few days, will be devoted to problems of economic policy. A report at that sitting will be given by Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov, chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee. The second sitting will be devoted to issues of land reform.

Among the instructions given by the president regarding the Presidential Council's work I would also single out the preparation of materials concerning the conversion of the defense industries. Instructions in this regard have been given both to the government and to the Academy of Sciences and also to the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

It is now as if three such groups of members of the Presidential Council have been singled out: There are the leaders of departments, ministers and the chairman of the Council of Ministers, who in their duties will naturally deal with the spheres that have been entrusted to them; there is a second group of members of the Presidential Council among whom I would include primarily the scientists, as you know we have three academics there, a number of economic managers, people of the same (?calibre), people who, without leaving their main activity in the area of their own competence, will work in various areas upon the instructions of the president; and finally the third group of Presidential Council members are people who belong wholly to this council and who will carry out the instructions that they are given by the president.

If one is to talk about the work of the Presidential Council as a whole, then the mechanism itself and the special functional features of that body will be polished up as life goes on and in the practice of its work. [end recording]

Discusses Lithuania

LD0304134890 Moscow TASS in English 1333 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 3 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent: The development of events in Lithuania now depends much less on Moscow than on Vilnius, the

Soviet president's press secretary, Arkadiy Maslennikov, told reporters in the Kremlin today.

This was his first briefing since he was named to head the president's press service.

Maslennikov said it was important that the Lithuanian leaders "return to the path of reason and reality and weigh their moves, rather than make statements that sometimes are more of an obstacle than help."

Answering a question from a THE WASHINGTON POST correspondent about the possibility of talks between the Lithuanian and federal leaders in order to settle the conflict, Maslennikov said that representatives of the country's top leadership "do not refuse to hold discussions with Lithuanian leaders, but the matter at issue is, on what basis should they be held?"

The spokesman emphasised that Lithuania is part of the Soviet Union and that "such discussions can be held only on the basis of the country's Constitution and not on the basis of diktat, ultimatums, and the unilateral rupture of relations established [illegible] decades."

'Regular' Gorbachev Briefing Planned

LD0304192890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Among today's reports is the first briefing of the press-service of the president of the USSR which has begun its work. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, himself, also intends to hold regular meetings with journalists. And at least once a week there will be a meeting similar to today's.

Government To Improve Conditions for Oil Workers

AU0404124190 Paris AFP in English 1144 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 4 (AFP)—The Soviet Government will shortly announce a series of measures to improve the living conditions of oil and gas workers in Siberia in a bid to avert a strike which could cripple the economy, industry sources said Wednesday.

A resolution by the Council of Ministers on improving the living and working conditions of Siberian workers will be published by Monday, according to a spokesman at the oil and gas ministry in Moscow.

The Tyumen regional trade union has threatened to call out its 700,000 members who produce 60 per cent of Soviet oil and gas if the government fails to improve living standards. Oil and gas exports provide the Soviet Union with its main source of hard currency.

A spokesman for the Tyumen oil and gas industry told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that the government was expected to announce a series of measures on granting workers better pay and housing conditions, but that a strike would still go ahead on April 7 to pressure the government into making further concessions.

Emergency talks between worker representatives and government officials, including Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, were held in Moscow last Wednesday after the workers had threatened a strike as of April 1. The strike call was later postponed by a week.

In its report on the meeting, the government IZVESTIYA newspaper acknowledged that urgent measures were needed to quell "social tension" in western Siberia.

The economy was seriously disrupted last summer by a nationwide coal-miners' strike called over conditions. The government made a number of concessions, but some coalfields have complained about slow implementation of reforms and miners in Vorkuta, in the far north, held a second strike in the autumn.

The oil and gas ministry in Moscow also acknowleged that the question of increasing the price of crude oil sold on the domestic market was under review, though no change would take place before January next.

Interior Ministry Figure Cited on Organized Crime

LD0304135890 Moscow TASS in English 1325 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Last year 1,310 criminal gangs were uncovered in the USSR. They were guilty of 93 murders, 377 robberies with violence, 355 robberies and 4,691 thefts of state, cooperative and personal property. Three hundred firearms and 122 various pieces of equipment were confiscated from the criminals. These figures were released to journalists at a briefing in the Soviet Interior Ministry today.

Aleksandr Gurov, head of the department for the struggle against organised crime at the Soviet Interior Ministry, said that along with a high crime growth rate, qualitative changes are taking place in it. First of all, criminals are becoming more aggressive and cruel and are offering ever more fierce resistance to law enforcement agencies.

Underworld traditions are becoming more stable and organised forms of illegal activities are developing. Extortion cases are becoming more worrying. Every third one was committed with the use of violence.

Gurov believes that executors of crimes in organised groups are a special danger for society. They commit atrocities for selfish purposes with the use of firearms. The number of clashes between organised groups for the division of spheres of influence is also growing.

According to Gurov, the struggle against organised crime can be successful only on condition of cooperation between all the law enforcement agencies. A series of operations were staged this year jointly with the State Security Committee (KGB) to arrest especially dangerous criminals.

Gurov said that a criminal gang was rendered harmless in the Mordovian Autonomous Republic recently by the Interior Ministry and KGB officers. It consisted of members of several trade and purchasing cooperatives. They planned to eliminate representatives of rival cooperatives, using firearms and explosive devices. As a result of the joint operation, the criminals were arrested. A large amount of firearms and other weapons, explosive devices, ammunition and radio terminals were confiscated. The case is being investigated.

Roundtable Airs Developments in KGB Work

PM0304130990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 90 First Edition p 4

[Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev report on "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Roundtable": "KGB: Facts Versus Conjectures"—no place or date given; first four paragraphs are an introduction]

[Text] We are living at a time when the words of official propaganda are virtually everywhere treated with skepticism, as it were. This is not surprising. For years on end, people had no faith in the sincerity of the spoken word, in whatever was written in newspapers, broadcast by radio, or uttered from high rostrums.

Being blunt about it, it must be said that the syndrome of mistrust and caution also extended to KGB organs a certain extent. The blanket of secrecy, which previously covered virtually all their activity, had its effect in this regard. Now it is being lifted more and more. Nonetheless, readers' letters still raise numerous questions....

As has already been reported, taking this into account, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial office organized a "roundtable" with USSR KGB representatives at which many questions were frankly discussed.

Lieutenant General V. Sergeyev, member of the USSR KGB Collegium; and P. Dubrovin, V. Medvedev, V. Makarov, R. Uluntsev, D. Mayorov, A. Zyubchenko, V. Korovin, and A. Tsvetkov, senior staffers of Military Counterintelligence and other KGB subdivisions, took part in this conversation. We publish the most important fragments of the conversation which took place.

V. Sergeyev: It must be admitted that so far our successes in the expansion of glasnost in the organs' activity have been modest. We hope that today we will in some measure succeed in filling this gap. Even though, in my view, it is somewhat exaggerated. Here, for example, is one of the most typical recent questions: When will the KGB's structure be made public? As a matter of fact, we have made no secret of this for a long time now. It is no secret at all that the KGB comprises operational, technical, and investigative subdivisions at the central level. At local level we have union and autonomous republic KGB's, KGB directorates at kray and oblast level, and KGB apparatus in some cities and rayons. The composition of the USSR KGB military counterintelligence organs has already been publicized. Their numerical strength has been cut back by 10 percent. More than 30 subdivisions have been abolished, even though there has been no reduction of functions or volume of work. Look at a new problem—the problem of nuclear terrorism. A large quantity of fissionable matter for combat application has been stolen around the world. You need resources and manpower to combat this....

[Question] What is the organs' attitude toward, for example, the suggestion by USSR People's Deputy S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, that the KGB should be split in two: A Committee for the Protection of the USSR Constitution and an Intelligence Committee?

A. Tsvetkov: The KGB organism has been shaped by our state's entire history and performs a function mainly associated with counterintelligence. Intelligence-gathering work is being done simultaneously in the interests of counterintelligence and the interests of the state as a whole. Therefore, any breach of this logical connection would cause a certain amount of damage.

[Question] But could it be that this might make your work within the country more democratic? After all, sundry informal movements for perestroyka—like the "Democratic Union," "Pamyat," and "Aprel"—are spreading more and more widely.... What is your attitude toward them?

D. Mayorov: We treat the overwhelming majority of unsponsored social movements and their members as equal participants in the overall democratic process. When it comes to those who breach the Constitution and the laws and set themselves the goal of overthrowing the existing system by force, fanning interethnic dissension, or engaging in terrorism, all the sanctions provided by the law's norms have been and will be applied against them. Individual leaders of the "Democratic Union," for example, engage in provocative activity which often results in antisocial actions verging on illegality, in disorders.

The "Pamyat" Society cannot be unambiguously evaluated. It does have positive aspects—people organized themselves for the purpose of tackling questions of history, our historical and architectural monuments. Until recently, however, it also included persons who had attracted—to put it bluntly—elements with chauvinist leanings. "Pamyat's" leader Vasilyev was officially warned on behalf of the KGB organs with the prosecutor's consent. This had its effect. As for "Aprel," its activity does not fall within the scope of the KGB's competence.

[Question] Some leaders of informal organizations make blanket appraisals of the organs' activity during Stalin's time....

V. Korovin: Those were difficult years in the activity of the party and the life of our society and state, which were accompanied by mass repressions, including repressions within the NKVD organs. Thousands of Chekists who

took a stand against the bloody bacchanalia lost their lives. They included some of Dzerzhinskiy's associates. And when the Internal Troops started the mass deportation of Karachai, Volga Germans, and other peoples, workers of law enforcement and state security organs, who had their own views of what was happening, were also deported. This must be borne in mind. But even in these conditions the Chekists managed to ensure the country's state security. For example, the activity of 66 resident agent networks of Hitler's intelligence service was exposed and terminated between 1940 and 1941 in the USSR's western region alone.

Now we are playing an active part in the work of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission for additional study of materials associated with repressions in the thirties, forties, and early fifties. Archive materials are used as basis for resolving property questions; labor service certificates of the rehabilitees are being issued; personal documents, letters, photographs, and manuscripts which were kept in the case files are being returned.... Proposals to recognize identified mass burial grounds as official cemeteries and to erect monuments are submitted jointly with commissions under local soviets of people's deputies.

[Question] But there are many people who would like to have actual access to archive documents, to personally investigate something. When will private individuals be given access to KGB archives?

A. Zyubchenko: The elaboration and creation of a law on the country's state archive stocks are now approaching completion. The draft contains a provision—an important one, in my view—establishing a standard period of time, after the expiry of which any classified documentary material held in the archives will be declassified for free access.

P. Dubrovin: Let me add this: The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions discussed the draft Law on the USSR KGB in January. The draft of such a law as a non-secret normative act, available to all citizens, was submitted for examination for the first time in our state's history. Its adoption will mark a qualitatively new stage of the democratization and expansion of glasnost in the KGB organs' work.

[Question] As far as we know, the work on these normative acts is proceeding in parallel with work on others, designed to improve the situation in the country and prevent crime. The USSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On Resolutely Stepping Up the Struggle Against Crime" has been promulgated. In your view, what effect will this have on the struggle against organized crime?

R. Uluntsev: A positive one, I think. Organized crime in our country comprises operations by established criminal communities which maintain corrupt ties with representatives of economic and administrative organs and engage in crime as a business. These communities have their gang leaders, hit men, and communications men, they set up money reserves for mutual assistance and for bribery of officials. Nonetheless, the KGB organs are waging a resolute struggle against this. Suffice it to recall the case involving RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Fisheries officials headed by Deputy Minister Rytov, who engaged in bribery and embezzlement of state monetary funds on especially large scale. Or the case of Lieutenant General Kiselev and other officials from the former State Committee for Economic Relations [organizational name as published], who enriched themselves over a prolonged period of time by deliberately concluding trade deals to their own advantage with foreign firms. The latest results include the operation to capture the Yakshiyants gang which had taken a school teacher and her pupils as hostages; the case of the Zapevalov armed gang which set up an arsenal of weapons in Voronezh and cruelly murdered two women in Moscow. There are also, so to speak, economic indicators of our work. Money and valuables worth more than R19 million, as well as 12 tonnes of drugs including the hard drugs heroin and cocaine, were confiscated just in cases involving organized groups of smugglers during the perestroyka years.

[Question] Does the criminogenic situation in the country provide a breeding ground for antistate crimes or for actions by agent networks of foreign states' intelligence services?

V. Sergeyev: I am reluctant to claim any direct link. As for exposures.... Over the last few years KGB organs have detained about 30 agents of Western intelligence services who had engaged in espionage, including espionage in the USSR Armed Forces and the USSR KGB system. They include Fedorov who had access to military secrets. While this "specialist" was on official travel abroad, the adversary noticed his passion for money and later on, having skillfully set up a situation, "bought" him for a few thousand rubles. In the course of meetings with intelligence officers from Western special services, Fedorov passed on espionage information and received assignments. He caused great damage to the state. The USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium sentenced him to the supreme penalty for betrayal of the motherland in the form of espionage.

Another example against the same background. Not all that long ago, a former student at one of the military schools attempted to establish espionage connections with Western countries' special services. Bearing in mind that any damage to the USSR's security was prevented, only measures of a preventive nature were taken against him rather than instituting criminal proceedings. We hope that the military Chekists helped this young man to realize the nature of the abyss whose brink he was approaching.

[Question] Understood. Nonetheless, one gets the impression that what you have described represents nothing but the tiny tip of a huge iceberg of work. Will the Law on the Press, which is now being worked on,

introduce anything new in the procedure for obtaining information from your spokesmen?

P. Dubrovin: I think that the norms to be adopted by the legislators and life itself will determine the nature of our subsequent relations with mass media. It will evidently be necessary to work out a mechanism for implementing the Law on the Press. This presupposes a responsible attitude by the journalists' corps, by staffers, by law enforcement organs, and by other institutions of our state. We are in favor of a frank dialogue. Even though there are certain nuances in this regard. Under the Freedom of Information Act in the United States, for example, all state departments, including the FBI, are obliged to supply any organization or citizen with documentary information on their activity, with the exception of information comprising state secrets. Noncompliance with this provision could be appealed against in the courts. But let us look and see, what is not available for publication? Information damaging U.S. national defense and foreign policy. As well as information on the departments' cadre policy, trade and financial secrets, personal records, medical cards.... As you can see, such broad and vague formulations make it possible to evade virtually every single question.

One more point. Some of our citizens, drawing a parallel from the claim that it is supposedly possible for someone to ask the FBI for its files on him, ask: Can this be done with the KGB? I must specially emphasize this: No files at all are kept on Soviet people.

[Question] And how is the KGB doing in the social sphere? Do our Chekists have to cope with, say, housing problems?

V. Medvedev: These problems, of course, are not as acute as those facing, say, the many officers and ensigns now returning to the Union from the groups of forces. Judge for yourself, however: Even in the central apparatus, one in 15 staffers is without housing, while one in 10 needs improved housing conditions. In the Military Counterintelligence organs as a whole, for example, approximately one in eight is without an apartment.

[Question] How do you select people for the organs?

V. Makarov: Candidates for KGB organs are selected on an individual basis. We need comprehensively developed, physically strong, and mentally stable people. They would usually have had several years of service as officers and work experience. Servicemen doing compulsory service can also become military Chekists, provided they have served at least one year and have successfully passed admission examinations to one of the USSR KGB's leading VUZ's [higher education establishments].

[Question] Fine. I think that we have had a sincere and useful conversation. If we are informed about your work, this means that ultimately our readers will be informed.

V. Sergeyev: For our part, we will be ready to have more meetings, to supply KRASNAYA ZVEZDA with any material that might be of interest provided, of course, it is not detrimental to the motherland's state security.

Official Bribed To Turn Blind Eye to Smuggling

PM0304135190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Mar 90 First Edition p 6

[TASS correspondent I. Biryukova report: "Customs' Blind Eye"]

[Text] Volgograd—The five-tonne container was filled to capacity with goods in short supply. All these items whose export is banned were recoverd from just four parts of a consignment of baggage consisting of more than 30 crates which had already successfully passed through the customs post in Volzhskiy, Volgograd Oblast, and were about to be dispatched to distant shores. However, the path of this contraband was barred by staffers of the oblast KGB administration.

"A second inspection of this baggage was necessitated because we had exposed criminal activities on the part of a customs official," V. Dyatlenko, chief of a department of the administration, said. In return for bribes from foreigners he turned a blind eye to their illegal exports of consumer goods via the Volzhskiy customs post.

This post was set up in 1988 by the Mariupol Customs Office to speed up the inspection of goods arriving from abroad in connection with the construction of an electrometallurgical complex by an Italian company at the Volzhskiy pipe plant. The post was also entrusted with the customs inspection of the baggage of foreigners working under contract in Volgograd and Astrakhan Oblasts and in Kalmykia.

"Of late," V. Dyatlenko went on, "we have received an increasing number of reports that foreigners are exporting goods which are in short supply here—refrigerators, air conditioners, electrical household goods, sewing machines, and many other goods—via this post. The atmosphere within the Volzhskiy customs collective itself was also unsatisfactory. However, what was needed was not an emotional response but concrete verification of these reports. Our administration asked the Main Administration of State Customs Control at the USSR Council of Ministers to carry out the check. The commission which arrived established that certain customs officials were indeed violating the rules by establishing non-business contacts with the foreigners and engaging in drinking bouts with them. All this was assessed as a violation of ethical standards for which reprimands were issued. However, the roots went much deeper. We detained a senior staffer of the customs post for receiving two bribes from foreigners."

Customs officials believe that, in addition to improving the technical equipment of customs posts, it is necessary also to enhance the strict responsibility of the collectives themselves for the smuggling of goods into and out of the country. This also applies directly to large-scale currency

speculation. One of the administration's offices a contains a "treasure trove" confiscated from two currency speculators—more than 100,000 rubles and $14,000, diamond-studded gold jewelry, antiques, and imported audio, photo, and video equipment....

The oblast prosecutor's office is conducting an investigation into the Volzhskiy customs post affair. However, the internal affairs and prosecutor's office organs will also have to find an answer to the question of where and how the foreigners manage to get hold of such large quantities of goods which are in short supply.

Exports Violate Customs Regulations

90UN1263A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Mar 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent V. Ogurtsov: "Who Is the Opel Senator Waiting For? (Can Customs Stay at the Country's Gateway Deep in Russia)"]

[Text] The shipment addressed to the ITI firm in New York was not particularly large. Altogether there were 25 rather small crates weighing a total of over a ton. D. Frolov, a customs official at Moscow Sheremetyevo-2 Airport, did not imagine at first that after examining the cargo he would confiscate 10,000 watches whose total price was estimated as R465,000. The very appearance of the cargo, though, did alert customs officials: It would have been more sensible to declare the cargo in Rostov where the Soviet-American enterprise Khud-Don (KhD) is located. Neither did the customs official quite comprehend the technological miracle which allowed the new plant to start mass production of competitive watches just three months after the enterprise was officially entered in the state register of foreign trade participants.

In spite of the intentionally confusing customs declaration, the customs officials managed to find out that the watches had not been produced by the Khud-Don, contrary to the letter signed by Khud-Don general manager B. Grinberg. The watches, which were supposed to bring $380 thousand in profits, turned out to have been produced at the Chistopol plant. The mass-produced watches were named "Albatross" and had a corresponding dial and a meaningless certificate. Let us not jump ahead of the Rostov Oblast KGB investigation and try to figure out the relationship between the Khud-Don and the "Vostok" state factory. Let me just note that the list of export goods submitted by the Khud-Don to the state register made no mention of any watches.

"At first the Khud-Don intended to smuggle their property through our 'gates,'" explained Yu. Mikheyev, head of the Rostov customs cargo department. "However, their suspicions must have been aroused by the preliminary negotiations, not to mention a possible examination of the shipment. So they decided to go through the Sheremetyevo."

This is where I need to do some explaining for the readers. What is this "Rostov customs" where I ended up in the course of my journalistic investigation? We have grown used to the fact that the customs are the gateway to the country, a controlled checkpoint on the road of all foreign trade exchanges. In the past the line connecting the customs offices followed precisely the familiar outline of the state border. Times have changed, together with trade relations and transportation possibilities. The Main Administration for State Customs Control had to open offices deep in the country.

"Reality made us take this rational decision," said M. Nogal, head of the Rostov-na-Donu customs office. "One just has to look at the huge flow of shipments passing, for instance, through the border station of Chop or the seaport of Novorossiysk, or to the Sheremetyevo. The situation there is paradoxical now: The more attentive and strict the customs official, the longer the lines on the access tracks and the more miserable his life. In a word, the smugglers of today are not sending their shipments through the border offices unintentionally. First, they hope that their container will be the sixth or ninth in line and therefore escape examination altogether. Second, they think that the inspector will be too exhausted from all the headaches to really dig into the declaration full of numbered codes or the registration certificate. So the internal customs offices should have taken over the examination of the export shipments of their respective regions. They have more time for the meticulous task and they are also better acquainted with the industrial qualifications of the senders.

In other words, the customs administration had the right idea in opening its offices in provincial cities. However, the offices did not receive due power because of loopholes in the "Customs Code," so the Rostov wheeler-dealers tried to smuggle their goods through a different location bypassing their "home" office. It is true that last May the Rostov oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] decided to make it obligatory for local exporters to send their shipments only through local customs. But any legal consultant can see how this decision contradicts the general law. However, this is far from being the only loophole in the customs regulations.

Recently, Rostov inspector A. Gribanov was examining a railroad car carrying cans of tomato paste. He suspected forgery in one of the signatures on the contract for additional supplies to the Bulgarian firm "Radopa Impeks." He was not mistaken, and it is now the investigators' task to find out who put a scribble instead of the name of a foreign representative. The paste was shipped by the "Donekspo" (DE), one of the administrations of the Rostov Oblast union of consumers' societies. The certificate was issued by a Rostov representation of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations [MVES] (another innovation) and it allowed the administration to directly "export their own products and raw materials according to their allocated funds, and also to import products for the development of their industries,

and to import consumer goods to replenish market funds. All these operations should be conducted as balanced trade exchanges."

Seemingly, it all fits together. The "Donekspro" produced an export product from local tomatoes and in exchange they would bring in some rare goods for the village stores. But one minor point destroyed this economic concept. The people on the Don weep as they plow under the tomato fields, and this particular tomato paste came from Tajikistan. It was purchased and brought to Rostov by a sciencetechnology (?) cooperative VNTK-VII, which tried to ship it across the border with the help of "Donekspro."

It is becoming popular practice for the exporter intentionally to ignore the origin of his goods. The "Komfort" cooperative of the Rostselmach [Rostov department of All-Union Syndicate of Agricultural Machines and Implements] also found such a loophole. The cooperative suddenly started to buy cast iron slabs from the factories of its own association. They sold those slabs, used for floors in factory shops, to the Moscow cooperative "Nauka." The latter, as a loyal associate, sold them to—Who do you think?—the firm "Burda Moden," the firm that adds beauty to our life with the wonderful pictures in the magazine of the same name. No, they did not use the cast iron to make some extravagant costume jewelry. After the "Burda" received a one-time license for metal export, the firm sent it directly to the smelting furnaces of their sponsors.

However, let us return to our amateurish "Donekspo." Against the grandiose background of the ANT operations, of course, its dealings are quite minute. However, they opened several loopholes at once and the nouveaux riches used them to get around the foreign trade regulations. Last year, for instance, decision No. 505 of the USSR Council of Ministers regulated the "Tsentrosoyuz" [Central Union of Consumers' Societies] by allowing direct trade exchanges only with its republic, oblast, and kray departments. The V/O Soyuzkoopvneshtorg [All-Union Association for Cooperative Foreign Trade] was requested to coordinate its trade operations.

What does the Donekspo have to do with this? What was the basis for the Rostov Oblast union of consumers' societies decision to delegate their authority to their own structural subunit? Maybe it was done to make the "Donekspro" into a kind of a lightning-rod to catch all the lightning and thunder in case of some shady operation. The origin of the Tajik tomato paste is questioned and the oblast union of consumers' societies displays a "genuine" anger. Somebody asks about the imported computers and the oblast union of consumers' societies again shows faked indignation and escapes real responsibility. The "lightning-rod theory" is confirmed, for instance, by the purchases of luxury, diplomatic category, cars. The "Donekspro" paid $35,000 for each Opel Senator equipped with a computer. This price is one and a half times higher than the cost of the car on "their" market. There you go! Even the fastest gatherer of pumpkin seeds cannot afford such an automobile miracle. Who is going to drive the cars? The Opels are now in safe keeping; they belong to no one yet.

But, after all, the regional representation of MVES does exist! How could it issue the export-import license to the "Donekspro" in violation of the USSR Council of Ministers decision? However strange it may sound, MVES representative N. Martynenko tried to rationalize all this by, no more or less, fighting against the bureaucracy and foreseeing further democratization of foreign trade. In other words, he violated the USSR Council of Ministers decision quite intentionally, and not by mistake. For some reason, however, while issuing various licenses the MVES representative charged customs officials with the strict control of the permits in question. It is our task, it seems, to issue substantiated permits, but checking on the origin of the goods or ensuring that they correspond to the papers that we have provided is a task exclusively for customs! I had to remind him that the MVES is obliged to cancel a permit if it notices any foreign trade turning into total looting. But Martynenko was not quite frank with me when he pretended that he had not heard about the Khud-Don and "Donekspro's" wrongdoings.

So, should we rely on customs? Customs officials do not have an easy life. They can hardly be expected to patch up the holes left by foreign trade agencies when they barely manage to cope with their own problems.

Department head A. Epifanov explains that the customs officials are very limited in their rights, their basic right being just persuading people to the point of exhaustion. If a smuggler raises his hand against an officer, the act is defined as routine hooliganism and not as resisting authority. The almost-completed package of laws on law-enforcing organs does not even mention customs!

It does seem strange. The people are carrying out their strategic duty at the country's gateway; they confiscate hundreds of thousands of rubles or dollars worth of contraband annually. But the government, deeply concerned that they be morally and officially reliable, forgot to give them corresponding rights and adequate pay. It is true that there is no monetary equivalent for the conscience of a federal employee. But it is time we understood that people in key positions cannot live on inspired phrases about their duty alone

Why not make their pay directly proportional to the contraband sold off to profit the government? Even a five percent commission from the auction sales can hardly be an adequate reward for the services of the customs. Their share should be different, otherwise the material and technical level of the customs cannot be improved. Customs officials will continue to lease parts of somebody else's offices and warehouses. They will continue to share the one ancient little UAZ [Urals Automobile Factory] car, blushing under derisive looks from foreigners. They will continue to wonder whether it

will ever be possible to assemble the detection devices that they have recently received. In a word, hang on, customs!

In the USSR Procuracy

The USSR Procuracy is investigating the criminal case of the offense committed in the interbranch state and cooperative concern, ANT.

As already mentioned in the press, twelve army tanks addressed to the ANT were seized at the Novorossiysk trade port at the end of December 1989.

In the course of the investigation it was determined that certain officials in the aviation, defense, and radio industries, as well as some officials of the organizations in charge of foreign trade, arbitrarily violated the rules for entering foreign markets. They also created specific conditions for the ANT that enabled it to purchase materials usually allocated by strict quotas within the country and to sell them without licenses to other countries. In this manner they violated the existing rules, including USSR Council of Ministers Decision No. 203, dated 7 March, 1989: "On State Measures Aimed to Regulate Foreign Trade Activity." The decision prohibits enterprises and cooperatives from exporting military hardware and from buying and selling materials allocated by strict quotas to other countries.

The concern involved dozens of other enterprises and organizations in their dealings. They signed contracts with foreign firms to sell them products and materials that are in short supply in the country. They included such items of strategic importance as engines for combat planes. Some of the top officials in a number of ministries and in the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Relations Commission flagrantly ignored instruction No. 924 of the USSR Government, dated 30 May, 1989, on the creation of the ANT. This instruction limited its foreign contracts to the exchange of recycled materials and industrial by-products for consumer goods.

The USSR Government and law-enforcing organs have taken measures to prevent the squandering of the people's wealth and to stop violations of the existing rules for the sale to other countries of military hardware and materials that are in short supply.

The USSR Procuracy investigation team is made up of experienced investigators and USSR KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] officers.

The investigation aims to identify everyone guilty of criminal actions and negligence; the inspectors are trying to determine the financial loss to the country. They are also attempting to ascertain the reasons and conditions that could give rise to serious violations of the law and state discipline.

Ligachev Chairs Rural Work Meeting 30 Mar

LD3003195790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] A CPSU Central Committee agrarian policy commission session was held today. The work of party and local soviet bodies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and of Belorussia on the development of housing and socio-cultural construction in the rural area was discussed. Overall the conversation was more than just about the social field in the rural areas of the two republics. An appropriate decision on the two republics was adopted, and it was deemed necessary to draw up a state program for the restoration of the rural areas as soon as possible. The session was chaired by Comrade Ligachev.

Social Democratic Leader on Dangers of Nationalism

AU3003094190 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 30 Mar 90 p 2

[Josef Kirchengast report: "Warning Against Russian 'National Socialism'"]

[Text] Vienna—"Mikhail Gorbachev would be a useful president if he were to run in free elections. Then he would get a mandate from the people. In five years, when the first popular election of the president is to take place he will not win anymore. Therefore, the election might be moved up." This is predicted by Oleg Rumyantsev, co-chairman of the "Social Democratic Alliance" of the USSR and since recently Supreme Soviet deputy of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Rumyantsev visited Vienna at the invitation of the Renner Institute of the Socialist Party of Austria.

The social democrat, who was expelled from the CPSU years ago, analyzes the current situation in the Soviet Union on the basis of three contradictions, namely those

—between the ruling power and the developing civil society;
—between the Moscow headquarters and the republics, and, finally
—between the democratic and the patriotic, neonationalist part of society.

For Rumyantsev the precondition for democratization is that "the conflict between the ruling power and the civil society is legitimated." Rumyantsev thinks that the "Committee for Citizens' Actions," which was founded by opposition groups in Moscow on 24-25 March, is the most important counterweight to the strong state president: "Parliament cannot be a counterweight, because it is manipulated." This was clearly shown by the events surrounding the decision about the presidential system.

"Purified Russian"

Rumyantsev sees patriotism [Patriotismus] as a "bomb that might blow up Russia." "This is very typical of Russia. Today patriotism manifests itself in a very brutal

form. Its advocates defend the party's monopoly on power and its instruments of rule, such as the KGB. They are really national-socialists, who propagate a purified Russian type and are also strongly anti-Semitic."

Concerning the nationality question, Rumyantsev does not see any alternative to a Soviet commonwealth, that is, a loose federation. The Lithuanians would no longer sign the new union treaty which Gorbachev has announced. They have been cheated too long. The decisive thing is that dialogue gets underway—both between Moscow and the Republics and within Soviet society.

Extremism Seen as Result of System's Faults

PM2903152190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 90 pp 2-3

[A. Ganelin article under the rubric "National Question": "If Fires Are Lit...."]

[Text] In the early eighties the Soviet lexicon lost its luster. The "outstanding figure" was no more. No one said: "Thank you for your personal concern...." No one responded with "shock labor." But very soon it was enriched with "state of emergency," "hot spots," and "curfew." And all the time we were being told that "the situation is stabilizing." Stabilizing? If what you understand by this is the events of the start of the nineties, will we not be riding into the 21st century in armored personnel carriers?

...If "hot spots" are being lit, does this mean that someone needs this? Or is spontaneous combustion taking place because of the economic and political crisis? Or both?

...When the pogroms began in Dushanbe, Michele Placido was taken by tank to the airport. He said on parting: "Things are worse here than in Sicily." And he flew out.

I do not know whether things were worse in Dushanbe during those days than in Sicily. I have not been there. On the other hand, I have been in four "hot spots." I can say that during those days the streets of Dushanbe differed little from the streets of other Soviet cities where mass disturbances were already taking place.

Armored personnel carriers at intersections. Passageways wired off. Soldiers with shields and submachine-guns. Even the faces of internal troop soldiers and officers became familiar on the streets of Dushanbe.

"Pardon me, didn't we meet in Isfara by any chance? No? In Karabakh? Or maybe in Kishinev, after storming the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] building? It must have been in Fergana."

Where will we meet after Tajikistan? At which point in the union? Only it was not just familiar people in military uniform that were encountered, but also familiar occurrences and topics. You get the feeling that in our country, where everything or almost everything is standardized, even interethnic clashes, mass disturbances, and pogroms are similar, too. As though there is the same scriptwriter everywhere.

...Paradoxical though it may seem, there have never been so many rumors as in the age of glasnost. Everything starts with them.

In Fergana there was a rumor right before the explosion—that Meskhetian Turks had butchered Uzbek children in a kindergarten. There were rumors in Kishinev before the 10 November storming of the MVD building—that during a demonstration on 7 November special-purpose militia detachment members had beaten up hundreds of people and thrown hundreds behind bars. In Dushanbe a rumor served as an incitement: Thousands of Armenian refugees had supposedly arrived from Baku and would be given apartments out of turn.

Then it comes to light that all these are lies. As usual, the authorities deny the rumors, but after the crowds have gathered. When it is already too late.

...No explosion happens out of the blue. After it happens, it turns out that the whole city had been saying beforehand that something would happen. Almost the specific dates of pogroms are named. It came to light, for example, that people arrived in Tajikistan from another republic and spread rumors of thousands of refugees.

...Even without going to Dushanbe at the time of the storming of the party Central Committee building and the pogroms, it was possible to presume in advance that people would later say—"the pogrom perpetrators included many drunken, hashish-drugged, and criminal elements." That is what was said after Sumgait, after Fergana, and after Kishinev. In Dushanbe I heard the already-familiar tales of eyewitnesses: "Vehicles without license plates drove up, and vodka was distributed from them. Some people were directing the actions of the pogrom perpetrators." In Dushanbe the minister of internal affairs said the same thing as militia workers were saying before him in places where there were mass disturbances. About a stupefied mob skillfully directed by extremists. About careful preparations attesting to coordinated actions by extremist groups and about guerrillas' being supplied with weapons and Molotov cocktails. All this is already familiar.

In short, they try to convince us every time that everything was prepared in advance. A structure, an organization had been set up. And we believe in dark forces which maliciously oppress us.

Another natural law: Enemies—internal and external enemies—are always sought after the event. The internal enemies are the informals, and at first they are accused of everything. In Kishinev, for example, the Moldavian People's Front; in Dushanbe "Rastokhez" and "Ru ba ru." But, as a rule, no one can adduce any proof.

The external enemy is other states' intelligence services and intrigues. The conflict is blamed on their influence.

In Kishinev it is the work almost of the "Siguranta" [prewar Romanian secret police]. In Fergana and Baku—the work of Iran. In Dushanbe—of the Afghan opposition. But not once has anyone obtained specific information: Whose intelligence service, of which country, and how it was mixed up in mass disturbances.

Any pogrom is an explosion. But the Dushanbe pogrom in the city center resembled a controlled explosion. Maybe I am wrong, but a great many things continue to amaze me. A jewelry store was looted, but a "Berezka" [hard-currency store] 10 paces away did not suffer. A book store and a culinary store were destroyed, but the windows of the nearby "Vostochnyy" bar remained intact. Who was directing and organizing that explosion? The mafia, corrupt elements?

There is said to be a strong mafia in Sicily. But, if you compare it with ours, it is simply a minor rabble. They may kill a prosecutor, arrange a shoot-out in a bar, or bribe someone, but the most they can do is set off a bomb. They cannot even organize the storming of the shabbiest local council, let alone a ministry building or the ruling party's central committee. But in our country everything is heaped onto the mafia and corrupt elements. Only you cannot believe that they are really capable of doing what only professionals can do.

This means that still-darker forces are to blame for everything. The search resembles the situation with the abominable snowman. Someone has found his footprint, someone else a tuft of wool, and some people have even seen him. But no one has yet produced him alive to the general public. Dark forces too—somewhere they leave a print, somewhere else a tuft of wool, for example, somewhere a vehicle without license plates, somewhere else a shell case. In Dushanbe a chance eyewitness saw some 20 guys gather around a vodka truck 14 February. "Some had pistols. And the oldest one said that there was nothing to do in the city now." I am sure that these are just the perpetrators. Not once(!) in all the years of pogroms and interethnic clashes has anyone yet produced alive the leader of an entire action or an organizer on a large scale. Even though, as distinct from the snowman, they are sought not by amateurs but by an entire army of professionals—investigators of the MVD, the KGB, and the prosecutor's office.

Investigation groups are set up after every new pogrom. Dozens of investigators gather from all over the union and swear almost on the Criminal Code to find all the organizers. Then six months pass, and a few extremist perpetrators are tried. Those who actually robbed, killed, burned, or raped. This is another natural law. Everyone wants to know who the scriptwriter is and who is in the chief roles. But they show some minor performers in occasional roles. Extras.

We have always been told: The KGB is on guard. It is always au courant with regard to any perfidious plan that threatens state security. But guerrillas are operating in "hot" spots, Molotov cocktails are being prepared, and underground structures are being created. And it turns out that the KGB knows nothing about this. Because if it had known, it would certainly have safeguarded us against this misfortune. They try to convince us that there are many criminals among the pogrom perpetrators. This is the MVD's sphere. But it, too, knows nothing in advance. What about the prompt information that the KGB and the MVD get from their own sources? If they get it and pass it on up, why are no measures taken?

Maybe interethnic clashes, mass disturbances, and pogroms are flaring up increasingly frequently because the KGB sometimes carries out the work of the MVD in rendering racketeers and bribetakers harmless? For so far the KGB has not once brought to light the organizers of disturbances and pogroms. Because it cannot? Or it does not want to? Or there are no dark forces?

...I caught sight of one of the "extremists" without the help of the law-enforcement organs—on the rostrum at the extraordinary republic Communist Party Central Committee plenum. He was a student, one of five rally participants' representatives admitted to the hall. He mounted the rostrum and began speaking, but was interrupted by a military man:

"Tell me where you were 13 February. You yourself are an extremist! I saw you inciting students to join the crowd. And I even suggested that KGB personnel arrest you."

"You are mistaken," the student objected. "I was not inciting anyone to go anywhere, but you can have it your way. I am an extremist. But I am your son."

The hall was hushed for an instant. But then people began murmuring indignantly. I do not believe that anyone—even among those who come out from extremist positions—has been infiltrated among us from outside. They are all sons of society. Extremism does not arise out of nothing. When the upper strata—official power—treat informal movements like pariahs, endeavoring to crush them, extremism is born in the lower strata. But it is already time to understand a simple truth: If the people live well, no extremists or special services will bring them out onto the streets....

...A sufficient number of troops arrived in Fergana when the entire oblast was already on fire.

They entered Baku when the pogroms were already over.

The pogroms began in Dushanbe 12 February. It was already clear that they would continue the next day. But neither the militia nor troops could stop them 13 February. The reason is always the same: insufficient forces. But why are we always late in gathering forces to strike where they are needed? Who hinders us? I hope not dark forces. And during this time more mines are being laid in another region. Only after there has been an explosion do

the specialist "sappers" arrive—MVD, KGB, and prosecutor's office personnel and internal troops. But people have already been killed and injured. The sappers must arrive sooner.

...One evening my neighbors in the block where the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent's center is located notified me that it was my turn on duty in a self-defense detachment from midnight through 0200. Such detachments appeared spontaneously in every block and every district after the population in Dushanbe saw that the law-enforcement bodies could protect no one. Some people turned up at the post with lengths of piping, others with crowbars. We stood, peering into the darkness. What would we do if attacked by pogrom perpetrators? Bang on an iron bar and hold out until help arrived. Good, we would waken all our neighbors. But it was not a bad thing that those responsible for citizens' safety should finally wake up.

Armored personnel carriers stood outside the building of the party Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium.

"Why do you guard these buildings but not our homes?" citizens asked.

"We are guarding not buildings but the lawful authorities," an officer replied.

If the authorities cannot protect citizens, then citizens ask—what do we want with such authorities?

"We can't post a tank outside every block," the military men explained. But the residents of every block pay taxes for the very tanks that cannot protect them. Then why do we maintain the militia, the KGB, the internal troops? If it is in order to protect us after a pogrom, blaming everything on mafia intrigues, it is an expensive luxury.

...The military warn that pogrom perpetrators might mark the doors of apartments with crosses and crescents. I have not seen crosses and crescents. But a demarcation is clearly visible, as though a system had been switched on: them and us. Some thrust embroidered skullcaps out of cars to show that "It's one of us driving." Others, in self-defense detachments, put on white bands.

"The people are not those who hold rallies on the square but those who engage in self-defense," it was said at the plenum.

"The people are not those at the plenum but those at the rally," it was said on the square.

As though it were a question of two different peoples. And we know what happens when one section of the people goes against another section. People against people.

In Tajikistan, for example, there is "Rastokhez." The Russian-speaking population is united in the International Alliance. Why should they not come to the negotiating table before a conflict? If the upper strata—the official authorities—cannot prevent an explosion, this means that the lower strata must prevent it.

...In the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee building the noise of the crowd was clearly audible through the broken windows. Evidently, windows must be definitively shattered for the voice of the crowd to be heard here. Prior to this, had the fact that people are displeased with the food shortages and the low living standards really not been heard in the very different buildings of the Central Committee and oblast and rayon party committees? Some people are displeased with the pace of political and economic reforms. Others with the fact that the situation is increasingly sliding toward chaos. The windows have now been reglazed. The shell cases have been swept up. Order has been imposed. For how long? If order is not imposed in the country, will it be long until the next disturbances?

During the first days after the pogrom I remember soldiers with submachineguns sitting on chairs by the windows in the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee building. And one of them was singing a melancholy song: "Don't cry, little girl, the rain will pass. The soldier will return. You just wait...."

How many girls around the union are waiting for their soldiers to return from "hot spots?" Girls are afraid of receiving a zinc coffin. Fathers, mothers, wives, and children are afraid. And next time they simply will not let their soldiers go to another "hot spot." The place where zinc coffins arrive could itself become "hot." We cannot go on having fronts inside the country. How long can we go on winning back cities?

The people are tired of being afraid. In some cities they fear for their soldiers. In others for themselves. People fear pogroms. Many fear rallies. People are becoming accustomed to the idea that rallies end in pogroms. But rallies have to be held. People have to attend them. Because there is no other possibility of being heard.

"Resign! The leadership must resign!" people shouted in the square in Dushanbe. And they had in mind the resignation of old methods. The resignation of such a life. Who will hear your voice before it becomes the voice of thousands upon thousands?

Rallies stem from rumors. Pogroms stem from some rallies. How are we to regard the rumors that the 25 February rallies in major Russian cities would definitely end in pogroms? In Moscow, at any rate, the troops and militia organs were in readiness. Whom do such rumors benefit: those who want to seize power, or those who do not want to give it up?

Questions, questions.... An old school textbook of USSR history clearly taught that pogroms were organized by dark reactionary forces and the czarist government, which feared the wave of revolution. How will history textbooks explain the pogroms of the eighties and the nineties? Is this really a job only for historians of the

future? And will we have a common history of the USSR at all? We must reply to this right now.

Deputy Elected From War, Labor Veterans Body

PM0304134990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "At Central Electoral Commission for Elections of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission, on the basis of a report from the electoral commission for the election of USSR peoples' deputy for the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans, and in accordance with articles 57 and 62 of the Law on Elections, has registered as USSR people's deputy Mikhail Fedorovich Lavrinovich, general director of the Belorussian association for the manufacture of heavy-freight vehicles and named for the sixtieth anniversary of Great October, member of the CPSU, and resident of Minsk City, who was elected 16 March 1990 from the All-Union Organization of War and Labor Veterans.

Liberal Democratic Party Meets in Moscow

LD0304083390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1950 GMT 2 Apr 90

[By correspondent D. Kiselev]

[Excerpts] [Kiselev] The founding congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union took place in Moscow last weekend. It favored a presidential form of government, the de-ideologization of society, a multi-party system, and a multi-structured economy with full equality of rights for all forms of ownership—or as 42-year-old Moscow lawyer Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the party says, where everything can be bought and where everything is sold. In foreign policy the Liberal Democrats of the USSR are for neutrality, against all military alliances, and for cutting back on the size of the army and making it a professional one. [video shows meeting in progress; speaker on rostrum]

[Unidentified speaker] We hope that this will attract more supporters to our ranks, not from the point of view of amassing an enormous as possible quantity of people and turning into a many-million-strong party. We do not favor that. That will be terrible, here's one party, a second, fifteen, twenty, thirty, forty, as many as you like! Why introduce limitations again? Well let's introduce limitations—only five parties. It will be terrible. It is better to have many small parties than once again one, because it, once in power, will again try to preserve its monopoly, to dominate, considering that it is the most powerful, the strongest..."

[Kiselev] There are 3,000 members in the party. Dozens joined here at the congress. Recommendations for a probationary period are not required. [video shows Kiselev talking to unidentified woman seated at a desk in an office; views of people in an office area; Kiselev talks briefly to an unidentified man] [passage omitted]

[Unidentified man] In May I will fly to Geneva, and there we will establish contacts with all European parties that are related to us.

Opinion Poll Reveals Soviet Attitudes

PM2203162890 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 11, 18 Mar 90 p 11

["MN Sociological Analysis" feature: "Homo Sovieticus: A Rough Sketch. Public Opinion Poll Reveals True Feelings"]

[Text] Is there a special historical type of person as the "Soviet person"? If there is, what are his or her typical features: what do they love, what do they hate, what do they hope for, and what are they afraid of? Last December, the All-Union Centre of Public Opinion (AUCPO) attempted to answer these questions and carried out an opinion poll among 2,696 inhabitants of the country. Its selection fully mirrors the population's model. The findings are still preliminary.

How are we living?

A year ago we already asked: "Can our country serve as a model?" At that time more than two-thirds of respondents were undecided in their answers, roughly one-tenth appraised the country's prestige as being very low, but about a quarter still made an attempt to descry the usual outlines of the first power in a heavily cracked ideological mirror. A year has passed, working major changes in the appraisals. Today, for as many as three-quarters of respondents, it is clear that our country mustn't be included among the advanced nations. The remainder either continue to keep mum (14 per cent) or, refusing to see our country as having lagged behind, maintain that we have "our own way to go and our own achievements to boast about" (11 per cent).

What are the reasons for the current crisis? A mere 4 per cent continue looking for them in external enemies, whereas 45 per cent of those polled see the root of evil in our own mistakes. And yet this is only a beginning towards a realistic assessment of the situation: 22 per cent of those polled consider internal enemies to be the most dangerous today.

Only 6 per cent of respondents believe that what Soviet people lack most is respect for their past, whereas more than half see their main trouble in the absence of material plenty. These figures bear witness not only to a realistic appraisal of the country's economic condition, but also to a narrowing down of the spectrum of human values, to a depletion of the incentives for action.

The reserve of the forces which makes it possible to endure day-to-day hardships for the sake of a radiant future, has been practically depleted. Sixty-seven per cent of the polled no longer believe in the possibility of building a society without hardships and sufferings, 55 per cent in general make no plans for the future, 10 per

cent believe that nothing will change in their lives, and 17 per cent don't look any farther into the future than a year or two.

Trust in the Communist Party has been falling rapidly: whereas in the September poll conducted by the AUCPO 22 per cent respondents voiced full confidence in the Party as being the spokesman for the people's interests, now the figure was only 4 per cent. The Soviet people's usual method of self-assertion through identifying themselves with the state is becoming less popular. Thirty-three per cent of the polled agree with the judgement that, "considering the present-day position of the state, we must help it even by accepting sacrifices", but roughly as many of them opt for a different variant of the answer: "We must at last become free people and make the state serve our interests." However, the process of consciousness being less associated with the state— a major element in the emergence of a civic society—still finds itself as it were in the phase of juvenile negativism: first and foremost, it finds expression in the prestige of the state bodies of authority reaching a critical point (a mere 14 per cent of the polled rely on the government to solve present-day problems). But only a quarter of the polled associate their hopes with the nascent democratic bodies of power, whereas the level of trust in the new social movements has almost quartered in comparison with September 1989 (7 per cent against 27 per cent at that time).

The system of habitual interdictions is ceasing to operate. Twenty-six per cent of the polled say that there must be no subjects closed for discussion. Eleven per cent consider it impossible to discuss the questions of "replacing our system with a capitalist one" in our press, whereas 9 per cent find it wrong to doubt the "correctness of Lenin's political course." Five per cent of the polled take exception to discussing "the possibility of the Republics seceding from the Soviet Union;" 5.5 per cent oppose discussing "the Party's responsibility for the present crisis-like state", and 3 per cent—"the political qualities of present-day leaders."

Do we need millionaires?

What do Soviets think will help them out of the present-day difficult situation? Forty-seven per cent put their stake on the conscientious day-to-day labour of everyone and as many, on their own common sense. More than a quarter of the polled believe that what their fellow-citizens lack most is diligence and thrift. On the other hand, 55 per cent agree to have smaller earnings in exchange for easier work or a guarantee of their condition's stability. And only 37 per cent would like to earn well by working their hardest. Only 7.3 per cent favour lifting all bans on enterprise and all "ceilings" on wages, and 24 per cent deem it necessary to revive independent farming.

Moreover, the replies to the question: "What is your attitude towards people amassing millions officially emerging in our country?" were broken down as follows: nothing against—11 per cent; positive if this money has been earned in an honest way—38 per cent; negative since this money cannot be honestly earned—40 per cent; negative even if it has been honestly earned—8 per cent; find it hard to answer—4 per cent.

All this testifies that the confrontation between two positions dividing society into approximately even parts—equalizing and paving the way to free enterprise—promises to be protracted and painful. Also bewildering is the too high percentage of those pinning their hopes on the honesty of people eager to possess large fortunes. Potentially, some of them can also desert to the populist camp of fighters for equalizing justice, setting morality against common sense. Which, in the final analysis, leads to the collapse of both.

What do we respect ourselves for?

All of us need self-respect. Its sources are many and varied. Nevertheless, in answering the questions: "Whom do you realize yourself to be, with pride; what adds to your self-respect?" the respondents noted a mere two positions on the average out of the 20 offered. Pride of place among them goes to parental pride. It was noted by nearly every second of the polled (43 per cent) or two out of three people with children. But only every fifth (20 per cent) takes pride in his or her parents. It is not fortuitous therefore that one of the main qualities which respondents would like to see in their children is respect for parents (68 per cent).

The runner-up among the sources of self-respect is pride from realizing oneself as being a Soviet person—24 per cent. Yet pride from realizing oneself to be the son or daughter of one's people was noted on the average by every eighth of respondents. On the same level (13 per cent) is local patriotism—pride of one's city, village, district. Also placed in the same rank must be pride of belonging to the human race—8.5 per cent.

Coming third among the sources of self-respect is the realization of one's being an expert in one's field (22 per cent of respondents or 29 per cent of those who work). On the other hand, only one in ten who work is proud of his workplace—enterprise, institution. Eighteen per cent of the respondents feel like they are the masters in their home and 12 per cent - on their land.

The different circumstances of past life constitute a separate source of self-respect. Standing above all else here is solidarity peculiar to one's age with one's generation (12 per cent). Taking pride in their part in the Great Patriotic War is twice less the number of its real participants, while practically all who happened to fight in the Afghan war are proud of this. Respondents practically no longer recall their participation in the great construction projects, in the development of the virgin lands or in the Stakhanovite movement (1 per cent).

The list is closed by the sources of self-respect linked to world view. This category primarily includes believers: in the case of one in 12 respondents (8 per cent) his faith

adds to self-respect. Membership of the CPSU adds to self-respect in the case of one communist in five. But practically all the participants in popular fronts and national movements (although they make up about 1.5 per cent of respondents) feel proud in being members.

The deficiency of sources of self-respect leads to people feeling lonely. Forty-four per cent of respondents see the reasons accounting for an increase in the number of those suffering from loneliness in the very organization of our society and the lack of consideration people have for one another. According to our findings, every fourth or fifth of respondents feels lonely in his or her inner life—gets tired of people, finds it hard to get along with them, needs to be left alone and feels superfluous. Twenty-six per cent of respondents believe that lonely people have no one to blame but themselves for being lonely. One in five holds that loneliness has been predetermined by the very course of things, simply by life.

The individual's moral responsibility to society is the deepest source of self-respect and, at the same time, the last barrier in the way of society's disintegration. To what extent is this quality inherent in respondents? A mere 17 per cent are unreservedly prepared to be responsible for the initiatives of their government; 20 per cent—for what is happening in the country; 22 per cent—for actions of persons of their own nationality. The feeling of solidarity with relatives is twice as high (42 per cent) and is even higher in relations to one's workforce unit (45 per cent). But more intricate feelings—links to bygone generations or awareness of the country's guilt before other people—can be detected only in rudimentary form (8 and 1 per cent respectively).

'I believe—I don't believe...'

Fifty-two per cent of the country's population consider themselves to be non-believers, with 20 per cent flatly denying the existence of God and 28 per cent being indifferent to the problems of religion; a mere 5 per cent are actively involved in religious affairs. (By contrast, a mere 1.5 per cent of people in the USA firmly declare a disbelief in God, 4 per cent say that it's impossible to know anything about God's existence, while 63 per cent are unconditional believers).

So that it is hardly possible, as it is sometimes done today, to say that a trend in the number of believers is growing. Rather the reverse is true. Sixty-six per cent of the polled have been baptized or taught in any other way to believe in God, yet only 48 per cent profess one or another religion and even less, 39 per cent, want to teach their children to believe. This, it seems, testifies to a continuing decline in religion's role in moulding world outlook. And today this process is no longer connected in any way to persecution of believers: less than 2 per cent of the polled have had to encounter an unfair attitude towards them owing to their faith.

The hard core of believers, for whom religious values indisputably rank first among all others, comprises, according to our estimates, 7-8 per cent of the population. These are those who ascribe our country's misfortunes to the loss of religious faith (8 per cent), who proudly consider themselves to be believers (8 per cent), who bring up their children in the idea of retribution for their sins (7 per cent), etc. And what about others? The most typical associations with religions identified in the course of the poll—religious rites (19 per cent), the omnipotence of God (16 per cent), prayer (15 per cent), punishment for sins (15 per cent)—bear witness to the predominantly ritual-cult content of faith. Moreover, Christ is firmly associated with supreme deity (22 per cent) and is very seldom present in consciousness as God the man or as a real historical person (only 3 per cent mentioned him among outstanding persons of all times and people, just as many as those who mentioned Khrushchev). For 20 per cent religion means Church holidays, for 10 per cent—religious art, and only 10 per cent link the notion of God to the moral imperatives of the ten commandments.

However, other systems of views and world conceptualization do not occupy any more meaningful positions either in our present-day mentality. There is no longer erstwhile faith in Marxism-Leninism: only 6 per cent believe that this doctrine can provide answers to the problems preoccupying our people. The arts and literature command prestige for only one in ten of the polled, and science for an even smaller percentage, with a mere 4-5 per cent believing that its mission is dedicatedly to serve the truth.

What are we afraid of?

What should be done to halt the growth of violence? On the one hand, in reply to the question about measures needed to reduce crime, stress is increasingly often laid on the need "to bring up children better" (47 per cent), "influence not only criminals, but also the social environment generating crime" (33 per cent). To the question of what should be done to those whose standing in society was unstable, the majority replied as follows: There is a need to help beggars, alcoholics, AIDS cases, and the congenitally impaired. Hippies and rockers must be left to their own devices.

On the other hand, the replies to the question about attitudes towards the death penalty were distributed as follows: 21 per cent favoured its immediate or gradual abolition, and 64 per cent wanted its retention and use on a broader scale. Speaking about assassins, 70 per cent chose the variant "liquidate", from 27 to 33 per cent suggested applying the same measure to prostitutes, drug addicts and homosexuals. From 16 to 22 per cent demand "liquidating" rockers, AIDS case and those born defective, and from 3 to 9 per cent want to wipe out beggars and alcoholics.

A third and fifth of respondents respectively advocate better technical provision of the militia and a higher pay for them. As many favour the introduction of life imprisonment. Nearly a tenth take a stand for toughening the

regime in places of confinement and for forming crime-combatting squads comprised of "Afghan vets". One in twenty is prepared to use the army for this purpose, and as many want fire arms to be sold to "reliable and trustworthy people".

These replies testify to the ruthlessness inhernt in the mass consciousness and to its measure of authoritarianism. Whereas about half of the polled are flaty opposed to concentrating state power in the hands of one person, a quarter assures that "our people are in constant need of a strong hand", and another 15 per cent admit that this "happens to be necessary in some situations".

Some replies to the questionnaire can prompt where lie the sources of this state of mentality in society. These are the misfortunes and offenses people have experienced, their fear of war and violence. And although less than a tenth of respondents personally took part in any hostilities whatsoever, 55 per cent happened to be "under the tough leadership of a power-thirsty person", 64 per cent had to act obeying someone else's will, and 57 per cent experienced injustice (a third—verbal insults, one in ten—assault and battery).

Our study has confirmed that the public believes that in the army what is known as "relations unprescribed by the regulations" remains one of the sources of violence. This phenomenon can be seen as a partial case of inequitable, authoritarian-suppressive relations in collectives, at school and in the family. The authoritarian complex is a complex because it ensures itself with reasons and pretexts: fear justifies violence, violence breeds fear.

Are you happy?

About a quarter do not know the answer to this question. Can Soviet men and women consider themselves happy? Seven per cent of respondents called themselves to be perfectly happy, and 39 per cent said they were "rather happy in general" (according to American data, the figures in the United States are 33 and 55 per cent respectively). All in all, for 46 per cent of Soviets the balance of joys and adversities is positive on the whole. Fifteen per cent consider themselves to be unhappy. But, for all that, a mere 16 per cent of respondents would like their children to be able to be happy (thrice as many want their children to aspire for knowledge, and four times more want them to be honest). Just as many believe that happiness is "not the most important thing in life". Even less people understand the fragility of happiness and treasure it to the utmost (5 percent). Thus, we value happiness as much as we don't treasure it, and even less we know what it is and whether we have a right to lay claims to it.

Health Ministry Statistics, Future Viewed

90US0752A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, 31 Mar-6 Apr 90 p 6

[Article by V. Romanenko under the rubric "Medicine: Facts and Figures" based on "data from the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Health": "Will the Health Ministry Be Eliminated?"]

[Text] Although the Health Ministry budget has increased significantly over the past three years (to R27.3 billion in 1990, 2.5 billion greater than in 1989), the residual principle is preserved to a certain degree. The share of the gross national product going to public health care remains, as before, within three percent, while it is reaching six to eight percent in all European countries.

The infant death rate in 1989 went down to a level unprecedented in the history of Soviet health care—22.2 occurrences per thousand births; incidence of infectious disease dropped by 12.3 million occurrences; dysentery—by 200,000 cases; measles—by 30 percent.

An additional R5.4 billion was allocated to increasing 12th Five-Year Plan expenditure norms for feeding the ill, procuring medicines and medical equipment.

There are presently 26 diagnostic centers functioning in the country; by the end of 1990 another 11 will become operational.

Thirty-one scientific research institutes have been eliminated; the USSR Ministry of Health apparatus has been reorganized.

In 1988, 16,008 construction and remodeling projects were rejected, having failed to meet health requirements; construction of 1,821 facilities was suspended.

The fundamentals of public health legislation of the USSR and of the union republics, and the Law on State Public Health Oversight in the USSR have been submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Laws are being drafted "on protecting the health of the population," "on the protection of mothers and children," "on social insurance for the health of USSR citizens," and the state program "preventing illness and shaping a healthy lifestyle for the population prior to the year 2000."

The USSR Ministry of Health presented to the government and CPSU Central Committee the question of the need to adopt a law in the country on the production and use of pesticides. A provision regarding state hospital insurance funds is being developed.

A unified AIDS-prevention service has been established which includes 21 republic and regional centers and more than 800 diagnostic laboratories. A new law is under development, "on AIDS prevention," which will establish the rights of infected individuals to social assistance and designate the responsibilities of medical

personnel with regard to these people. Today 430 AIDS-infected Soviet citizens are registered in the country. Twenty-seven citizens are registered as being ill with the disease (of whom 14 have died). Individuals designated as HIV-positive have already been identified in 11 republics.

Life-expectancy figures remain at the 1988 level.

According to sociological research data, over half the population is dissatisfied with the operation of hospitals, clinics, and maternity facilities.

About 270,000 women are currently engaged in heavy physical labor.

Seven million abortions occur annually in the country for every 5.5 million births. The economic detriment proceeding from abortions and associated gynecological illnesses exceeds R1 billion. The purchase of contraceptives has risen sharply. In particular, the number of hormonal contraceptives has increased from 6,195,000 packages in 1986 to 32,800,000 in 1990.

Every year the plan for bringing new public health institutions into operation is underfulfilled by approximately R200 million. In 1989 the public health branch failed to use funding amounting to almost R600 million.

Financial allocations designated by Gosplan [State Planning Committee] for the purchase of medical equipment comprise just 10 percent of what is actually required.

Losses incurred over a three-year period through shortages, theft, and spoilage of drugs and medicines grew by 40 percent on the whole in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic] (from 3.5 to 4.9 million rubles); in the USSR—by almost 25 percent (from 5.3 to 6.6 million rubles). Irresponsibility on the part of drug supply personnel causes medicines in critically short supply to become spoiled, including those purchased abroad. In 1986 in the RSFSR alone, medicines in the amount of R105,000 were written off.

The situation concerning domestically produced medicinal preparations will become even worse in 1990. The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a measure for construction of a number of "turnkey" pharmaceutical enterprises. In two or three years this will provide the country with most of its medicinal preparations. The task has been assigned of providing the entirety of children's medicines required in 1991, the remainder—by 1993.

Ye.I. Chazov: "Regarding the future, we must raise the question that in the second half of the 13th Five-Year Plan, after basic matters of medical treatment are transferred to the jurisdiction of the republics, the USSR Health Ministry will be converted into a scientific-methodology, methods, and coordinating organ with highly restricted functions. It is possible that in 1992-1993 the question of its elimination will be raised. To the degree that republic public health ministries become consolidated, the necessity will arise to establish a State Committee on Public Health Care, and the Ministry of Health will become part of it in the form of a Main Health Services Administration. The Sanatorium Administration should move there (from the jurisdiction of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions), as should the State Committee on Sports and Physical Training, in the form of an administration."

Radio Views Attitude Towards Jews

LD0204223190 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] A recent poll in and around Moscow designed to find more about attitudes to Jews and the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union was conducted by Houston University of the U.S. and the sociology institute under the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Some of the questions, such as: Do you like Jews? or, if the choice is between people and money, would a Jew go for money? had better be left on the compiler's conscience. More substantially, when the results were published, newspaper reports in the West jumped to a conclusion that there ws a mounting tide of antisemitism in the Soviet Union. Is that so? Yuriy Minayev of our staff writes:

Since no identity was given of people who made such conclusions, that leaves U.S. pollsters as the only source. In the meantime, a formal reply by the sociology institute suggests that a general impression of growing antisemitic mood is there, although the bulk of those polled said they felt about Jews as much as they did about other ethnic groups. But almost none of them, individually, had anything against Jews. If so the Western conclusion about a rising wave of antisemitism in this country remains to be clarified.

A rough conclusion by the institute itself is that the Jewish problem and the danger of antisemitic sentiments are being fanned up deliberately with public mood being swayed in this direction. But the questions to be answered, however, are by whom and why?

The USSR Supreme Soviet has passed a new law on responsibility for encroachments on the ethnic equality of citizens. The new law declares illegal all activities fanning ethnic or racial hostility or discord as well as violence on ethnic, racial or religious grounds. Individuals guilty of fanning ethnic discord will be held responsible under the acting legislation.

Scale, Urgency of Refugee Problem Viewed

PM3003100190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Article by special correspondents A. Ganelin and I. Chernyak under the rubric "The National Question": "Carried Away by the Wind"]

[Text] Until recently they loved to sit comfortably at home with a cup of strong tea, watching the "Vzglyad"

program on television. They took pleasure in their New Year fir tree and talked about their holiday plans. If anyone had said to them that soon they would not be able to sleep at nights but would lie awake listening out for suspicious sounds....

... February in Moscow was foul and slushy. Mud, snow, salt, sand: All this was mixed together underfoot outside the "Prazhskaya" Metro Station, and the indifferent tide of human feet compacted this glutinous mass still further. Few paid any attention to the two women with a shawl and small box, at the bottom of which could be seen some coins and crumpled ruble notes. They were not begging: They were collecting for refugees from Baku. The atmosphere of general indifference was broken by an elderly woman, who shouted: "You Armenians are all parasites, used to trading rather than working! Clear off!" She was supported by others: "This is provocation! They have been given R100 each, what more do they want?"

Give Us Somewhere to Live!

The Armenian permanent mission in Moscow. Armenians are not the only ones to have found refuge here: There are also Russians, Azerbaijanis, Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles. The notices on scraps of paper at the entrance read like those from wartime: "Zhanna from Baku. I am looking for you. Valya." "Kasya Abramova: I am looking for my brother, Karen Kazarov." "If anyone knows the whereabouts of Izabella Nikolayevna Atalyants, please contact me. Her daughter, Irina Ferzaliyeva, is looking for her. I am in the children's room...."

In the sports hall there are mattresses: About 60 people sleep here, side by side, and it is also in here, at the tennis table, that children are given their meals.... A gray-haired man with medal ribbons is curled up in a chair.... A bent, blind old woman dressed in black is being taken somewhere by her daughter.... A mother is sitting on the floor, breast-feeding a child.... There is a notice on the wall written in a child's handwriting: "Give us somewhere to live!...."

Two months after the events in Baku, about 200 people were living in this building.

Others, they say, have been more lucky. They have been housed in hotels, Pioneer camps, boarding houses, and leisure centers. It is no secret that people have tried to find asylum in Moscow. Not to stay here forever, but simply because it is easier to gain access to the authorities to get what they want.

The "Severnaya" Hotel is one of those that have given shelter to the refugees. We went into Room 34, completely at random. In the room were about 20 people, the air stale, children crawling on the floor. Eleven people are officially "registered" in Room 34: from a 10-month-old baby to a 70-year-old woman.

We repeat: They have been living like this for two months.

"I am sorry I smell unpleasant, but I have no change of clothes," an 80-year-old man said, in tears. "I last washed on 14 January, in Baku. I am an invalid, my eyesight is poor, and I need to be bathed. My wife was struck with paralysis when we first arrived here. So I am alone, on the verge of starvation. This is all the money I have." He pulled a 10-ruble note and a few coins out of his pocket. "Help me," and, with pleading eyes, he showed us his insignia book, passport, and CPSU veteran papers....

What does the future hold? This is a question to which hundreds of thousands of people are awaiting an answer. But no one can give them an answer.

Moscow does not believe the tears. You hear frequent mention of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis who swan around Moscow in taxis, buy up gold, and speculate at the markets. Yes, there are such people. They engage in speculation and get apartments for fantastic sums of money. But are they the only ones doing this? After all, you do not need a passport to get into the underground economy! Some are now finding it hard to make ends meet: Those who have had to pay for others' prosperity. God will be the judge of those who raise their hand to throw stones at them.

In this article we will not attempt to describe the living conditions of the families of military servicemen evacuated from Baku to barracks outside Moscow, or of the Azerbaijanis driven out of Armenia, or of the Meskhetian Turks who have miraculously gotten through the winter in the Russian Non-Chernozem Zone, or of the many others who have been torn from their homes by the wave of interethnic discord. Just take our word for it that most of them are not having an easy time of it.

Vicious Circle

"We were unprepared: It all happened very suddenly." This excuse can be found in many statements by officials. They were unprepared two years ago, when the first refugees from Sumgait appeared. And they have been unprepared ever since. Today the flood of people leaving Baku is like another bolt from the blue. But, you know, as early as last fall refugees were besieging people's deputies, pestering the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry and the USSR Prosecutor's Office, having meetings with R. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, and demanding that attention be given to their problems. Their arguments have been ignored. Although the need to create a legal mechanism guaranteeing protection for the rights of refugees in the Soviet Union has long been under discussion, no results have been forthcoming. The number of people abandoning their homes had to top the half million mark before the "men at the top" would admit that a problem even existed.

Now it has begun. Numerous commissions, staffs, centers, and services are being feverishly set up, decisions and resolutions adopted, hundreds of people torn from their main employment.... Everything is being done that

is always done. As always, the collection of money and clothing has been announced: Let us all pull together! Certainly we will all pull together. But the state's refugee problems cannot be resolved by worldly philanthropy. You get the impression that the institutions concerned are also approaching the problem on the basis of what appear to be voluntary principles. The USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems Migration Administration does not even have a photocopier to duplicate the lists of refugees.

One noteworthy point is that many have still not received the R100 which the government decided should be allocated to every refugee from Baku. There is not even any point in mentioning the items to the value of R200 which people have been promised should they need them (incidentally, how is one to define who needs them and who does not?)

"But why have the victims of the accident in Ufa been paid R10,000 each and the Meskhetian Turks R2,000 per head of family plus R500 for every family member, while we are being paid considerably less?" people from Baku asked us more than once. What could we say? That the Turks have been paid compensation like anyone else who moves to the Non-Chernozem Zone and that the amount paid to the Azerbaijanis from Armenia is perfectly ludicrous? Later we put this question to L. Gorshkov, USSR people's deputy and deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.

"The answer is that there is no nationwide procedure," Leonid Aleksandrovich replied. "Draft laws concerning refugees were drawn up last year but are still 'doing the rounds' at the top. Hence the confusion in the payments procedure. When people fled from Fergana a resolution was adopted, then another was adopted when people fled from Baku. Now people are arriving from Dushanbe and no decision has been adopted at all. So we have agreed that we are not going to wait, that we will pay them the same amount of money as the people from Baku have been given, and that we will issue documents giving them the right to live and work anywhere they like in Russia, with the exception of Moscow and Moscow Oblast."

They will have the right, but how is that right to be exercised? We have frequently heard people say that they cannot get work without a residence permit and that they cannot get a residence permit without work.

If only it were just a question of getting a residence permit! But where are they to live? Where are they to work? Ministry officials are now going round boarding houses and hotels and presenting the refugees with various options. They try to take their wishes into account: Armenians are not invited to go to the north, the Urals, or Siberia and city dwellers are only offered cities. But they have not been very successful: For example, only just over 1,000 people have been placed in employment with the aid of the RSFSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems.

"I have been involved with this problem for 18 months and have a right to say that most refugees from Sumgait and a considerable number from Baku are determined to stay in Moscow, whatever they may have said before," P. Rudnev, head of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems Migration Administration, believes.

It is possible, of course, that Petr Sergeyevich has a better insight into the situation. But, in that case, what are these people with neither house nor home in the capital hoping for? Perhaps the suggestions put to them are not quite what they seem? After all, you can give a family three options that you know to be unacceptable and then wash your hands of them, saying they are too fussy. You would probably be fussy yourself if, in place of your four-room apartment in the capital of a republic—an apartment for which you waited 15 years and from which you were driven in breach of all laws—someone tried to put you in a hostel in a rayon center in the central region! "But giving refugees housing out of turn would mean putting local people's backs up. In Dushanbe there are enough rumors to cause an explosion," you will object.

"We need to define the status of the refugee and his rights and responsibilities," is the kind of thing you hear increasingly often lately. But, according to P. Rudnev, the adoption of this status will be opposed by such powerful departments as the Internal Affairs Ministry and the State Planning Committee. The reason? There are fears that this will give rise to a new wave of refugees. And it will not be a question of paying out R100 or even R2,000: In one city, for example, the public refugee committee sets the figure at R20,000. Where is the money going to come from?

"We need a USSR Council of Ministers reserve fund. People must be paid compensation out of the resources of the republic which allowed the lawlessness to happen," L. Gorshkov believes. "We also need a ministry or committee for national affairs, the kind that existed in the first years after the revolution. Because the Soviet of Nationalities and its commissions are really concerned with legislative authority.... We need a migration service, such as one finds in all civilized countries, union and republic-level organs to coordinate work with migrants, and a network of evacuation centers in the republics."

The fact that the flood of refugees has abated for the moment should not mean that we sit back and relax. Also, it has noticeably increased outside the U.S. embassy.

What Does the Future Hold?

Let us remind ourselves that Azerbaijanis driven out of Armenia played the most active role in the events in Baku. They were the detonator which caused the explosion. They were embittered, reduced to despair, and consequently ready for anything. The authorities in both

republics—to say nothing of the center—cast them into the arms of fate. So is it surprising that these people took to the streets?

The republic has now set up a state committee for work with people forced to leave their place of permanent residence. It is allocated construction materials and money, and more work places are being created. The Azerbaijan Refugee Association has also been set up and already has R8 million on its books, in donations from labor collectives and private individuals.

"I must point out that most of the work is done using our own resources, without help from Moscow," V. Techenin, a senior official from the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, stressed in a conversation with us.

But it took pogroms, mass evacuations, and a curfew before the authorities finally lifted a finger to do something!

There have been no notable changes in other regions. There have been some changes, however. Whereas before people were fairly willing to take in refugees, there is now growing resentment. Some stores have pasted up signs saying "for refugees only," which is causing bad feeling among the indigenous population. And in some places people are indignant that the new arrivals are engaging in trade and joining cooperatives—something not very well received among locals.

"Labor collective councils are holding meetings and deciding not to accept refugees for work," A. Blokhin told us. "The Law on Labor Collectives gives them that right. Whereas previously it was possible to 'put pressure' on the management of an enterprise, nowadays you have to talk them round. And you certainly are not always successful in this."

Now in possession of greater rights, people at local level no longer automatically accept everything "with a salute" as they did in the past. The Krasnodar Kray Soviet Executive Committee, for example, has adopted the decision not to give residence permits to refugees and to sell homes exclusively to "their own people." But we must not be in too much a hurry to condemn the kray authorities: The number of refugees of various nationalities who have accumulated here is way above all permissible norms.

Thousands of refugees still cling to the hope that everything will turn out all right in the end and they will be able to go back home. But, left to their own devices, events are going from bad to worse. We were informed by the RSFSR Council of Ministers that proposals are being drawn up on the inadvisability of holding conferences in Moscow and on reducing the number of tourist itineraries and visits to the capital, including weekend excursions. Specialist assignments in Moscow have to be authorized by the minister. This is hardly likely to be received with approval at local level.

"There is no single person who could solve the problem of the refugees from their standpoint," P. Rudnev believes. "The state administrative system which used to function, albeit not very well, has broken down. We are facing a crisis of authority. The question of what awaits these people must be answered. The answer may be difficult but it must be honest. People must be told the truth: Things are not going to get better. Moscow and the Moscow region are unable to show hospitality for very long, especially as the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee is doing its utmost to oppose work with the refugees. We have received information that a number of labor collectives are threatening strike action if we do not evict the refugees from boarding houses in the near future—and summer is just around the corner. They are supported in this by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions...."

It will be interesting to see how they evict them. With the help of the militia? Or troops? Or will they just leave it up to the mob?

In many respects we are being prevented from building a civilized society by the mines laid during Stalin's time. They must be defused. But we, too, are planting a mine under the future. That mine is called the refugees.

According to preliminary data, during the last two years some 600,000 people have been forced to leave their place of permanent residence. A total of 330,000 people have left Azerbaijan; 173,000 have left Armenia; and 64,000 have left Uzbekistan. The main bulk of the refugees are concentrated in the following areas: 200,000 in Azerbaijan; 230,000 in Armenia; and 150,000 in the RSFSR. So far 60,000 refugees have registered in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. This is only the beginning. We should cast off our illusions: Things are not going to calm down in the future. We can expect migrations from the Baltic, Moldavia, and Central Asia in the near future.

People are fleeing in the belief that it offers the only possibility to ensure their personal safety. But the regions to which they are fleeing are afraid that they could suddenly get "my" apartment, buy "my" television set, and eat "my" meat. We have no other option: Either we sharply increase the quantity of apartments, meat, refrigerators, and much else or the idea of "driving out" the new mouths to feed will become increasingly popular among the masses.

Since the events in Baku, Dushanbe, and other cities, the frightened Russian population is leaving and, until stability returns, will continue to leave for Russia. It is not hard to guess what will start to happen if they find themselves in the same position there as the refugees from Armenia and Baku.

Some 60 million people in our country do not live in their historical homeland. It is terrifying to even imagine that they could become refugees. What would happen during an upheaval on that kind of scale? An explosion? Chaos? Pogroms?

...Our country spans 11 time zones. If the situation gets any worse, we could find ourselves living under curfew in all of them.

Media Officials Confer on Information Problems

PM0903155590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 90 Second Edition p 8

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Journalist and Time": "In the Mirror of Information"]

[Text] As already reported, a "roundtable" has taken place at our newspaper's editorial offices with the participation of representatives of departmental press centers. Questions of the work efficiency of the current information services under conditions of perestroyka and glasnost were discussed. The meeting was chaired by V. Snegirev, member of the PRAVDA Editorial Board and editor of the information department.

Moderator:

Glasnost has radically changed our life. There has been a real revolution in the mass media, and literature, the cinema, and the theater have changed. There are no forbidden subjects. There is no ideological censorship. No one muffles foreign "radio voices." People have been swamped by diverse information reflecting the realities of today's world in all their complex fullness.

Such an information "explosion" is a complex sociopsychological phenomenon in need of comprehensive study. You and I have gathered here to discuss more local problems associated with the receipt and dissemination of information. Frankly speaking, we have another interest, too: I would like to hear from those present businesslike advice, criticisms, and suggestions aimed at improving the contents of PRAVDA itself. You see, the newspaper is changing and seeking opportunities for a sharper and more profound discussion with the reader and the all-around interpretation of the processes that have overwhelmed the party and the country.

And, finally, I would like to hear your views on the work of departmental press services. Under conditions of perestroyka and glasnost the activity of this great detachment of journalists is assuming special significance.

M. Agranovich, press center of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification:

I will begin with the last point. Our press center is approximately 10 years old. We work, above all, with the sector's large-circulation press—approximately 80 newspapers with a print run of 140,000 copies. We supply them with Power and Electrification Ministry information and TASS and APN information materials, provide methods assistance, and hold newspaper competitions. The second task is associated with supplying the central press, radio, and television with information. We order both movies and individual materials for showing in the "Good Evening Moscow!" and "Vremya" programs.

But sometimes we feel as though we are profoundly isolated within the department: We do not know what our colleagues are doing or how they participate in resolving their sector's problems. And yet the national economy is a unified organism. I have a suggestion: In order to strengthen our positions, it is necessary to produce a catalogue of all press centers and press services. For some reason the Journalists' Union brushes us aside.

V. Tomarovskiy, press bureau of the USSR KGB:

Our subdepartment has been in existence in its present form since 1979. But it should be pointed out that until last year its functions were limited. We mainly advised on authors' manuscripts and materials for the mass media and the cinema concerning the history and activity of KGB organs and troops. However, we never abused "censorship" functions, not that we had such functions in fact.

Much is changing now. Our contacts are expanding, and we have gotten new tasks of widely informing the Soviet public and strengthening communication with working people in the light of the well-known decision of the USSR KGB Collegium.

Today there are no closed topics in the coverage of KGB activity—with the exception of certain quite understandable aspects conditioned by security requirements. In all other areas we can supply practically any exhaustive information.

Our representatives readily participate in news conferences, appear on television, and provide appropriate explanations in newspaper pages on particular aspects. People have many questions to put to our department, and we do not intend to avoid answering them.

Incidentally, our openness has not gone unnoticed by foreign representatives of the mass media either. For example, a Japanese television company group recently finished working with us, having made a movie on the KGB's present activity. The guests had an opportunity to visit a number of our installations and to meet with people. Earlier the movie "The KGB Today" had been made jointly with APN.

Ye. Arapov, press center of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]:

What if we all organized a "PRAVDA Friends Club?" I propose discussing this idea. Over the past year PRAVDA devoted 12 full pages to trade union topics. The newspaper is well aware how important it is today to discuss the destiny of the working people's movement and the revival of the trade unions as V.I. Lenin saw them.

Now about information in our world of information. I am a graduate of the old school of journalism. I was once taught that a fire is news, while an AUCCTU plenum is not. Maybe those empty, ceremonially soulless plenums that were being held just a few years ago really did not

merit even a 10-line mention. But now everything is different. Life is in full swing all around, and people want prompt, accurate, objective information on what is happening. This is why we have set up a network of trade union press centers at all levels.

Moderator:

But let us return to what, strictly speaking, is called information genres. Does it not seem to you that the mass media have been swamped by waves of reports of a quite definite type: on crimes, accidents, catastrophes, natural disasters? On the one hand, this can be accounted for by the bans on such reports going back many years (even many decades)—such a thing always happens when "floodgates" are opened. On the other hand, information on this reflects events that are actually happening, and so it would seem to have every right to life. But this is the question: Are we not in this way developing in the reader some sort of complex of uncertainty and fear? Maybe we should still retain a sense of proportion in supplying current information? For events with a "plus" sign, so to speak, do happen in the country—do we not forget about them in favor of criminal or scandalous news items?

Understand me correctly: I am certainly not calling for the truth to be "truncated" or for glasnost to be subjectively measured out in doses. No, I favor full glasnost, which presupposes precisely comprehensive coverage of reality and different colors on the journalist's palette, not just black.

Major General G. Kashuba, press center of the Ministry of Defense:

What you are saying is particularly applicable to coverage of life in the Armed Forces. The mass media now devote a lot of attention to the problems which have accumulated among us. I will not go into how this is done but will speak of something else: Because of total criticism, much that is interesting in Army and Navy daily life escapes the reader. Our people accomplish exploits, master new hardware, and have their own artistic collectives. We military people need support now more than ever.

The press center of the Ministry of Defense was established quite recently, at the end of 1989. We are still at the formative stage. Incidentally, with regard to the talk of "PRAVDA Friends Clubs" I can say that we are getting reports that such clubs are being set up in many military units. The newspaper has many friends. We can see all the changes that are taking place at PRAVDA. And yet I believe that the newspaper provides scant coverage of military life, and this, in my view, impoverishes its contents. Everything that concerns the Army is of tremendous interest to millions of young people, above all.

A. Komarovskiy, "Glasnost" Agency under the USSR Journalists' Union:

The question of of a good balance between diverse information is, above all, a question of the publication's position and the editors' professional and civic maturity. Of course, it is not right when information is selected only according to the principle "strawberries" or "mushrooms." It is desirable for all the colors in the spectrum of life to be represented. It must not be forgotten that the printed word (as well as the television word) both heals and maims. How is it to be used? Particularly when passions are inflamed and emotions overflow.

Our agency, which mainly unites retired professional journalists, provides paid services in the production of bulletins, the compilation of press releases, and the preparation and dissemination of information. We produce the newspaper RAYONNYYE BUDNI in the capital's Volgogradskiy Rayon. We also fulfill the functions of the press center of the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building.

It seems to me that departmental press centers sometimes find it hard to surmount the barriers that have taken shape: There is a lack of mutual understanding between the departments and the big press. On the one hand, departments see representatives of the press as people who only seek where to latch on to something and to strike the most telling blow—which, from my viewpoint, does not correspond to reality. On the other hand, because of a lack of information, the press also sometimes regards the departments as nests of bureaucrats.

V. Kovtun, press center of the USSR Ministry of Installation and Special Construction Work:

First, I thank PRAVDA for bringing us all together. I believe this is only the second time this has happened in many, many years. It is a pity: The vast detachment of professional journalists is disunited and "left to its own devices." As has already been pointed out here, the Journalists' Union is indifferent toward us, and there is no other common "roof"—maybe PRAVDA really will gather together, at least occasionally, representatives of departmental press services to exchange experience and to discuss common problems. I vote with both hands for such a "Friends Club."

At one time PRAVDA criticized ministries' press centers quite sharply and cast doubt on the very need for their existence. Well, there were some grounds for this in the article: to serve the ambitions of high-ranking officials, to defend the honor of the uniform, to publicize ministry signboards at any price—this really is not acceptable. But why not publicize real achievements, if there are any? Why not build a bridge between the department and the mass media? In the West any firm that is at all decent has a "public relations" service, i.e. for contacts with the public, publicity, and propaganda.

Moderator:

I entirely agree with you. The policy of glasnost and openness presupposes both a quantitative and a qualitative growth in information services—this is a natural law for any developed and democratic society.

But now let us speak about secrecy. We all remember the not so distant times when there were so many restrictions and prohibitions that the entire country seemed to be ensnared in a single solid military secret. Much has now been abolished. And yet you occasionally hear complaints that every department still draws up huge lists of secret installations, topics, and so forth, including on them absolutely everything that occurs to it.

G. Kashuba:

It seems to me that journalists sometimes create a problem artificially here. I, for example, have repeatedly heard my comrades on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and other publications complain that they are not allowed to write about something. But if you delve into the essence of the matter and look at the list, it turns out that they can. The colleagues simply do not know a great deal.

B. Mikhailov, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] press center:

The fact that the shroud of secrecy has been removed from all criminal statistics is greatly to the credit of our press center. We persistently aimed for this at all levels. Now some people are accusing us of inundating them with a statistical stream of truly terrible figures. We are told: You have filled the newspapers with criminal statistics. And negative indicators are indeed increasing. People are worried by this. But it is also making them take adequate measures. We believe that we should not conceal, but sensibly channel, the flow of information, without "fixing" or concealing anything.

Briefings and press conferences in our USSR MVD take place once a week. We bring out problems of combatting organized crime and drug addiction, we talk about the professional preparation of cadres and technical equipment....

Last year alone more than 2,000 journalists approached us about various questions, and we tried to help each one of them. An information-analysis group operates as part of the press center. There are problems with foreign currency everywhere, so we decided to earn it ourselves, and we have done so. We have opened a foreign currency account at the press center and have made contact with the appropriate foreign agencies which come to us for information. Now we have our own computers, soon we are to open our own television studio.

Moderator:

We are well aware of the activity of the USSR MVD press center. Incidentally, on behalf of PRAVDA workers I thank you for the help you have given the newspaper: We constantly receive from you diverse reference material, advice, and information about subjects for interesting assignments. This cooperation could become an example for others.

V. Aushev, USSR Council of Ministers Main Customs Administration press center:

Although there are still only two people in our press service, we have begun to compile and produce our own publications—BYULLETEN TAMOZHENNOY INFORMATSII and TAMOZHENNYY VESTNIK [Bulletin of Customs Information and Customs Herald]. The bulletin is virtually an independent journal publication comprising six pages. The print run is still small—30,000 copies. We will talk about the history of customs work, publish all kinds of information relating to normative acts, and discuss the campaign against smuggling.

I fully support the proposal to coordinate the efforts of various press clubs. This is very important in our times. If PRAVDA takes us under its wing this will be very good.

A. Goryachev, MGU [Moscow State University] student and editor of STUDINFORMO:

Our news agency was set up under the MGU Faculty of Journalism as a source of serious information. For instance, it was precisely our correspondent who obtained information that homeless people live in Mukhina's well-known sculpture "The Worker and the Kolkhoz Woman." This news was then used by many publications.

Moderator:

Of course, during our meeting there was no chance for deep discussion of all information problems in glasnost conditions. We think that this is just the first step toward serious interpretation of these problems and the search for new approaches to the work of the information services and their more efficient cooperation with the press, radio, and television.

PRAVDA invites you to more energetic creative cooperation. We think that one more "Friends' Club" of our newspaper has begun to operate.

Economic

Ryzhkov Chairs Foreign Trade Cooperatives Meeting

PM0404102590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 4 Apr 90 p 2

[TASS report: "At USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers examined on 3 April issues concerning the external economic activities of cooperatives. USSR ministers, the leaders of central economic departments, and also representatives of cooperatives and their unions were invited to the session.

A report on the results of the work of cooperatives carrying out operations on the external market was given by Stepan Sitaryan, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers. He noted that about 2,500 cooperatives had been registered as participants in foreign economic links during the year following the introduction of the new foreign economic activity procedures. They are actively developing work on overseas markets.

At the same time, there are shortcomings and violations of the existing legislation in the activity of some individual cooperatives. As was shown by a check carried out on the instructions of the government, substantial shortcomings at present are as follows: the predominance of intermediary activity, which is not in keeping with the type of the cooperative and which becomes a source from which speculative profit is derived; the low level of commercial work on external markets.

Representatives of cooperative organizations and their unions who took part in the session provided information about the difficulties they have encountered during the year that has passed since they were given the right to operate in foreign markets. They drew attention to shortcomings in the system of organization of foreign economic activity.

Instructions were issued at the session itself that further work be done on some of the questions raised by cooperatives' representatives.

Summarizing the results of the discussion, Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers stressed that the new procedure for carrying out foreign economic activity had created conditions to involve an ever growing number of enterprises and state and cooperative organizations in work on foreign markets and to increase the country' export potential. An analysis of the cooperatives' foreign economic activity last year reveals both positive and negatives aspects and shows that there are many unresolved issues and that a whole series of provisions of existing laws need to be amended and improved, in connection with which there have emerged crude violations, both as far as state and cooperative enterprises are concerned.

After pointing out that cooperatives' foreign economic activity demonstrates the cooperative movement's great potential, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers noted that the strengthening of the foundations of market economy will require homegeneity of economic laws for enterprises which belong to various ownership categories, strengthening of financial discipline, fine-tuning of accountability, and strengthening of the customs service and other state structures which regulate the market. He stressed that the further development of foreign economic activity, in which cooperatives are expected to play a substantial role, will be one of the main areas for radicalizing the economic reform.

The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium has issued an instruction to the effect that proposals should be made ready quickly concerning the essential changes to the existing laws on issues of foreign economic activity, strengthening of the customs service, improving the system of licensing of export-import operations, and enhancing the role of the USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations in carrying out foreign economic policy. It was deemed necessary to accelerate the preparation of draft new legislative acts regulating foreign economic activity and improve information and cadre policy.

Finance Ministry on Uncompleted Projects

LD0304142190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 2 April carries a report on the Soviet budget.

The announcer reminds listeners that the Soviet budget for this year envisages a notable cut in state expenditure on capital construction. Its continual growth has of late been one of the main causes of the difficult finance situation. The first quarter of the year over, what has been achieved? This question is put by correspondent (Valeriy Giosa) to Anatoliy Vasilyevich Blizhenko, head of administration of the USSR Finance Ministry.

Blizhenko says that in 1990 we cut by R13 billion the volume of proposed capital investments and by 22 billion the allocations from the budget for these purposes. Unfortunately if you take the initial figures for the first quarter of 1990 you can see we have not achieved an acceleration in capital construction. The target for capital investment against the level of last year has been fulfilled by only 70 percent at any rate in the first two months of the quarter. Things are no better with commissioning.

Giosa says that in other words, despite the cut in state spending the growth in uncompleted construction continues.

Blizhenko says the effectiveness of capital investment is accounted for in the assessment of the national income growth per invested ruble. Unfortunately the growth in national income per ruble of investment in the past few years has been continually falling. This process has not been halted even today. The fact is, we are taking two to four years to build production facilities instead of one to two years. Effectiveness of investment therefore falls, national income falls, and this means it is difficult to cover the budget deficit, it is difficult to fill the shops with goods and so on.

Last year we cut the capital investment limit, tried to trim down the excess of work undertaken and concentrate on the most important projects. This did not work; work was cut all around regardless of priority: "This trouble continues now too. The number of projects is growing," Blizhenko notes.

Giosa concludes with the observation that the first quarter is however not characteristic for the whole year, and we must wait hopefully for the next results.

Agriculture

Ligachev Chairs Central Committee Agrarian Panel

PM0304152190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Policy Commission Session"]

[Text] A routine session of the CPSU Central Committee Agrarian Policy Commission has been held under the chairmanship of Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

It discussed questions connected with the development of housing and sociocultural construction in the light of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum in villages of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and the improvement of peasants' living conditions. Reports were delivered by A.A. Babenko, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and Yu.M. Khusainov, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

The speakers noted that the current five-year plan has seen a rise in the rate of growth of capital investments in the development of sociocultural facilities in the countryside, particularly in Russia, by 16 percent, and in Belorussia, by 39 percent. More housing, schools, clubs, and medical establishments have been commissioned than ever before. The increase in the pace of highway construction has been particularly great. Yet the social reorganization of the countryside remains a most acute problem.

During the exchange of opinions, in which Ye.S. Stroyev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Purchases; A.M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee; A.F. Ponomarev, first secretary of Belgorod CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committeee]; N.F. Tatarchuk, first secretary of Kalinin CPSU Obkom; D.K. Motornyy, chairman of the kolkhoz named for Kirov in Kherson Oblast; and others participated, it was stressed that a number of regions have not yet adopted enough measures to ensure the priority development of the social sphere in the countryside, and the construction of housing and cultural and consumer facilities is too slow.

Unsatisfactory material and technical supplies for construction work are inhibiting the development of the rural social sphere. Without good cause the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] is setting low norms for the consumption of materials through an excessive increase in economy targets and the reduction of production reserve normatives.

Society must believe that the country can only be provided with plenty of food if production arrangements in the countryside are radically improved and the peasant has enough equipment and social facilities. Moreover, rural workers must be granted maximum independence and initiative so that they really do become the owners of the land.

The commission recommended that the RSFSR and Belorussian SSR State Agro-industrial Committees, the USSR Gosplan, Gossnab [State Committee for Material-Technical Supply], State Committee for Construction, and State Committee for Architecture and Town Planning, and other ministries and departments make a practical effort to ensure the priority development of the rural social infrastructure. Special attention should be paid to developing the construction industry base and local construction materials, increasing the production of bricks and ferroconcrete and carpentry articles, and satisfying more fully the demand for cement, metal, and sanitary engineering and heating equipment. There was emphasis on the idea of industrial ministries' extensive involvement in creating production facilities to produce equipment for the manufacture of materials and structures for use in rural construction.

Telegrams and letters are being received from oblasts and republics about interruptions in supplies of materials and equipment for kolkhozes and sovkhozes, peasant farms, and personal plots. Agriculture is sustaining major losses and in some places the best times for field work will soon be past. In view of this the commission considered it necessary for P.I. Mostovoy, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gossnab, to report to the session on material and technical supplies for the agro-industrial complex. Numerous instances were cited of gross violations of state discipline in the supply of equipment, mineral fertilizers, and fuel and lubricants. Further specific examples were given in the speeches by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of Krasnodar CPSU Kray Committee, and V.M. Vidmanov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Agro-industrial Committee.

There was serious criticism of the Communists in charge of a number of USSR ministries and departments, who are failing to insist that enterprises and organizations strictly observe delivery plans and contract pledges.

In his closing speech Ye.K. Ligachev stressed that the questions under discussion are of an exceptionally important, social nature. All the legal prerequisites have been established for their solution, as embodied in the laws on ownership and land and on the lease system adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet. They have the backing of working people in agriculture, in the processing sectors, and the sectors providing services. And it

is very important to strengthen the material and technical base of the agro-industrial complex as quickly as possible and create the requisite social conditions in the countryside.

The main thing is to significantly increase production of bricks, wood and ferroconcrete structures, and facing materials. There is also the even more acute question of manufacturing independent heating installations for apartment blocks and sanitary engineering equipment for them.

The set aims can only be achieved through concerted efforts by city and countryside and concrete work by ministries, departments, and local party, soviet, and economic organs. Attention was paid to improving the activities of party organizations in construction workers' and planners' collectives and at construction materials and products enterprises.

The commission members were shown an exhibition of planning studies by USSR State Committee for Construction scientific research organizations on the comprehensive architectural and planning organization of construction in the countryside.

Scientific

Scientific Director on Marafon Satellite System

LD0304114990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1115 GMT on 2 April broadcasts a 13-minute program entitled "Topical Interview: Space Communications, New Horizons", in which special correspondent Leonid Lazarevich interviews Doctor of Technical Sciences Aleksandr Petrovich (Radimov), chief designer and director-general of the Astra scientific production association. (Radimov) asked about plans to develop a new system of satellite communications—the Marafon (Marathon) system—stresses the importance of developing an efficient communications system in the Soviet Union.

He quotes the USSR minister of communications, who at the Congress of People's Deputies underlined the importance of creation of space communication systems, to be more precise, satellite systems. Developing communications networks by cable systems alone will not solve the requirements of telephone and other communications systems in the USSR, he says. Problems of financing all programs of communication make it necessary to turn to commercial systems of communication.

(Radimov) continues that Comrade Erlen Kirikovich Pervishin, USSR minister of communications and Oleg Nikolayevich Shishkin, USSR minister of general machine building have already signed a decision on setting up an association of enterprises aimed at solving the task of developing a commercial satellite communications system. The priority should be given to the development of a system of communication with mobile objects. Overall calculations show there is a demand for 150-200 thousand mobile and semi-stationary communications sets by the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, fishing fleet, river fleet, and to a greater degree by the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Geology, and some others.

(Radimov) says the Marafon system enables communications equipment for making telephone calls and sending telexes to be installed on all aircraft, trains, and motor vehicle transport. This opens up opportunities to prevent loss of containers and wagons; for example, a type of equipment for containers has been developed, costing somewhere up to R1,000, which enables telecoded information to be transmitted.

(Radimov) answers a question from Lazarevich, saying the work of Energiya scientific production association in launching large communications platforms will not be hampered by the development of the Marafon commercial system of communication, though there is cooperation between the enterprises on this program. Main communications systems such as television broadcasting are at present a state monopoly: the Marafon is a commercial system.

(Radimov) says that the Marafon system will consist first of all of central stations of control and commutation, situated on earth, then base stations and subscriber stations. Then there must also be a control and measuring complex and a space segment, which will include three satellites in stationary orbit and two sets of four satellites in elliptic orbit.

He says financing of the system can be done on various bases by credits, by creating a joint-stock company, by an association of banks purchasing the space segment. About R72 million from various organizations and government departments has been offered to the Marafon system so far. Preparations for production are under way at the manufacturing factories. (Radimov) gives a guarantee that the system will start functioning on 1 January 1993. Defense ministries subject to conversion over the last year, or which are yet to undergo conversion are offering their services to the Marafon developers, though there must be an appropriate technological base and trained staff: in each specific case a working group can be set up to examine the possibility of any enterprise participating in the Marafon project.

Military

Defense Industry Conversion Problems Viewed

PM0404102190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel N. Ustenkov: "Sharp Facets of Conversion"]

[Text] It was with the eyes of a professional, as they say, that I read the lines of the draft of the party Central Committee platform and considered the meaning it

contains and compared it with specific situations. Of course, literally all the draft platform's sections give rise to profound thought and the desire to express one's opinion but, as a military man, what naturally perturbs me primarily are the problems connected with the army, with the defense industry, and in particular the very topical problem that is conversion.

I have only just returned from a Urals plant known to military people for its specific output. Many manufacturing flow lines have now been installed at it. Preparation for the production of consumer goods is in full swing. It would seem we should rejoice at the innovations, but a gloomy atmosphere reigns at the enterprise. There are various reasons. I should like to describe them on the plane of a debate.

"We support the idea of conversion, but look what is happening," I was told by the chief engineer. "There are no new orders. Existing ties have been broken. Supply is starting from nothing. We seem to be no better off than we were at the start..."

It is an open secret that under the conditions of the existing defense industry structure when the proportion of pure military production predominates conversion is becoming a very complex task. It is clear to everyone that it is essential for the maximum use of the accumulated potential in civilian production and for the improvement of the country's economic state. But for scientists and practical experts a package of problems is arising whose solution goes far beyond the framework of technical tasks. The USSR Council of Ministers Presidium has examined the State Program for conversion through 1995. How scientific and organized is the way in which it has been conceived? How does it consider the interests of the Defense Ministry and the sectors of the national economy? How fully does it reflect the complex process of the adaption of military production to the mass production of civilian output? All these questions require not only immediate study but also a genuinely party attitude toward an important matter.

While people "upstairs" are being informed of the program, there is considerable muddle and confusion at the defense complex plants. And that means that it is difficult to implement the thesis from the draft CPSU Central Committee platform reflecting a dual task: not reducing the quality of military equipment and saturating the market with a sufficient quantity of consumer goods.

The first steps of conversion revealed trends which could seriously reduce the effect of all the multilevel work aimed at the recovery of the country's economy. For instance, there has already been a marked increase in the cost of models of equipment produced by the defense sectors of industry, caused primarily by enterprises' transition to economic accountability [khozraschet] and self financing. As a result there is a reduction in the volume of purchases dictated moreover by quotas introduced in financing. This chain inevitably leads to the emergence of surplus capacities. Arbitrary reorientation which is often unjustified and fails to consider output profile leads to the point where shops and plants with unique equipment and a powerful potential of engineering and worker cadres start to produce articles which cartels or local industry could manage. Is that the way for the state or the party to behave?

I am surprised, to say the least, by the neutral stance of the party committees of those enterprises where the conversion of production facilities is leading to the point where people with the highest qualifications are leaving. Long-established production ties are being destroyed. And what about advanced technologies and the obvious slowing down of the implementation of the latest achievements of science and technology? Here lagging behind is not only irreparable but also dangerous. That is why in my view the platform should also clearly reflect these facets of conversion. They can only be considered in full in a state program. Specialists of the Defense Ministry and scientists, production organizers, and representatives of party organs and soviets of people's deputies must take part in working out this program. It is our common business.

The various options for conversion include those which give rise to varied assessments. For instance, we are rushing to transfer very complex manufacturing lines to produce plates or samovars. What is this? A tribute to fashion or chasing after favorable returns?

There is more. On the plan of technological compatibility it is probably impossible to provide for everything. And conversion expenses are inevitable. A tank plant can within just a year produce tractors because the compatibility here is almost ideal. But the prime cost of such a "plowman" increases drastically compared with those produced at tractor enterprises. While it is highly reliable and has other positive qualities it nonetheless loses out in competition because of its expensiveness. Conversion renewal has now encompassed about 400 defense industry enterprises. The picture in many respects is identical almost everywhere. That is why in the immediate future, while conversion is gathering momentum, strict state regulation of the production of civilian output is needed at union level. Considering the easily predictable losses of profit by defense enterprises. It is important to envisage the interests of all echelons of the national economy engaged in reequipping. In terms of their economic indicators they should not automatically slide to the sidelines of progress, as often happens.

Conversion also has one more painful spot which in no way should be overlooked. I have in mind military scientific research structures. The point is that according to the new conversion formulas financing is carried out from what has been achieved, in terms of the overall numerical strength of employees and fixed production capital. However paradoxical it may seem, it is a fact that money is not being earmarked for the implementation of targeted programs needed today and tomorrow!

The question of price formation also still seems very vague. The economic accountability of scientific subdivisions has led to protracted paperwork and to attempts to ascertain the optimum price of developments. It is not surprising that a scientist with a doctor's degree has been turned into an ordinary accountant while collectives have been placed within the strict framework of survival. It is no accident that heated disputes are flaring up about the cost of developments and since the relevant methodologies and accounts exist neither in our country nor abroad a rise in prices is observed.

I am attentively following the discussion of the precongress documents in the press. And it seems to me of fundamental importance that the party organizations are called on to adopt right now all that is best and innovatory and to restructure themselves. Here is a specific situation. Conversion often gives rise to new hotbeds of social tension. And it is a case not only of people who have been working at machine tools in enterprises of the defense sectors. A real outflow of real experts into other spheres of production is already being observed. The picture of a promising worker with a scientific degree being obliged to resign in the full flower of his creative powers and potential has become a typical one in scientific structures. So surely the party committees and bureaus should wait to see what is said at the congress on the subject?

That is what I thought after reading the draft of the fourth section of the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the party congress. I hope my proposals and amendments to the theses on defense will be taken into account.

Better Pay for Soldiers at Chernobyl Urged

PM0304132190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Letter from Major V. Pereverzev, chief of department at Chernigov Oblast's Nosovskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, under the "Sore Point" rubric: "'I'm Not Going to Chernobyl...'"]

[Text] I find myself forced to write to the newspaper, since I cannot comprehend why nobody in the party, the government, or the Ministry of Defense has given a single thought to the flaws in the system for enlisting draftees to work on the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station]. Or at least why nothing is being done to change this unfair system.

I have no intention of passing a judgment for the country as a whole, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to post people from our rayon to Chernobyl. So far we have not had any mass refusal to obey posting orders, but draftees use every possible excuse to avoid the special selection boards. On one occasion, for example, when I had to hand a posting order to someone who had taken the Hippocratic Oath, I had to look for him... under his bed.

I perceive a way out of this situation via the introduction of voluntary principles. This would require paying those who would work in Chernobyl R500, R1,000, and maybe even more per month. At present, draftees who are not at work on the day they are drafted receive R100. That is payment for dangerous work in what is perhaps the most dangerous place on earth.

Of course, all this would require considerable funds. I realize that it is exceptionally difficult to find them, but this must be done. I personally simply cannot see any other way out. To this day we have simply no conception of what Chernobyl means. I think that the situation is so serious that it would be perfectly appropriate to launch a collection of voluntary donations and maybe even introduce some special taxes. I repeat, matters are too serious for us to rest content with the way things stand now.

Chernobyl veterans who have become invalids must be paid special pensions. Those who volunteer to work on the elimination of the accident's consequences must know that their main jobs will be kept for them (without any loss of term of service, either).

Other benefits could also be introduced. But the main point is that we must realize that it is impossible to endlessly exploit selflessness, nobility, and readiness for self-sacrifice. They should be not only duly appreciated but also duly remunerated.

Baltic Republics

Vilnius Radio Continues 3 Apr Council Session

Radio, Television Board Set-Up

LD0304164790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 3 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

The session resumes to discuss setting up the Radio and Television Administration Board. Deputy Ilgunas takes the floor to nominate the candidates for the committee. Among the nominations are Edvinas Butkus, chief of Radio Vilnius external services; Juozas Aputis, a writer, chief editor of PERGALE magazine; Edvardas Balakauskas, a composer; Jonas Boruta, vicar of the Vilnius Cathedral-Basilica, head of religious programs; Domijonas Sniukas, current head of radio and television; Romualdas Brazys, doctor of physics, chairman of the Society of Lithuanian Polish Scientists; Mikhail Yevdokimov, actor at the Russian Drama Theater; and others.

Concerning the post of general director, the council decides this post should not be discussed until a later date. The appointed commission should nominate candidates for this post.

At 1415 GMT debates begin. Rimvydas Valatka proposes that because of the threat of occupation of the radio and television station, this issue should not be discussed because it would give the pro-Soviet forces the chance to ask the USSR military forces to close down the radio and television committee under the pretext of a threat to the property of the USSR; he believes that the appointment of this new administrative body would be treated in this way.

At 1425 GMT J. Paleckis takes the floor. He speaks about introducing the possibility for all parties and political movements to present their views on radio and TV. He says that at the moment the CPSU in Lithuania is speaking, acting, and camouflaging itself as the Lithuanian Communist Party.

At 1436 GMT debates proceed concerning the representation of parties, movements, and Sajudis in the Radio and Television Administration Board.

At 1509 GMT the names of the candidates to the board are read once again, and a vote is taken: 81 in favor, 14 abstained, number against unheard. By a majority of votes, the board has been appointed.

At 1513 GMT other legal formalities concerning the newly appointed board are discussed. The board is entrusted with the task of nominating the candidate for the post of director general.

At 1516 GMT the chairman states that the government has now been formed, with the exception of the country's minister of the defense.

At 1522 GMT debates on the issue of the possibility of having either a ministry or a department of the defense of the country are in progress. Some deputies propose postponing the formation of a ministry of the defense for the time being, bearing in mind the current political situation in this republic. Opinions voiced are rather controversial. Vytautas Landsbergis voices his opinion, saying that this issue should be resolved because he wants the formation of the government completed.

At 1535 GMT a department of the defense of the country in the council of ministers, rather than in the ministry of defense, is proposed.

At 1539 GMT debates on the proposal proceed. Some deputies argue that no one saw the written concept for this department.

At 1547 GMT a vote is taken on this issue, but it is impossible to describe results owing to poor reception.

At 1548 GMT Landsbergis reads a message from the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. The main point of the message is to start negotiations with the republic of Lithuania, to stop military pressure and intimidation. The Estonian Supreme Soviet supported all the decisions of the Supreme Council of Lithuania and was prepared to cooperate with the republic of Lithuania.

At 1555 GMT deputies discuss the possibility of attending rallies. A protest rally will be held outside the building of the Supreme Soviet at 1400 GMT on 4 April. It was decided to start work at parliamentary commissions at 0600 GMT, and at 1100 GMT the plenary session would begin.

At 1558 GMT the session adjourns until 4 April.

Landsbergis Addresses 3 Apr Council Session

LD0304134690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1009 GMT on 3 April broadcasts live a 15-minute speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Landsbergis begins his speech: "Esteemed colleagues, today I am not going to review the international situation, but will share my thoughts about the situation in Lithuania." He then states that Lithuania's enemies attempt to prevent the Lithuanian people and their elected deputies from taking steps to benefit Lithuanian, and adopt methods which can be very precisely described. Landsbergis continues: "The most important is the well-known method used by all totalitarian systems: To destroy the people's spirit. It turns out that the threat to undermine and destoy the economy is not as

reliable as was previously thought. It seems that it is not worth trying to destroy the economy. It is too closely linked with the Soviet Union's economy; perhaps, it is also politically not worth trying to destroy. But attempts are being made to influence our spirit, using all possible overt means of demonstrating a military might which seems to be unlimited and omnipotent. Attempts are being made to destroy our nerve, composure, self-control, resistance, and unity."

Having stated that these attempts have so far been unsuccessful, he continues: "There are attempts to deny the legality of our decisions, and when this is impossible, there are attempts to discredit the Supreme Council and individual persons. One can expect that material discrediting individual persons will be more widely used."

Landsbergis criticizes some articles in the Lithuanian press which ask naive questions, such as, when negotiations with Moscow will start. When foreign correspondents ask this question, explanations are given to them, but it is very strange when local correspondents do it. Landsberis states: "Attempts are being made to destroy our legislation. This we have seen and see now. This is also a means to discredit, to discredit a state where there will be no system of law and order, or where it will be ineffective or unable to cope with criminal elements. They have a desire and intention to destroy information, and at the same time, glasnost. If there should be a refusal to print the newspapers, this will be a form of indirect political censorship, or a direct form naming the newspapers, starting with TIESA and ending with I do not know what, with something unfavorable to socialism. This, of course, will be the end of the epoch of glasnost, but not for Lithuania alone. But since it will start in Lithuania then, perhaps, Lithuania will be blamed once again for having harmed the Soviet Union, as they attempt to do now.

Landsbergis continues: "This is being done through the use of foreign or pseudo-local hands. The limitations of glasnost and the frustration of information, which could be forecast, are also being done by the same heads. Of course, we will work in any conditions, we would work and endure in any conditions. They do not like our endurance. They would like to prevent us. But how? I think that one of the possible versions can be some kind of an alleged local coup, an overthrow of the state authorities. What forces could do it? I think that this could be done by local fascist elements, which have no support in society but would lean for support on the military force that has been sent in and at present demonstrates that there are no limits to its actions. Who would then be responsible? It is possible that Moscow, in the person of its civic and party authorities would attempt to stand aside, pretending that the locals are fighting for power. Maybe it would blame some old generals and would then purge the general staff. Or maybe the generals would be able to blame local or regional military leaders. This would be the affair of their own policy."

He continues: "We see a basic decision by the Estonian Supreme Council when it describes itself as an occupied country from 1940 and here is its starting point. We want to propose to the Soviet Union another version, but they demonstrate to us now that we are, or can be, a quite openly occupied country. Buildings are being occupied, the law and order bodies are being usurped. We do not know what the next step will be."

Landsbergis then quotes the Swedish foreign minister's statement that Lithuania is annexed and continues: "We see that they wish to return us to a state of active military occupation, maybe; this is the way to 1940 or 1939, we do not know, we have heard of offers to return to the status of 1939 and the agreement of that time with the Soviet Union. But this would be a strange way. I propose that such an idea should be examined, how we could label this changing status. There is another thing we should label: When the country is occupied, and not because the army situated on its territory is not subordinated to the government of that country, and which does everything it wishes to do, but when this army interferes in an active manner in the life of the country and introduces its order, then in that occupation the occupying power is responsible for everything. It is also responsible for any possible provocation and for any coup or seizure planned by some local or pseudo-local group, because it has approved it, it could prevent it. We must state that whatever happens in Lithuania by the use of force, Moscow will be responsible for everything, because it has the power to prevent it. I think that some document, or two documents should be prepared while we have the opportunity to do this. Thank you for your attention."

Further Report on Speech

LD0304225190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Attempts are made to derange the law and order of Lithuania, continued Vytautas Landsbergis [in a report to the Supreme Council today]. This is one of the means to discredit the state. [passage omitted]

Many of these attempts are made trying to use pseudo-Soviet forces, said Vytautas Landsbergis, and added: We can work at any cost here in the parliament. However, one of the possible variants is a presumably local putsch. It could be carried out by local fascist-minded people who have no support of the society but might by backed by the Moscow military force. Who then would be responsible officially, asks Vytautas Landsbergis? Moscow could say that this was the work of the local people, or elderly generals might be accused. Or the general officers might accuse local generals. However, said Vytautas Landsbergis, this is already politics. He suggested evaluating the current political situation by a separate document. Now, stressed the chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Lithuania is in a state of active

military occupation. Thus the occupational forces are responsible for any provocative actions and the results of such actions.

Lithuanian Supreme Council Forms Government

LD0404121290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] The republican Supreme Council is meeting in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government has been formed. It comprises 18 ministers. Work will continue today on a draft reply to the president of the USSR. [video shows footage of press briefing in Moscow]

Lithuanian Appeal on USSR Military Service

LD0304135190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0703 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Resolution of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council appealing to the International Red Cross Organization and the International Human Rights Organization; issued at the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session in Vilnius; read by session chairman Deputy Ceslovas Stankevicius—live]

[Excerpts] Because the Armed Forces of the USSR invaded Lithuania in 1940 and occupied it, crudely violating international law; because states including the Holy See and Switzerland have never recognized Soviet occupation and annexation of Lithuania and today still recognize the de jure continuity of the statehood of Lithuania; because, on 11 March 1990, following legal and free elections in which representatives to the Supreme Council were elected by the people of Lithuania, the restoration of the independence of Lithuania was declared by the elected Supreme Council; because more than a thousand Lithuanian young men refused to do military service in the USSR Armed Forces and returned from the USSR to Lithuania, looking for protection against physical and psychological pressures applied to them, especially because of their nationality; because the USSR Armed Forces is an occupational army on the territory of Lithuania; [passage omitted]; because the Polish-U.S. television group was threatened with reprisals unless they surrendered video recordings of some events in the N. Vilnia hospital to the Soviet airborne troops; because Soviet military forces refuse to reveal the location and condition of the kidnapped soldiers; because Soviet servicemen in plainclothes are breaking every day into the private homes of Lithuanian people and have already kidnapped by force about 10 Lithuanians who absconded from service in the Soviet Army; [passage omitted]; because the Republic of Lithuania demanded that the Soviet military forces closed down their military recruitment centers in Lithuania, and at the same time declared that this government will no longer support attempts by the Soviet regime to recruit Lithuanians into the Soviet Armed Forces; because the Red Cross Committee in Geneva asked the representative of the Lithuanian Supreme Council for an official decision adopted by the parliament appealing to the International Red Cross for help, therefore, the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council:

1. Asks for urgent help from representatives of the International Red Cross in observing and monitoring the activities of the Soviet Armed Forces on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania with respect to the position of Lithuanians who have been deported by force, and those who are being forced to do military service.

2. Asks the International Red Cross Organization to urge the USSR Government to comply with the pledges given in the Geneva Convention and the universally recognized principles of international law; to urgently demand that Soviet servicemen stop their attempts everywhere to deport by force, or to force, the Lithuanian people to do military service.

3. Asks the International Red Cross organization and another human rights organizations, including the International Human Rights Organization, Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, to take all necessary measures in order to investigate the location and situation of all Lithuanian refugees [as heard] forcefully deported by the Soviet military forces during previous weeks, as well as to find a solution concerning their future.

4. Asks the Red Cross organization and other international human rights organizations to start investigating the location and physical and psychological state of those Lithuanian servicemen who are currently doing their military service in the Soviet Armed Forces.

5. Appeals to the governments of the world's states and to the International Red Cross Organization to raise the issue of the forcible recruitment of Lithuanian people into the occupational army at the UN Human Rights Conference and at the upcoming CSCE meeting.

6. Asks the International Red Cross to take all other necessary and suitable measures so that the young Lithuanian men who refused to serve in the Soviet Army and who have been kidnapped are released.

Lithuanian Council Discusses Army Call-Up

LD0304224190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] The address in question [to the International Red Cross] was adopted in the course of continuing debate [in the Lithuanian Supreme Council] on what ought to be done in the face of the spring call-up to the Soviet Army that started on the 1st April and with respect to the intended setting-up of an alternative work service in Lithuania, the latter to be a compulsory yet temporary measure. The parliamentary discussion brought to the surface a number of intricate aspects of the problem related to the Army. It was finally agreed that these problems could not be resolved without negotiations with Moscow.

Actually, Army-related issues constitute a major, perhaps the most difficult, problem for the restoration of

Lithuania's real independence. A whole package of proposals by MPs [member of parliament] is to be submitted for thorough consideration in parliamentary commissions, while the Presidium of the Supreme Council is commissioned to hold consultations on these issues with the leadership of the neighboring Latvia and Estonia.

Council Rules Against State Protection Ministry

LD0304225990 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The afternoon sitting [of the Lithuanian Supreme Council] started with a report by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimieras Prunskiene. [passage omitted]

Taking into account the present situation, and seeking to avoid misinterpretation, the Lithuanian parliament ruled that no ministry for state protection will be established.

Moscow Radio Reports on 3 Apr Council Session

LD0304195490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] For the second day the inhabitants of Lithuania, just as the whole country, are awaiting the answers of the republic's Supreme Soviet to the appeal by the USSR president. But even today this question was not decided.

In the view of the majority of deputies, the main thing is to complete the formation of the Council of Ministers. The parliament's entire working day was spent on this and other matters.

The session appointed the republic's minister of trade, endorsed the composition of the governing body of Lithuanian Radio and Television, amended the Law on Government, and eliminated the Ministry for the Protection of the Country, handing over its functions to a special department of the government.

Regarding the answer to the USSR president, work on the draft message will continue in the commission from the morning onwards and then, at the evening plenary session, it is planned to adopt it. However, at the preliminary discussion on this matter, so far not a single deputy has even uttered the possibility of rescinding the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

Supreme Council 4 Apr Session Previewed

LD0404064690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Elena Kurkletyte report from Vilnius]

[Text] At a session yesterday, the Board of Lithuanian Radio and Television was confirmed; the 17 members are people involved in culture, science, and journalism. The general director has not yet been appointed, and the radio and television broadcasting statute is also still being drawn up.

Today, the republican Supreme Soviet session will continue its work. The question worrying all inhabitants of the republic—regarding service by young men of Lithuania in the USSR Armed Forces—has still not been settled, even though it has been under discussion for several days already. Deputies' opinions differ here. Apparently, each youth will be granted the right to decide for himself how to act: whether to remain in Lithuania and build his life in accordance with the laws of the Lithuanian Republic, or to submit to the demands of the laws of the USSR.

The agenda for today's session will include issues on the conditions of deputies' work, discussion of the draft decision on the structure of the Supreme Soviet apparatus, and on the status of deputies and other matters. And today, I think, the deputies will continue their discussion of a reply to the USSR president, in answer to his address to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Lithuanian Representatives, Moscow Hold 'Dialogue' Meet With Yakovlev

LD0404000390 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Three Lithuanian parliamentarians met with USSR Presidential Council Member Aleksandr Yakovlev. This is Roma [name indistinct] reporting to you.

As was announced by us earlier, Lithuanian Vice Premier Romualdas Ozolas and two more Supreme Council deputies, Mecys Laurinkus and Romas Gudaitis, left for Moscow yesterday in the hope of meeting today with Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov. However, the Lithuanian government representative in Moscow, Egidijus Bickauskas was only able to reach the minister by telephone. According to Egidijus Bickauskas, Minister Yazov refused to talk to the Lithuanian emissaries and especially, to receive them. The minister did not deign to provide a reason for his refusal.

Thanks to Egidijus Bickauskas' efforts, success was attained today in reaching Aleksandr Yakovlev, who agreed to receive the parliamentarians, however not as delegates but solely as Lithuania's representatives.

It appears the meeting at the Kremlin commenced at 1600 Moscow time and went into the late evening hours. It was impossible to obtain further details of the meeting.

In the words of Egidijus Bickauskas: one cannot consider this fact as the start of negotiations. He characterized them as consultations, which perhaps will continue tomorrow and in the following days, also with other high government officials of the USSR.

Egidijus Bickauskas also stressed that according to his personal deep convictions, negotiations with Moscow will not be taking place soon. Meanwhile, Lithuania's Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis stated in his news conference today: This meeting constitutes the start of a dialogue." [passage omitted]

Visit USSR Council

LD0404091290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Sajudis Information Agency report]

[Text] A delegation from the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of the republic of Lithuania arrived in Moscow yesterday morning.

Mecys Laurinkus and Romas Gudaitis, members of the Supreme Council Presidium, and Romualdas Ozolas, deputy prime minister of Lithuania, were met by Egidijus Bickauskas, representative of the Lithuanian government in Moscow and Nikolajus Medvedevas, deputy of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, as well as correspondents of seven television companies.

The same day attempts were made by Lithuania's representatives to meet the USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov. However, in the telephone conversation with Egidijus Bickauskas he declared that if Lithuania regarded itself an independent state then in this case he had no mandate for talks and refused to meet them. This is an interesting thought.

Yesterday at 1200 GMT Egidijus Bickauskas, representative of the republic of Lithuania government, paid a visit to the USSR Council of Ministers. During his visit there he asked that Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, be informed about the arrival of the Lithuanian delegation and he also presented his mandate.

Dissatisfaction was expressed in the Administration of Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers about the absence of the words Soviet Socialist in front of the word Lithuania. However, this did not develop into a conflict. Egidijus Bickauskas stressed that he is the representative of the government of the republic of Lithuania.

At 1400 GMT Deputies Mecys Laurinkus, Romas Gudaitis and Romualdas Ozolas met Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Presidential Council. Unfortunately, this was not an official meeting. However, according to Mecys Laurinkus, this was the first step toward a dialogue and future negotiations. The situation which has developed in Lithuania and the Soviet Union was discussed at the meeting.

At 1600 GMT in the afternoon, Egidijus Bickauskas, representative of the republic of Lithuania government in Moscow, and Nikolajus Medvedevas, deputy of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, held their press conference at the Mission of the republic of Lithuania in Moscow.

More than 100 Lithuanian and foreign journalists and about 15 television companies came to the press conference.

E. Bickauskas gave a brief account of events in Lithuania and provided information about the future restructuring of the activities of the Lithuanian Mission in Moscow. Questions put by the journalists were answered. The press conference lasted for one and half hours.

M. Laurinkus and R. Gudaitis will meet USSR Internal Affairs Minister Bakatin, member of the Presidential Council, today at 0900 Moscow time.

Hold Press Conference

PM0404094490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[S. Kiselev report: "Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Delegation Arrived in Moscow Yesterday"]

[Text] The delegation includes R. Ozolas, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers; E. Bichkauskas, Lithuania's permanent representative in Moscow; R. Gudaytis, member of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium; M. Laurinkus, member of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium; and N. Medvedev, member of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

"We have come without any specific plan," E. Bichkauskas said, "our visit could be called a goodwill mission."

At a press conference held in the evening N. Medvedev clarified this statement: "Our aim is to outline a range of questions for possible future talks with the Union." As was said at the press conference, A.N. Yakovlev, member of the USSR Presidential Council, met with the members of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. "I would like to clarify," E. Bichkauskas said on this point, "that this was not a meeting betwen an official delegation and an official personage. It was something between a consultation and a conversation."

Meet With Interior Minister

AU0404081690 Paris AFP in English 0755 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 4 (AFP)—Informal talks were taking place Wednesday in Moscow between Lithuanian officials and Soviet Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, the parliamentary press office in Vilnius said.

This followed several hours of talks Tuesday evening between the Lithuanian representatives and polituro member Alexander Yakovlev, a close advisor to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The talks are the first serious contact between the two sides since Lithuania declared independence from the Soviet Union three weeks ago.

Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis said he was optimistic about the initial contacts Tuesday evening in Moscow, local sources in Vilnius said.

Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov had refused to meet with the Lithuanian representatives Tuesday, Lithuanian legation representatives said.

Mr. Bakatin was meeting Megis Laurinkus, president of the Lithuanian parliamentary commission which deals with the problem of deserters from the Red Army, and Komas Gudaitis, another senior government official, the parliamentary press office said.

The opening of the informal talks in Moscow occurred as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze was arriving in Washington for talks with U.S. counterpart James Baker.

Landsbergis on Requirements for Referendum

AU0304132790 Paris AFP in English 1305 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, April 3 (AFP)—The Council of Nationalities, one of the two chambers of the Moscow Supreme Soviet, Tuesday adopted on a second reading a bill outlining the modalities for republics to secede from the Union, TASS news agency said. [passage omitted] Currently, the Soviet Constitution only specifies that a republic has the "right" to secede, without specifying how this can be done. Lithuania therefore considers its UDI [unilateral declaration of independence] lawful, while Moscow has ruled it unconstitutional. [passage omitted]

Three Lithuanian officials have arrived in Moscow in a bid to open talks with Soviet officials on UDI, according to INTERFAX, a Moscow-Radio publication. The delegation was expected to hold a press conference later Tuesday. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis meanwhile indicated willingness to hold a referendum, providing this does not call into question the republic's UDI proclamation. In an interview late Monday with the French newspaper LIBERATION, Mr. Landsbergis said that "no referendum should call into question the Lithuanian parliament's decision" adopted on March 11. The official Soviet media has suggested this represented a change of heart on the part of the secessionist leader, who has also called for negotiations with Moscow.

Democracy Questioned Due to Broadcast Ban

LD0304222190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1730 GMT 3 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] Each day brings news from Lithuania. Judging by the reports being published in the republic press, the democracy and pluralism proclaimed by the leaders of the republic are not always being realized in practice. Thus, on Sunday evening, for example, the relay of Leningrad Television, which is so popular among the population of the republic, was halted. And there are even calls to end television broadcasts from Moscow; the Sajudis parliamentarians do not like them.

At the same time, four republican newspapers expressing the interests of the Lithuanian Sajudis movement, which hitherto have been published in the publishing house of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee have been refused the further use of this printing facility. And the newspaper of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee on the CPSU platform, SOVETSKAYA LITVA, finally will come out, not outside the republic's borders, but in its own publishing house. The newspaper will be published in Lithuanian, Russian, and Polish.

Our correspondents have just reported from Vilnius.

[Correspondent V. Dvinin] In Vilnius, the Supreme Soviet of the republic continued its work today. Among other papers, the deputies also received a draft of parliamentary expenditure for 1990. According to this document, the monies intended for the reimbursement of the deputies are doubling. The maintenance of the Supreme Soviet administrative apparatus comes to R834,000 against 316,000. And the holding of the session of parliament, on which R70,000 was spent last year, will require R1,738,000 this year: A very clear trend.

The formation of the republic's government is coming to an end. Among those newly appointed is the minister of the economy, (Vytas Novickas). How does the new minister appraise the prospects for economic and scientific-technical development in Lithuania?

[Begin (Novickas) recording] In the first place, I think there is no need. The conditions that would disturb the normal rhythm of the republic's national economy are not there. Insofar as being minister of the economy—and I have spoken with other ministers—they are very interested in retaining the currently existing economic ties. Their only desire is to turn these into more effecive ties, into mutually beneficial economic ties.

I do not agree with those comments to the effect that the republic's economy allegedly is switching over to working under conditions of autarky, of a separatist regime, and so on. Not a single minister has such aspirations, and the government of the republic advocates only the development and deepening of economic ties with other Union republics and with the Union's economy. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Printing of Sajudis Publications Banned

LD0304145690 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1400 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] The pro-Moscow Communist Party of Lithuania has banned the printing of four newspapers expressing

the interests of Sajudis in its printing house. Here is Maria Wiernikowska speaking from Vilnius:

[Wiernikowska] Employees of the House of the Press have today gathered at a rally to protest against the ultimatum they received from party authorities. According to a decision by the Soviet Union's Prime Minister Ryzhkov, the newspapers and publications are being transferred to the management of the pro-Moscow faction of the Communist Party, which in practice means that all Lithuanian newspapers would disappear and in their place SOVETSKAYA LITVA would be published in three languages.

The director of the publishing house is determined not to give in to blackmail—he was threatened with withdrawal of resources—and the work crew is prepared to print all newspapers, even the communist ones, provided they get themselves registered with the Supreme Council of Lithuania.

However, it is not known whether the other side is prepared for any sort of compromise.

Soldiers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are guarding the entrance. The loop around the Prosecutor's Office has tightened as well. At about 1500 the guards were reinforced and a Lithuanian prosecutor was not allowed into the building.

Publication of Non-Independence Papers Debated

LD0304230890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2027 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Correspondent P. Orlov's report from Lithuania; live or recorded]

[Text] Political events continue to be the center of attention. One of them, the main one today, is what is happening in the Printing Works House. On the previous day representatives of the provisional Central Committee on the platform of the CPSU informed the management of the printing works that from then on it would issue the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA in three languages and a few more publications, but printing of such newspapers (OTGEMIMUS), (SOGLASIYE), (RESPUBLIKA), and GIMTASIS KRASTAS would cease.

(Alfonso Spirarunus), director of the printing house, was in a difficult position. The point is that the Sajudis newspapers (OTGEMIMIS), (SOGLASIYE), AND (NEZAVISIMAYA REPUBLIKA) brought in good profits to the publishing house. It continues to be the property of the CPSU Central Committee although documents had recently been prepared for transferring the publishing house to independent status. It is the only printing house in the republic that is equipped to and is really capable of issuing daily and weekly newspapers.

[Orlov] How do you view the idea of publishing SOVETSKAYA LITVA here, too?

[First unidentified printer] It is not here.

[Orlov] But what if you are obliged to print it?

[First unidentified printer] I will not compose it. Only Lithuanian newspapers and literature which supports the independence of Lithuania.

[Orlov] What about SOVETSKAYA LITVA?
[First unidentified printer] No, no.
[Orlov] You do not want to print it?
[First unidentified printer] No, no way.

[Orlov] What is your attitude toward the printing of SOVETSKAYA LITVA alongside EKHO LITVY?

[Second unidentified printer] I have a positive attitude toward this, because that is what should be done. It is part of the democratic traditions that there should be newspapers of both sorts. I am not at all opposed to the printing of SOVETSKAYA LITVA. But, the EKHO LITVY also has the right to exist.

[Orlov] To get onto this transporter [video shows transporter carrying newspapers] the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, in accordance with the laws of Lithuania, must undergo official registration. Evidently, the question now is whether it will pass muster.

At a meeting of the workers' collective which took place today, the decision to issue other publications was reached unambiguously negatively. On the other side, the communists who have remained on the CPSU platform believe the decision to cease publication of SOVETSKAYA LITVA and go over to the newspaper EKHO LITVY is illegal.

Further Reaction to Gorbachev Appeal Reported

LD0304141290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1240 GMT on 3 April broadcasts a seven-minute report by correspondent Yelena Kurkletyte on the reaction in Lithuania to Gorbachev's message to the republic.

Kurkletyte quotes from Landsbergis's reply to Gorbachev, and says that people have also sent thousands of telegrams to Moscow. "These telegrams basically contain two positions—either 'We support the decision of the Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Soviet', or 'We do not support it'. To the best of my knowledge, there are far more of the former, but I can only say that a clear polarization of political views is in the progress." The republican Supreme Soviet is continuing discussion of Gorbachev's message today, says Kurkletyte.

Asked about other decisions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Kurklityte picks out the call-up of young Lithuanians for service in the Armed Forces. A statement published in the press says it is up to the individual to decide what to do, Kurklityte says. The question is of great concern to many; she quotes the republican youth

paper LIETUVAS RYTAS on the parliament's failure to give clear guidance and support.

Kurklityte reports the opening yesterday of a joint press center of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR KGB, USSR Ministry of Defense and the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU platform). She plays back a recorded interview with (?Juozas Jermalavicius), member of the bureau of the provisional Central Committee, who says that the other bodies have helped technically and in provision of accurate information. The press center will publish bulletins about important events, he says.

Kurlityte reports the denial of CPSU printing facilities to a number of republican publications. Rimvydas Valatka, deputy editor of GIMTASIS KRASTAS and a Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputy, is interviewed: "I represent the second biggest Lithuanian paper, GIMTASIS KRASTAS, with 312,000 readers, and now, beginning Friday, they will be left without their favorite newkspaper," Valatka says. He recalls that the paper has a contract with the printing house which is now being broken. "And so there is a second phrase, the rule-of-law governed state. The contract between the printing house and the paper has a legal foundation. I cannot talk about my indignation. I just ask you, is it that the world glasnost is now meaningless?".

Commentary on Landsbergis Reply to Gorbachev

LD0304151190 Moscow World Service in English 1410 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Sergey Vorobyev commentary]

[Text] The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis, has responded with a telegram to President Gorbachev's address to the Lithuanian parliament and people. Here is a commentary by Sergey Vorobyev:

President Gorbachev proposed to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania that it immediately revoke the unlawful act unilaterally proclaiming the independence of the republic. The position of the Lithuanian parliament is as yet unclear. It intends to discuss the issue soon.

Speaking at the Supreme Soviet of the republic, Vytautas Landsbergis said that not only parliament but residents of Lithuania as well must respond to Mikhail Gorbachev's address. At the same time he said that the organization of an appopriate referendum must proceed from Lithuania's stand and it should decide whether Lithuania wants to join the USSR or not. A referendum of that nature, however, can only be conducted within the framework of the acting USSR Constitution because it's an internal matter.

It follows from the message Vytautas Landsbergis sent that those who drafted the act on Lithuania's independence do not have a clear idea of what it would mean in real life.

Landsbergis acknowledged that the act means that the entire territory of the republic becomes independent. But there is no elaboration on this in his telegram.

Meanwhile, Sajudis has continued to enlist volunteers aged between 19 and 40 into what is termed units for the protection of the land.

Has the dialogue entered an impasse? The indications are that this is not so, but what will future developments be like? My view, writes Sergey Vorobyev, is that the dialogue will continue to proceed within the framework of the USSR Constitution. At the moment a draft law on the order of secession from the USSR by a Union republic is being discussed in Moscow. Mutually acceptable agreement can only be reached if the supremacy of the Union legislation is recognized and if no unilateral demands are made. Only given that interpretation of the situation one can accept the assurances of Vytautas Landsbergis that Lithuania has no intention of doing damage to the USSR or perestroyka.

Not all residents of Lithuania are prepared to accept the decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuania as binding. Rallies have been held in the republic and those who support the idea of Lithuania as part of the Union and a constructive dialogue between various political forces of the republic have spoke at them.

The movement in support of socialist perestroyka; Yedinstvo, or Union, enjoys growing support. Its cochairman, Valeriy Ivanov had this to say to national television:

Let's all get together and think it over, I mean Yedinstvo, Sajudis, the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of Lithuania. Let's all get together and plan a line of concerted action. The complicated situation calls for keeping emotions at bay. We must look for compromise for the good of the whole.

Three Independent Information Centers Operating

PM0304181990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Leonid Kapelyushnyy report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Information Must Be Objective"]

[Text] Vilnius—The provisional Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Central Committee has opened an interdepartmental press center for Soviet and foreign journalists covering events in the republic.

Press centers are also at work at the Lithuanian Union of Journalists and the republic's Supreme Soviet. Thus journalists have a chance to obtain information about the events taking place in the republic from three independent sources.

Opening the first press conference, Vladislav Shved, secretary of the provisional Central Committee, described the situation in the republic as calm but

complex. He stressed that the USSR president's appeal to the Lithuanian people has opened up another opportunity for dialogue between the republic's incumbent leadership and Moscow.. It would be a pity if it were wasted.

Expressing the provisional Central Committee's viewpoint, V. Shved pointed out that, in assessing events, the republic's leadership is juggling the facts and passing the buck, so to speak. Laying the blame for everything on Moscow and the USSR leadership, they are stubbornly refusing to see and acknowledge that the unprecedented situation only arose owing to their unconstitutional decisions.

"The numerous appeals and statements made both by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and public organizations," V. Shved went on to point out, "distort the true state of affairs in Lithuania. For instance, when speaking about the military's seizure of nonmilitary buildings, they hush up the fact that these nonmilitary buildings are CPSU property which was unilaterally taken away in defiance of Lithuanian laws. The dramatic statement regarding the seizure of the psychiatric hospital and the bloody reprisals neglects to mention that deserters were hidden in the hospital on the instructions of the highest authorities. The 'blood' was from the broken leg of one of the fugitives who resisted the assault troopers. There were also 'reprisals'—a militiamen who resisted had his pistol taken away..."

It must be said that the military presence in Vilnius and the question of drafting young men and deserters for service were the focus of attention not only at the press conference. At the same time the Supreme Soviet, whose law had released draftees from service, was deciding what was to be done. A call for insubordination was heard from the Supreme Soviet platform, along with a request for the parents and relatives of draftees to hide them from the Military Commissariats.

Today 348 out of several tens of thousands of serving Lithuanians have succumbed to the call to "down bayonets." Some 82 men have returned to their troop units. A total of 42 who had gone AWOL have turned up at Military Commissariats voluntarily. Defense Ministry representatives who attended the press conference said that criminal proceedings have been instituted in respect of each case of desertion.

The Committee for the Defense of USSR Citizens asked for leniency toward the fugitives and asked that they not be imprisoned.

To be fair, I must say that V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, had asked Lithuanian young men to continue their service until agreements were secured with the USSR Defense Ministry on this subject. But obviously everyone hears what he wants to hear...

It was noted at the press conference that fulfillment of the USSR presidential decree on the surrender of hunting guns has in practice been frustrated. Passions are boiling on this score, and cartoonists are practicing their craft, but the fact is that there is mass disobedience with regard to the decree. Only 3,118 of 30,000 hunting guns in the republic have been handed in. The republic's Council of Ministers amended the president's decree, resolving that if weapons are handed over, they will be stored at internal affairs organ premises and not taken out of Lithuania.

Lithuanian Border Troops Reportedly Reinforced

LD0404090590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0735 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 4 Apr (TASS)—"The situation on the Soviet- Polish section of the USSR's border on Lithuania's territory and in the area near the border is normal. There have not been any serious incidents or events recorded since the presidential decree came into effect." This has been reported in an interview with Lt.-Gen. Vladimir Shlyakhtin, chief of staff [position as received] of the USSR KGB Border Guard Troops, published today in the GOVERNMENT HERALD.

The USSR president's decree of 21 March 1990 "On additional measures to guarantee the rights of Soviet citizens and protect the sovereignty of the USSR on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," he said, poses extra tasks for the border troops in stepping up the guarding of the section of the USSR state border which passes through Lithuania's territory. This has been brought about by the exclusively unconstitutional legislative acts of the present leadership of the Lithuanian SSR, which infringe the rights of Soviet citizens and the sovereignty of the USSR.

Speaking of the measures already adopted, Vladimir Shlyakhtin reported that the units and subunits of the Baltic border district guarding the state border on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR have been given extra duty. This means that their leave, days off, and demobilizations have been cancelled. Combat training studies have been cut back. The border posts of the Lithuanian sector have been reinforced in personnel and equipment by maneuvering manpower and means. The state border is being guarded by reinforced squads, and the guarding of places where units and subunits are stationed has been stepped up.

The control crossing points of the border troops on the international communication routes, along with the customs establishments, have stepped up their control of the movement of freight and of all kinds of transport. Not only ships going abroad, but also ships engaged in fishing in coastal waters are being subjected to thorough inspection by border units.

Ships of the border troops inside the territorial waters and economic zone of the USSR are taking measures to discover and put an end to possible contacts between Soviet fishing ships and foreign ones. All of this is being done with the aim of preventing the delivery of arms and

ammunition to the USSR. Crossings of the state border of the USSR within Lithuania by foreign citizens are being limited.

The lieutenant-general stressed that the troop personnel is acting strictly within the law "On the State Border of the USSR" and the decree of the president of the USSR. Propaganda groups have been set up in the border units from among the best prepared officers, and warrant officers of the Navy and Army. Their task includes explaining to the population the content and essence of the decree of the president of the USSR, the forced nature and the temporariness of the introduction of the supplementary classified measures in the border area, the perniciousness of the consequences of possible illegal actions on the border, the groundlessness of the territorial claims of the extremist forces of Lithuania against Union republics. At the same time the need to hand over guns for temporary safekeeping, and the dangerous consequences of being recruited into the so-called "organizations for the defense of the country" are being explained to people.

Lithuanian Party Wants Atheism Institute To Leave

PM0603101190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 Mar 90 p1

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Only the Facts"]

[Text] A session of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has decided that it is inadvisable for the interrepublic branch of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Academy's Scientific Atheism Institute to continue its activity in Vilnius.

Lithuanian Economic Claim Against USSR Cited

PM0304153090 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Apr 90 p 10

[Yvonne Butfors, Per Andersson, Simon Lefvert, and Katarina Elghuvud dispatch: "Lithuania's Bill to Moscow"]

[Text] Vilnius—Vilnius is now presenting its own bill in response to Moscow's. Less than a month ago Moscow told the Lithuanians that their independence would cost them 21 billion rubles [R]. According to the Lithuanian Commission for Economic Settlement the opposite is the case.

When Gorbachev's hefty bill reached Lithuania the commission had already been at work for several weeks. With the aid of archives and oral sources, for example, it has looked into how much the Soviet Union has seized in Lithuania since the 1940 annexation.

The full bill is expected to be ready in mid-April and will then be presented to parliament. But the majority of the figures are already available.

The core of the material consists of the figures which counter Gorbachev's assertion that all centrally managed enterprises in Lithuania belong to the Soviet Union.

In Lithuania enterprises are managed in three different ways—by the republic itself, by Moscow, or by both jointly. The commission has concentrated its work on the centrally managed enterprises. The commission considers that the rest belong to the republic since they are either fully or partly managed by the republic.

Vytenis Aleskaitis, a member of the commission, said that all centrally managed enterprises in the republic have submitted all their annual accounts from the years 1965 to 1989. The commission takes the view that the investments in all the enterprises which began operating before 1965 have now been paid back.

The enterprises' figures have formed the basis for the commission's calculations, which show that in these years the Soviet Union made investments of around R3.8 billion, but extracted profits of R8.9 billion. The difference of R5 billion is thus part of the Soviet Union's total debt to Lithuania.

"We are not primarily out to get money. What we are demanding is that all enterprises on Lithuanian soil become ours. But if we run into problems in the negotiations we will of course bring these figures into the discussions," Aleskaitis said.

He has no illusions about future negotiations with Moscow, if any such negotiations do take place.

"The main thing is that we have all the material ready if negotiations are held. Much of it will be used to apply psychological pressure rather than representing realistic demands," he said.

Records of what the Soviet Union confiscated from Lithuania's banks have also been kept.

Figures from 31 August 1940 show that in total the Soviet Union confiscated 11.4 billion litas from the national bank. The litas was the currency of independent Lithuania. According to the last rate of exchange, from January 1939, 100 Swedish kronor were worth 140.75 litas.

The National Bank was also deprived of all its silver coins, which were worth a total of 35 million litas (in 1940 prices.)

But it was not only the National Bank that was affected. Jewelers also had to hand over their goods. The total recorded value of these assets was 1.24 million litas. The commission proposes that Lithuania should demand that the Soviet Union return these assets.

Things are more difficult when it comes to deposits with foreign banks. While France has promised to an internationally recognized Lithuania the gold that it has deposited in France, there are some countries which no longer have the gold that was deposited with them. The 1.3

tonnes deposited with Sweden's National Bank before annexation was handed over to the Soviet Union in 1940.

The commission's headache is whether Lithuania should demand the money from the Soviet Union or Sweden. Opinions are divided.

Britain, on the other hand, set off its 2.95 tonnes of gold against the assets—in the form of factories, machinery, and so on—which it lost when the three Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union. But it was Moscow and not Lithuania which took part in the negotiations.

On several occasions Moscow has pointed out that Lithuania must be responsible for part of the Soviet Union's foreign debt, which at present totals slightly less than R400 billion. According to the commission, however, Lithuania is not prepared to pay as much as Moscow is demanding.

"It was not we Lithuanians who took the loans; it was the Soviet Union. Also, we have always been one of the more productive republics in the union," Aleskaitis said.

It is often claimed in Lithuania that the Soviet annexation put a stop to a favorable economic trend for an agricultural nation with high productivity and a stable currency.

The commission has prepared figures which compare the development of Lithuania's national income (the Soviet Union calculates not GNP, but national income, which excludes all services, for example) from the years 1960-1989 with those of Sweden and Finland.

The figures show that Lithuania's national income is more or less half those of its two Nordic neighbors.

"However, the figures are far from definite, since no one can really speculate about what would have happened if we had not become a part of the Soviet Union," Aleskaitis said.

He told us how difficult it was to find competent people for the commission, and thus produce reliable figures.

"The aspects to do with territorial waters and military arrangements have still not been investigated, largely because of a shortage of experts," Aleskaitis said.

These are fields which have always been managed centrally from Moscow and for which Lithuania has not needed to train people.

As for the environment and environmental damage in the country, the commission has nothing to say—which could seem somewhat surprising since Sajudis pushed the environment as one of the main issues in the election campaign. The Soviet Union was then blamed for factories emitting pollutants and for the Ignalina nuclear power plant, whose expansion the people's front was unable to stop.

"We were actually involved in all the decisions which led to the environmental damage in Lithuania. There is nothing that we can demand from Moscow," Aleskaitis said.

Lithuania To Seek Compensation for Deportees

PM0304154690 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Apr 90 p 10

[Yvonne Butfors, Per Andersson, Simon Lefvert, and Katarina Elghuvud dispatch: "365,000 Were Deported"]

[Excerpts] Vilnius—In 1949 Ricardas Zukauskas was deported from Lithuania along with his father, mother, and sister to Tasayevo, a village in the middle of Siberia. He was 11 years old.

Last Friday [30 March] the Lithuanian Government's Commission for Economic Settlement finished its work on estimating the price of this and other injustices. The same commission is working out the Soviet Union's other debts to the republic.

If the commission's proposals are approved by parliament, Lithuania will demand 467 million rubles [R] in compensation for the people who were deported to the Soviet Union beginning in 1940.

"There is much that cannot be counted in money, but they must pay in some way for what they have done," said Ricardas, who is now 52.

According to the government commission, there were 365,000 others who shared Ricardas' fate between the years 1940 and 1954.

Among those deported were politicians and poets, teachers and philosophers, "capitalists" such as hotel and shop owners, or people who simply had foreign contacts.

"They tried to decapitate the nation—in both senses of the phrase," said Vytenis Aleskaitis of the government commission. [passage reporting Zukauskas' personal experiences omitted]

The Government Commission for Economic Settlement takes the view that the number of deportees given in the report—365,000—is on the low side.

"Our figures will be attacked by the Soviet Union, which is why we only included things that we can prove using military reports and newspaper reports from the period," Vytenis Aleskaitis of the commission said.

The amount of compensation proposed—R467 million—is the sum Lithuania is estimated to have lost in income between 1940 and 1954.

The commission has worked out national income per person for each of these years and how many were deported during each year.

These two figures were then multiplied together on the assumption that those deported would otherwise have lived and worked in Lithuania.

But Aleskaitis pointed to a number of problems in the calculations:

"On the one hand we have no index to work to, so we are asking for compensation in the monetary values of the forties. And on the other, there is no real rate of exchange for the ruble."

According to the tourist exchange rate there are six rubles to the dollar. According to the official rate only 63 kopeks to the dollar.

The most difficult question—how the 100,000 people who died during deportation are to be evaluated—has been left aside for the time being.

"We have not decided what the commission should do," Aleskaitis said. "Personally, I think that it is cruel to put a price on human lives."

However, the deportees' organization—Lietuvas Tremtiniu Sajunga—takes a different view.

"It is not a question of putting a value on human lives, but of achieving redress and punishing those responsible," said Ricardas Zukauskas, now chairman of the deportees' association in Vilnius.

He reminded us that the Germans gave Israel $2 million in compensation per victim after World War II and that the United States paid 300,000 dollars to relatives after the Vietnam war.

Tremtiniu Sajunga is an organization with over 130,000 members in Lithuania, all of whom were once deported. In parallel with the work of the government commission, they have made their own calculations of how their sufferings are to be evaluated. The result was a bill of R573 million, not including compensation for the dead.

"In negotiations with Moscow it is our figures which will be used," said Vytenis Aleskaitis of the Commission for Economic Settlement.

'Shift in Sentiments' in Lithuania Reported

LD0404134590 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Over the past few days observers have been noting a shift in the sentiments of some residents of Lithuania and even some of its leaders, who only recently were euphoric about the proclamation of independence from the Soviet Union by this Baltic republic's parliament. What is the reason for the shift? Here are notes on the subject by our commentator Vyacheslav:

As I see it, now even the most consistent supporters of Lithuania's independence are gradually realizing that the decision of the republic's parliament was hasty and ill-devised. For one, an eminent Lithuanian politologist who is a member of the Sajudis leadership, Mr. Radzvilas, believes that the proclamation of independence was somewhat ahead of the natural course of the historical process.

Some Lithuanian political leaders undoubtedly have been forced to stop and think about the consequences of their move also by the recent appeal by President Gorbachev to the Lithuanian people and parliament. [passage omitted]

As local observers note, after that statement by the president, the high emotion and passionate statements by a number of current Lithuanian leaders are increasingly giving way to reason. For example, the chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis says more and more often that he wants to begin a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Government at any level. [passage omitted]

To my mind, writes Vyacheslav Solovev, the changes in the sentiments in the top echelons of power in Lithuania are also shown by a statement of the just-appointed minister of the republic's economy, Vytas Navickas:

[Begin Navickas recording] I, in the capacity of economy minister, as well as other ministers, are highly interested in maintaining the existing economic ties. We have the only desire for these ties to become more effective and to greater mutual advantage. I don't agree with those people who believe that the republic's economy will be working in the conditions of autarchy, of a separatist regime. No minister has such a desire. The republic's government only speaks in favor of developing and promoting the economic ties with the other sovereign republics. [end recording]

Lithuania's Economy Minister Vytas Navickas. One would like to hope that the development of these ties will be proceeding within the framework of a somehow renewed federation, but in any case, both the economic and the political as well as some other interests of this Baltic republic will further urge its leaders, I think, to look for some compromise decisions which would cause no damage, either to Lithuania or to other sovereign republics, or to the whole of the Soviet Union.

Lithuanian Commissions Discuss Reply to Gorbachev

LD0404103390 Moscow TASS in English 1017 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 4 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Alexander Budris:

Commissions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet are discussing a draft reply to the Soviet president, who demanded on March 31 that the parliament cancel illegal resolutions adopted by them and thus pave the way to the discussion of existing problems within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. The document is expected to be approved at the afternoon plenary session.

During a preliminary discussion of this issue none of the deputies even mentioned the possiblity of the cancellation of resolutions adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

A statement of the Sajudis Sejm Council was broadcast on republican television on Tuesday. It said that a meeting in Vilnius, scheduled for today, in connection with the appeal of the Soviet president to the Lithuanian people had been postponed until Saturday. However, meetings planned in other cities will be held.

Military helicopters again appeared over Vilnius on Tuesday afternoon. They were spreading leaflets of the Soviet Citizens' Committee in Lithuania, which urged the population to gather outside the republican Supreme Soviet and support the address of the Soviet president.

Sajudis leaders "are creating a society of social inequality and are destroying economic, political and social ties between Soviet nations," the leaflets said. They also said that Sajudis is "deliberately pushing the republic and its people towards catastrophe."

The Soviet Citizens' Committee in Lithuania supports the republic's sovereignty within a renewed Federation.

Incident at Vilnius School Described as 'Hasty'

PM0304203990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Special correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Urban report: "In No Mood for Jokes..."]

[Text] Vilnius—It is hard to describe the incident which occurred 2 April at Vilnius School No. 27 as a belated April fool. A group of senior students dressed up as soldiers and prevented their juniors from attending classes: They said that the school was being occupied and there was nothing for them to do there... This incident was cited on Monday at a press conference given by the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Central Committee.

But even jokes do not spring out of nothing. Owing to the impending spring draft the subject of "occupiers" is coming up at the highest level with increasing frequency.

On Monday the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet devoted a considerable amount of time to discussing the USSR president's appeal to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] parliament. Strange as it may seem, even on that day the topic of military service prevailed at the session: Should Lithuanian young men be sent into the Army or not? V. Landsbergis, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, cleaves to the position that Lithuania's citizens should not serve in the army of "another state," that each young man must make his own concrete decision. The speeches made by delegates at the parliamentary sitting and later the traditional evening press conference showed that the republic's Supreme Soviet is giving the so-called waverers no guarantees. Thus, the politicians' thoughtless haste may once again have tragic consequences for the young men's futures.

Incidentally, let me say a word about deserters. There are 380 of them in all. According to figures as of 2 April, 82 fugitives have been arrested, half of them being people who themselves showed up at military administration organs. As far as the others are concerned, time is running out day by day until the time when confrontation with the law becomes inevitable.

The USSR president's appeal to the people of the Lithuanian SSR was examined at a session of the provisional Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform) Central Committee Bureau. V. Shved, second secretary of the provisional Central Committee, described the document as extremely restrained, but as providing a basis for dialogue.

The republic's Supreme Soviet has not as yet made its final decision.

Is dialogue possible? I think that it is. But this dialogue must naturally be based on fulfillment of the demands of the USSR Constitution and the well-known presidential decree. All the hunting and sporting guns in the hands of the population have not as yet, for instance, been handed over to troop units for storage.

At the Supreme Soviet sitting Deputy Z. Vayshvila, head of the area protection commission, called for an act of insubordination to the "occupying powers."

All this is not helping to stabilize the situation. Thus, the joke played by the seniors at School No. 27 left a bitter taste...

Incurably Ill Support Lithuanian Parliament

LD0404133990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1233 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] In Vilnius today, outside the Lithuania Supreme Council building, there was an event of special significance. On the initiative of the Society of Invalids, people suffering from incurable illnesses gathered there in order to express their support for the republic's parliament. The participants in the meeting were greeted by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council.

Many Rallies To Be Held 'All Over Lithuania'

LD0404085190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Summary] Viktoras Radzevicius, reporting Sajudis Information Agency news, said that today many rallies would be held all over Lithuania: in Kretinga, in Marijampole Rayon, in the city of Marijampole, in Kazlu Ruda, in Kalvarija. Support of the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Council on 11 March will be expressed at these rallies.

At 1000 GMT this morning a picket will be staged outside the printing house of the Central Committee, at 1000 GMT a rally will be held outside the building of the Supreme Council by the Society of Invalids and the Blind.

On Saturday at 1300 GMT a rally organized by Sajudis will be held in Vilnius Vingis Park.

Sajudis Meeting Postponed Until 7 Apr

LD04040000690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] We draw the attention of our listeners in Lithuania to the fact that the Sajudis meeting planned for tomorrow in Vilnius, in support of Lithuania's independence, will not take place. The Sajudis Seimas council has announced that the meeting will be held on Saturday [7 April] at 1600 in Vingis Park.

Vilnius Rally Supports Lithuanian Loyalists

LD0304125990 Vilnius Internationhal Service in English 2130 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] News about Lithuania, including:

A thousand people or so gathered at lunch hour outside the Lithuanian Procurator's Office in Vilnius today. They came to express their support of those prosecutors who remain loyal to the republic of Lithuania. They make up the bulk, and 95 percent of the whole staff of the Procurator's Office, and they refuse to serve the Soviet system of law.

Addressing the crowd, the Lithuanian Procurator Arturas Paulauskas said the staff loyal to Lithuania would continue working in the premises until they were forcibly made to leave.

The crowd loudly chanted his final words: Our supreme law is the will of the people.

Meanwhile, the guard of the Procurator's Office has doubled from the old watch posts with the newly brought servicemen of the internal army.

Leaflets Dropped; Vilnius Protest Planned

LD04040001190 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Leaflets were dropped again from helicopters on the heads of Vilniusites today. The Committee of [words indistinct] Citizens in Lithuania is urging Vilnius residents to hold a protest meeting tomorrow against the Lithuanian nation's right to self-determination in restoring its own state. The gathering is planned at a site none other than the Supreme Council building. Thus, it will not be easy for the Lithuanian Supreme Council to carry on its work tomorrow.

Leaflets Urge Support for Gorbachev Appeal

LD0404102690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Report by TASS Special Correspondent Aleksandr Budris]

[Excerpts] Vilnius, 4 Apr (TASS)—[passage omitted] Yesterday evening the republican television broadcast a statement by the Sajudis Sejm Council that a meeting in connection with the USSR president's appeal to the Lithuanian people, which was scheduled for today in Vilnius, is being postponed to Saturday. Nevertheless, the other announced meetings will take place in other cities of the republic.

Military helicopters appeared over Vilnius again yesterday afternoon. They scattered leaflets with an appeal from the Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania to the population to gather in front of the republican Supreme Council building and express their support for the USSR president's appeal. In particular it is noted in the leaflets that the Sajudis activists are "creating a society of social inequality and are destroying the economic, political, and social ties between the USSR peoples"; they are "consciously pushing the republic and its people toward a catastrophe." The Committee of USSR Citizens in Lithuania has spoken for the republic's sovereignty within the renewed Federation, for the renovation of the whole country for everybody's benefit.

League Issues Appeal Against Joining Soviet Army

LD0404091390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 4 April, citing the Sajudis Information Agency, reads an appeal to the Lithuanian people by the Lithuanian League of Liberty.

The appeal says that actions by the Kremlin and its fifth column here in Lithuania indicate that the occupationist forces are attempting to set up an alternative to the legal government of the republic of Lithuania which, supported by the USSR Armed Forces, would block the work of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania.

The appeal stresses the importance of keeping calm and not giving way to provocations which would spark off distrubances in Lithuania. It urges people to support the government of the republic by opposing the demands of the occupants with resolute civil disobedience.

Concerning recruitment to the Soviet Armed Forces, the appeal says that a few cowards and traitors who would join the Soviet Armed Forces would be enough for their act to be presented by Moscow as an example of the determination of the citizens of the republic of Lithuania to remain in the composition of the empire. It goes on to say that, although nobody could guarantee absolute safety for those who refuse to join the Army, it is much

safer to go into hiding rather than suffer in the Red Army, where revenge against Lithuanians awaits them.

Finally, the appeal declares that joining the occupationist Soviet Armed Forces today is an act of treason against the motherland.

'Anti-Army' Moods Seen Escalating in Lithuania

LD0304130190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1155 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)—According to the press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense, anti-Army moods, reinforced by the steps of the Lithuanian leadership, are continuing to escalate in that Baltic republic. Thus, the financing of Military Commissariats from local budget funds and salary payments to the military bookkeeping staff of local soviets have been halted beginning 1 April.

By a decision of the republic's Supreme Council, access to television and radio broadcasting has been forbidden to servicemen. Moreover, many indigenous residents of the republic who do not share the "Sajudis" leaders' point of view have been deprived of the opportunity to express their opinions in the mass information media.

The report from the press center protests against the order by the Lithuanian minister of communications on disconnecting the system of notification of Military Commissariats and civil defense headquarters. "This is yet another link in the chain of irresponsible and illegal decisions which are damaging not only servicemen but also the republic's population," the report says.

It also notes that the Lithuanian press has published a report on the establishment of a ministry "for the territory's defense." Registration of volunteers to join its formations is continuing and inspections of detachments of fighters are being organized. Nationalist elements are stepping up their search for contacts with servicemen, primarily conscripts from the Baltic republics. The report from the press center says that their aim is to influence them ideologically and push them towards desertion, and to study the possibilities of obtaining weapons and collecting information about officials.

The formation of self-defense detachments is also underway in Latvia and Estonia. Means for their creation are being collected openly. Active work aimed at establishing contacts with the organizations of the people's fronts of other republics is being conducted. Visits by representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan with the purpose of discussing, with Sajudis' local bodies, the issues of joint actions have been noticed.

Provocative actions against servicemen, including guard personnel, do not cease. According to the information available to the press center, on the night of 29 March, in the town of Varena (Lithuanian SSR), a group of intoxicated civilians approached a guarded storehouse in four cars. Four shots were fired from one of the cars. Some of the attackers were detained.

At the same time there are quite a few examples of local residents, despite the anti-Army campaign in the media, addressing the military with words of gratitude and thanks.

The separatist and nationalist elements are stepping up their efforts aimed at thwarting the spring call-up. The desertion by some servicemen of Lithuanian nationality is a direct result of the instigators' activity. Some of them have given themselves up to the military registration offices and this, as is known, will be regarded as a mitigating circumstance. Others, meanwhile, have been given refuge by their "patrons" in various places, including psychiatric hospitals.

One of the telegrams that has arrived at the ministry of defense from Vilnius expresses a protest in connection with the alleged fact that servicemen with a fixed period of service, who were at a psychiatric hospital, have been taken by "paratroopers" to an unknown destination. The press center report notes that the authors of similar telegrams kept silent however when specialized medical institutions were being used "for such vile purposes."

Review of Foreign Media on Lithuanian Situation

PM0204213790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Press roundup: "The Way Out Lies in Dialogue. The World Press on the Situation in Lithuania"]

[Text] Events in Lithuania are still attracting the attention of the world's news agencies and press. A great deal of attention has been paid to the development of events in this Baltic republic in the light of the USSR president's appeal to the people of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"The Soviet president has insistently called on the Lithuanian leadership to immediately repeal the declaration of independence," THE WASHINGTON POST reports.

Japan's MAINICHI singles out, in particular, the part of the appeal to the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet where M.S. Gorbachev said that the incumbent Lithuanian leadership "is taking unilateral actions that go against the USSR Constitution and are frankly provocative and offensive to the whole Union" and that "this path is destructive and will only lead to deadlock."

During an interview with Finnish Radio, Finnish Prime Minister Holkeri pointed to the Lithuanian leadership's impatience and political awkwardness.

Recently the U.S. mass media have animatedly discussed and analyzed the White House position and its possible steps in connection with the situation in Lithuania. Virtually all commentators who tackle this subject

share the opinion that the administration has long placed its main bet on perestroyka, which it is very hard to renounce.

"By all their recent statements and actions," INS Radio pointed out, "administration spokesmen have demonstrated their blatant desire to avoid any steps that could damage Gorbachev."

"According to State Department, Pentagon, and White House sources, virtually none of Bush's political advisers has urged the White House to publish an unequivocal statement recognizing the 11 March declaration of Lithuanian independence," THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER points out.

Britain's THE SUNDAY CORRESPONDENT writes in an editorial: "If the republic's leadership headed by Landsbergis refuses to compromise on its unilateral proclamation of independence, everything that has been achieved in East-West relations will be in jeopardy. Lithuania is an integral part of the Soviet Union, and the question of whether its demands should be met must be examined in a leisurely and circumspect fashion. Circumstances require the Lithuanian government to be patient. But instead, by hastily proclaiming independence and stating its refusal to obey in response to Moscow's well thought-out position, the Lithuanian leadership is thus failing to consider the broader implications of its actions. Just as we supported Gorbachev during easier times, we must support him now that times are tough and must clearly show the Lithuanian leadership what our position is."

Analyzing the Lithuanian authorities' recent steps, London's THE OBSERVER points out that after V. Landsbergis' election as chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet quite ambiguous sentiments began to appear within Sajudis. Many people, particularly industrial workers, THE OBSERVER points out, think that it lacks experience. This is particularly manifest in the way in which it is establishing relations with Moscow.

The Lithuanian leadership headed by Landsbergis, Austria's OBEROESTERREICHISCHE NACHRICHTEN points out, loves playing with destructive words; however, it has not as yet been seen to take any constructive actions. It is not the military and not the Russians who bear the main responsibility for the current "war of nerves" between Vilnius and Moscow. That is done by Landsbergis: by his premature appeals, cables, and decrees, which were adopted predominantly at night, the Lithuanian president has created an increasing threat to the Lithuanian population.

In the opinion of Yugoslavia's POLITIKA, events in Lithuania are entering a new phase. One of the main questions of the day is the need for a breakthrough in the current situation in the immediate future—naturally, by political means. This will only be possible if dialogue is established between Moscow and Vilnius, the conditions for which were articulated in the USSR president's appeal to the people of the Lithuanian SSR and the Lithuanian SSR's Supreme Soviet.

Listeners Asked About Reception, Distortion

LD0404131790 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] At present our radio station has very many listeners—twice as many as we had last year. Our latest reception reports received from all over the world are dated 12 or 13 March. Due to the recent political developments we are not sure whether you can receive our programs normally, and if you do, whether the voices of the presenters are distorted or not. You see, we have received some information that our second broadcast, which is on the short wave frequency at 2200 GMT is technically distorted by the relay station. We would much appreciate your help in either confirming or negating this.

Deputy on Party Political Broadcasts on TV

LD0304154690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1245 GMT 3 Mar 90

[Statement by Deputy Justas Paleckis, ideological secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] It is natural that in a multiparty society ecah political organization must be known to society. Unfortunately, not all political parties and movements in Lithuania (?strive for it). Lately the organization in Lithuania basing itself on the CPSU Platform has started widely camouflaging its not very honorable actions with the name of the Lithuanian Communist Party. It endeavors to make use of the USSR mass media and convince society that it is only that organization that represents Lithuania's communists and Lithuanian public opinion. Falsifying and illegally using the title of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LITVA, the CPSU organization in Lithuania is misleading society and attempts to create doubts among uninformed people about the consistency and goodwill of Lithuania's communists in striving to consolidate Lithuania's independence. [passage omitted]

All positive changes in our television system would better fit the present Lithuanian multiparty system—variety in the assessment of political changes—if the opportunity is granted to political parties and movements to make use of television and radio in accordance with their political weight in society. [passage omitted]

Political approval by the Supreme Council of the introduction of regular television and radio broadcasts for the most important parties and movements to express their political attitudes would be very desirable. [passage omitted]

I would even like to call a vote on this problem, because at present this is very, very, important for the Lithuanian Communist Party. [passage omitted]

Newspapers Report on Lithuanian Situation

LD0304105790 Moscow TASS in English 1038 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—"The appeal by President Mikhail Gorbachev is a serious document, which deserves a positive reaction and comprehensive study. This opinion was expressed by many people with whom I had occasion to talk in Vilnius," a special corespondent of the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper writes today.

"People value the president's concern and considered language. It would be good if all understand that the president's appeal speaks on behalf of the entire multinational Union, all who are concerned about Lithuanian leaders' attempts to destroy everything that has been created over years and decades," the newspaper writes.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publishes a letter by more than a hundred party, war and labour veterans from Vilnius, who believe that the resolutions by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on restoring the independence of the Lithuanian state do not express the will of the majority of the republic's residents and are illegitimate.

"We strongly protest against the falisification of the historic truth about the restoration of Soviet Government in Lithuania and its voluntary entrance into the Soviet Union. We are faithful to the memory of hundreds of thousands of Soviet people who gave their lives for the freedom and independence of Soviet Lithuania. We will not allow a division of the USSR," the letter says.

"I am not in a position to judge which path Lithuania should pursue. This is a matter for the people themselves. But to secede from the Union by slamming the door is impermissible. I do not believe that this is the will of the people," Mariya Pochenchuk writes in her letter to the SELSKAYA ZHIZN newspaper.

In an interview with the TRUD newspaper, M. Yekabson, a worker of the Vilnius taxi fleet, says: "Landsbergis is acting not by the will of the people. He introduced chaos into life in the republic. I support Gorbachev's appeal. We should not solve all problems off- hand. People will sort out things. They are deep in thought now."

"The euphoria over Lithuanian independence declared by the republic's Supreme Soviet has not petered out. Republican newspapers and television have long been inculcating in people ideas about the priority of one nation, about an unprecedented flourishing of democracy and the economy, which is to come as soon as Sajudis takes office," TRUD writes.

"The leaders of this organisation did come to power. But instead of democracy and pluralism, they are fostering a line of reasoning similar to that of Sajudis. For instance, Leningrad television programmes, which are very popular with Lithuanians, were halted on Sunday evening.

"Calls are being made to halt television broadcasts from Moscow. They go against the grain for parliamentarians who during the election campaign swore loyalty to democracy, pluralism and freedom of speech, but now act contrary to their own promises," TRUD writes.

Participants in an enlarged plenary meeting of the Irkutsk regional committee of the Soviet Communist Party sent a letter to Soviet leaders and TASS.

They write that they respect the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination and their aspiration for economic, social and cultural progress. But they consider that these issues can be solved only given scrupulous compliance with Soviet legislation and when account is taken of the interests of Lithuania and other Union republics.

Lithuanian Youth Group Urges 'Presidential Rule'

LD0304111590 Moscow TASS in English 1049 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—The Lithuanian Young Communist League [YCL] Congress has called on Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to introduce "direct presidential rule" on the territory of Lithuania. An address on behalf of the congress has been received here. The league has a membership of 35,000.

The reasons given in the address for the request are that "dozens of people who are in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet have upset the destiny of hundreds of thousands of people by one decision", which is leading to "the most dangerous, unpredictable tension".

Many in the Soviet Union express concern over the development of events in Lithuania. This is illustrated by Soviet people's response to the Soviet president's appeal, dated March 31, to the Lithuanian people and parliament to show prudence.

"World practice confirms that progress in any cause can be made only on the basis of universal human, internationalist values. Attempts are now being made in Lithuania to ignore the interests of thousands of people—this is inadmissible," Nikolay Fomin, an engineer from Stavropol, told TASS.

The personnel of the Sosnovskiy ship-building plant (Russian Federation), which for decades has been maintaining business contacts with Lithuania, has also expressed anxiety over developments in Lithuania.

The ship-builders held a meeting at which they adopted an address to the people of Lithuania. The address reads: "We are calling on the workers and collective farmers of Lithuania: Support forces that favour a Soviet Lithuania

within a renewed alliance of equal republics. It is bitter and distressing to realise that attempts are being made to separate us into different states. We oppose pressure tactics with regard to the peoples of Lithuania but we call on you to remain committed to our common interests."

"The obstinacy with which Sajudis leaders seek confrontation and the heightening of tension is striking," said Moscow engineer Olga Torchevskaya. "Only a calm and constructive dialogue, in which the opinions of everyone would be taken into consideration, may provide an answer to the complex 'Lithuanian question'.

"The Lithuanians have always been notable for high culture, common sense and a sense of civic responsibility. I hope that these qualities will prevail. It is necessary to keep the process within the framework of the reasonable," Torchevskaya said.

"My father is a Lithuanian and my mother is a Ukrainian. I work in Kazakhstan and throughout my life I have regarded myself as a native of the Soviet Union," said Vytas Pamakstis, a member of the Alma Ata railway management.

"Therefore I follow the developments in Lithuania with concern. One gathers the impression that some political figures in the republic are overwhelmed by imprudent passions, while sober voices get drowned in emotions and hard feelings. A well-considered approach to the problem is necessary, for it concerns the destiny of people."

Commentary Describes U.S. Stand on Lithuania

LD0304115890 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] With the center and Lithuania locked in a further wrangle over the latter's declaration of independence, what is Washington's position on what appears to be a deadlocked situation? Here is a commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov of our staff:

By all accounts the White House does not seem to be unwilling to lend an ear to the Soviet position and explain its own stand on the issue. Nor does it want, it seems, to do anything that might worsen what is entirely this country's internal affair.

President Bush, said to have sent a confidential letter to Mikhail Gorbachev last Friday [30 March], made it clear by saying: I want to be sure the Soviets understand our position and understand that we are not trying to make things difficult in the Lithuanian crisis.

For his part the White House spokesman, Mr. Marlin Fitzwater, said: Our interest is not in making threats and not in doing any damage to the situation, but in being positive and constructive. And he added: We want to be helpful in resolving this process, we do not want to do any harm.

However, there are quite a few comments that are in stark contrast with the assurances given by the president and his spokesman. In what might be construed as a desire for fanning of passions rather than cooling them, a number of senators have pledged solidarity with the illegitimate move by the Lithuanian leadership which is in gross violation of the Soviet Constitution. Three U.S. senators telephoned Mr. Landsbergis with words of encouragement last Friday as though encouraging him to further unconstitutional moves. One of them, Senator D'Amato, is quoted as saying: Our role is to demand independence today.

By calling on Lithuanian leaders for immediate action Senator D'Amato is being virtually supportive of their tactic of unilateral and ultimatum-like moves which put normal life and security in the republic under threat. What he is trying to do can be described as nothing short of putting fat into the fire.

All manner of warnings come from a number of other senators could hardly be called as undamaging. Senator Bob Dole, for example, continues attempts at scaring the Soviet Union, saying its resort to force in Lithuania would be a severe blow to U.S.-Soviet relations- - as if improved superpower relations were in the Soviet Union's interest alone.

U.S. analysts say these pronouncements were in utter contrast to guarded and measured statements coming from Mr. Bush. One might say that they are also in contrast with commonsense.

Pro-Moscow CP Issues Blacklist of Undesirables

LD0304110390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Radio Vilnius has information from foreign sources that the leaders of the pro-Moscow Communist Party organization in Lithuania have drawn up lists of undesirable foreigners of Lithuanian descent. These black lists are said to have been sent out by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to Soviet embassies in various countries of the world, so getting a Soviet visa may be even more difficult for some foreigners now.

CPSU-Lithuanian Party Division of Property Viewed

LD0203110390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 1 March broadcasts its 30-minute daily interview program hosted by Benas Rupeika. Rupeika begins the program by announcing that a CPSU commission set up in Moscow arrived in Vilnius a few hours previously to begin the partition of property between the CPSU and the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania [CPLi]. Rupeika then moves on to the day's interview, a prerecorded telephone conversation with Rolandas Pavilionis, member of the CPLi Central Committee Bureau, as follows:

"[Rupeika] Well then, it looks like the long-awaited partition of property—or the divorce, if you like—has begun.

"[Pavilionis] It seems to me that the divorce has already taken place, but the partition of property has not yet begun, and I think it will not begin. At least my position, as member of the bureau, which I had a chance to voice at the latest bureau sitting, is that there should be no partition of the property between us and the CPSU Central Committee.

"[Rupeika] Why not?

"[Pavilionis] Because, first of all, this property belongs to Lithuania. This is the property that was partially accumulated by the contributions made by Lithuanian Communists. Of course, there is property the party received during the postwar years. This property should be returned to Lithuania. As far as I know, there are buildings of this type here in Vilnius, Kaunas, and in other places. On the whole, after the decisions made at the 20th Congress, we have parted ways with the CPSU and therefore the CPSU should have no formal or informal claims on us.

"[Rupeika] But despite it all, they have come.

"[Pavilionis] Arriving or not is their own business. They still believe that they can continue running our affairs. It has been clearly stated in the decisions of the 20th Congress that all the property that belonged to the CPSU organization in Lithuania now now become the property of the CPLi.

"[Rupeika] However, the decisions adopted by the 20th CPLi Congress have been nothing but a sheet of paper until now. The CPSU Central Committee is the power. If the need arises, the militia will be sent in on you.

"[Pavilionis] I do not think this will happen, because this would amount to interstate affair."

Concerning the the CPSU organization in Lithuania, Pavilionis says that "they walked out of the congress, having rejected all the congress decisions, therefore they lost all rights to claim some part of the property of the CPLi. If they want to set up some material basis, they should do it like any other political organization, if such a political organization is recognised in Lithuania at all."

Lithuania Depoliticizes MVD, KGB, Other Organs

LD0503224490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] A session of the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee Bureau on 2 March, in which a group of members of the Central Committee also took part, adopted a resolution on the depoliticization of many of the institutions of Lithuania. It was decided to suspend the activity of members of the Communist Party in the organization of the republican Internal Affairs Ministry, the Committee for State Security, the Customs Service, and in the organs of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Justice, the Procuracy, State Arbitration, state control and courts. The resolution says that the organization of the Communist Party of Lithuanian is being eliminated in the listed organs of law and order. Before 1 April they will transfer the documentation and documents of party members to the territorial party committee.

Veterans Council Protests Lithuania, Estonia Decisions

LD0503225790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1602 GMT 5 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 Mar (TASS)—The All-Union council of War and Labor Veterans has issued an appeal in connection with decisions taken by the Councils of Ministers of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic which harm the civil rights and benefits provided under USSR legislation for officers, ensigns, warrant officers and servicemen on extended service upon discharge into the reserve and retirement, in particular with regard to the provision of housing for them.

This act, the appeal says, cannot be viewed other than as discriminatory toward people who have given their best years to the fulfilment of the sacred duty of ensuring the security of our homeland.

The All-Union council of War and Labor Veterans, on the grounds of numerous requests by veterans of the USSR armed forces and members of their families, appeals to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic to restore justice and bring these decisions into line with the legislation of the USSR.

Edgar Savisaar Elected Estonian Prime Minister

LD0404105390 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Today the Supreme Soviet on Toompea [in Tallinn] solved organizational questions. First, chairmen were elected for seven commisions. Those are in addition to the five commissions chairmen were elected yesterday. The Environmental Commission will be led by Andres Tarand, the Family and Social-Issues Commission by Lehte Soot-Hainsalu, Nationality-Relations Commission by Sergey Sovetnikov, Foreign Commission by Indrek Toome, Commission for Administrative Reform by Andrus Ristkok, State Defense Commission by Rein Tamme, and the Press Commission by Rein Veidemann.

After 12 commission chairmen were elected, the composition of the Supreme Soviet Presidium was endorsed—this is 16 strong. Belonging in it are the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, head and deputy heads of the Supreme Soviet, and commission chairmen. Thus: Arnold Ryuytel, Ulo Nugis, Marju Lauristin, Viktor Andreyev, Tonu

Anton, Ants Veetousme, Eldur Peterson, Andres Tarand, Enn Poldroos, Lehte Soot-Hainsalu, Sergey Sovetnikov, Indrek Toome, Villo Jurjo, Andrus Ristkok, Rein Tamme, and Rein Veidemann.

In the afternoon the time came for Arnold Ryuytel to announce the candidate for prime minister. Two candidates had been under discussion at the Supreme Soviet Presidium: Edgar Savisaar and Tiit Vahi [minister of transport]. Arnold Ryuytel put forward the candidature of Edgar Savisaar [one of the leaders of the People's Front] in the name of the Supreme Soviet Presidium—which fact pointed to the future government not going to be only the government of the People's Front but also having to take into account the stances of all political forces in Estonia. Edgar Savisaar did not present a governmental program because that was said to be up to the would-be government. The Supreme Soviet voted on the issue of the prime minister. There were 54 votes in favor of Edgar Savisaar, with 32 against and [indistinct number] of people's deputies abstained. Savisaar promised to hold consultations within this week and to present the composition of his government by the beginning of next week. The new prime minister gave his first interview to Estonian radio.

[Begin Savisaar recording] The People's Front has indeed endeavored to influence politics within our society, particularly at a time so full of tension. I think the fact that I was endorsed as the leader of the government today reflects a certain political line within parliamentary relations: a political line in respect of restoring the republic of Estonia as well as in respect of the present economic [words indistinct] to get out of the social crisis. I believe that we will all together—parliament, government, our people, the public at large—engage in this work.

I do not think my speech had any effect on the voting results either way because my positions were already known before and had I now started backtracking, I would not have been believed and there is no point in that, either. I am what I am. [passage omitted] Of course, one needs to hold talks with [name indistinct] and with everybody who is prepared to enter democratic talks and everybody who wants to get out of the present crisis because the roof may fall upon us all. One must hold talks with all of them, and the wider partnership we obtain, the firmer this government will stand. We are not meeting so as to disperse again tomorrow. [end recording]

This then was the first interview of Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar to Estonian radio.

The Supreme Soviet endorsed Jaak Kirikal as chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Court.

Tomorrow at 1000 the Supreme Soviet will continue its work on Toompea.

Soviet Tank Monument Destroyed in Estonia

LD0404140490 Moscow TASS in English 1354 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tallinn April 4 TASS—A Soviet T-34 tank, placed as a monument to mark the 35th anniversary of the liberation of Valga from fascist invaders, was blown up near this Estonian town on the night of April 2.

About 10,000 Soviet Army servicemen perished during the liberation of Valga. The tank near the Valga-Tartu highway commemorated the battle. The attack occurred on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet victory over fascism.

According to the Basic military district specialists, a shell was put under the tank. The blast was very powerful—the engine was destroyed and heavy rollers were thrown about 50 meters away, Chairman of Soviet Army Veterans Section D. Silyutin told TASS.

The Valga authorities held a conference where representatives of parties and movements unanimously denounced the attack as aimlessly aggravating the situation.

At 19:00 on April 3, several cars brought some twenty young people to the damaged monument, covered with tarpaulin and surrounded with pegs. An unarmed soldier, guarding the monument, was threatened and forced to leave.

After that, the hooligans cut the tarpaulin, tore it off and disappeared. Nearby militiamen did not intervene.

Some Valga residents are indignant about the incident, others rejoice and gloat over it. Some people say that the monument will be restored, but who can guarantee that the new tank will not be destroyed in another uneven battle? Silyutin said.

More on Ryuytel Appeal for Swedish Support

PM0404140490 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Apr 90 p 4

[Estonian Supreme Soviet President Arnold Ryuytel "Debate" article: "Estonia's President Appeals to Sweden"]

[Text] I have been asked to send a greeting to the "Monday Movement" in Sweden, where citizens from all parties support the Baltic peoples' right to self-determination and cooperation between the Baltic region and the rest of the Nordic area.

We Estonians have always seen ourselves as a part of the Nordic area. That is why we feel a kinship with Sweden and want to develop the cooperation and solidarity between our two countries in every possible way. We have noted with gratitude that after the 28 March 1990 meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council Prime Minister

Ingvar Carlsson declared that "the Lithuanian people have given clear voice in free elections to their desire to exercise their legitimate right to national self-determination through the formation of their own independent state." We assume that Sweden's Government also supports the Estonian people's right to national self-determination and the reestablishment of the republic of Estonia on the basis of the 1920 Treaty of Tartu.

We share the Swedish Government's view that "all force or threat of force is unacceptable." In accordance with wishes expressed by the Swedish Government, we are also prepared to develop links between the parliaments and political parties of our two countries.

We have followed the discussion in Sweden of the question of whether Estonia is occupied or not. For the Estonian people the answer has always been clear, and now our scholars have confirmed that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied by the Red Army in the summer of 1940 and were subsequently annexed. But this annexation did not undo the occupation.

This is why Estonia's Supreme Soviet last Friday [30 March] adopted a decision on Estonia's status as a state. Estonia's Supreme Soviet declared that the Soviet occupation of Estonia on 17 June 1940 did not interrupt the continued existence of the republic of Estonia. The territory of the republic of Estonia is still occupied today. Taking as its point of departure the Estonian people's clearly expressed desire to reestablish the independence and state authority of the republic of Estonia, Estonia's Supreme Soviet declared that Soviet state power in Estonia has from the very beginning been illegal and therefore called for the restoration of the republic of Estonia during a transitional period which will end with the recreation of the republic's constitutional state institutions. In this transitional period Estonia's Supreme Soviet will draft provisional government arrangements together with legal guarantees for all inhabitants, regardless of their nationality.

We have already started negotiations with the leadership of the Soviet Union and want in this way to find our way back peacefully into the free family in the common European home.

Sweden has already contributed in several ways to the process of renewal on this side of the Baltic, through air links and soon through sea links, consular offices, jointly owned enterprises, gifts of agricultural machinery, and so on. We would like to see Sweden's Government give further support to our endeavors to develop Estonia into an economic, cultural, and political bridge between East and West.

Estonia's government has approached the Swedish Government with the proposal that it support a major market economy training project organized by Swedish industrial and commercial organizations. Within the overall framework of this project Estonia's Supreme Soviet could also benefit from Swedish expertise in the legislative work connected with the transition to a market economy and political democracy. This cooperation would make it possible for Estonia—and the rest of the Baltic region—to be an advance guard for the policy of perestroyka in the whole of the Soviet Union, especially now that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has emphasized the need for market economy reforms throughout the Soviet Union.

Estonia's government has also approached the Swedish Government in connection with the plans to use Sweden's Tele-X satellite to create modern telecommunications links between the Baltic region and the rest of the Nordic area. Functioning telecommunications are a prerequisite for the economic reforms, which in turn can contribute to peaceful developments that are to the benefit of all throughout the region around our shared Baltic Sea.

Militarized Detachments Emerge in Estonia

LD0304173390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Tallinn, 3 Apr [TASS]—Calls to join the "Kastseliyt" ("Defence Union") were heard here at a meeting organized by the Tallinn Christian Democratic Union of Young People. During Estonia's bourgeois years, the "Kastseliyt" helped the authorities to maintain order and enjoyed all kinds of support from the authoritarian regime of President Peats. The organization consisted of 15 units [druzhina] and had at its disposal rifles, artillery batteries, and tanks. Now, the "Kastseliyt" units are being reborn in a number of districts of Estonia.

News about the creation of these militarized detachments caused serious concern among a significant portion of the republic's population. As a counterbalance to the "Kastseliyt," the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Power and Citizens' Rights in Estonia has appealed to labor collectives to form workers' units.

Estonian Rally Held Against Soviet Military

LD0304114690

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1700 GMT on 2 April broadcasts a four-minute report on a rally which took place in Tallinn that day "against the occupation Army." The rally in Town Hall Square was "well-attended" despite the bad weather, the radio says. It was organized by about twenty different movements and parties. A speaker on behalf of the Estonian Women's Movement said that after the movement's appeal together with the Estonian Doctors' Union, in the 10 March issue of PAEVALEHT; 65,129 people pledged their support with a petition. The radio says there were numerous speakers, each of whom spoke about the Soviet Army from the viewpoint of their movement. Appeals were made to join the Geneva-40 Movement and the Defense League, and to support the idea of alternative (military) service, the report adds.

The radio notes that a speaker at the rally read out the following: "To the parents of Estonian sons, to all citizens of the republic of Estonia, and to all inhabitants of Estonia. Proceeding from the resolutions of the Estonian Congress, we address the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and the government with the [following] demands: Stop assisting in the forced conscription into the Soviet forces; recall home immediately citizens of the republic of Estonia and other inhabitants of Estonia who are serving in the USSR forces; demand removal of the USSR forces from Estonia, as well as putting a stop to the activity of KGB, internal forces, and other repressive bodies, and demand they be removed from the territory of the republic of Estonia; ensure protection to all citizens of the republic of Estonia and inhabitants of Estonia who are in danger of forced conscription, as well as to those who have refused or interrupted their Army service in the USSR forces. We consider serving in Estonian formations outside of the USSR forces as lawful and acceptable.

Tallinn Young Christian-Democratic Union, with the following having joined [this view]: The Estonian Democratic Labor Party, the Geneva-49 Movement, the Estonian Conservative People's Party, Estonian Christian-Democratic Party, Estonian Christian-Democratic Union, Estonian Christian Association, initiative group of the Estonian Rural Center Party, Estonian Society for Preservation of the National Heritage, Estonian Women's Union, Estonian Green Movement, Estonian Green Party, Estonian National Independence Party, the Memento Association, Nomme Scouts Column, People's Front, Green Regiment, Independent Information Center, Estonian National Independence Party, and the Res Publica Association.

Latvian Party Plenum Urges 'Unity'

LD0304173490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] A plenum of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee was held in Riga today. Our correspondnet Ninel Meshkun is at the microphone.

[Meshkun] Recently, one has hardly been able to open a single republican newspaper or journal in which the headlines alone have not indicated matters which alarm everyone. Latvia, where are you going? These problems also concern communists, who gathered today for the plenum of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee. The agenda includes discussion of the political report to the congress by Jan Yanovich Vagris, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, and the agenda of the extraordinary 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia has been proposed for examination by the members of the plenum.

It will begin work at a historic moment. Exactly five years have passed since the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which took the course of perestroyka, and today the restructuring processes in the republic have reached a critical point at which the fate of perestroyka itself, and the fate of the Communist Party of Latvia, are being decided.

Over the last few years, several ideological platforms have taken shape in the republic's Communist Party, around which communists of the republic have grouped depending on their attitude to two closely and mutually connected cardinal problems: the sovereignty of Latvia and the independence of the Communist Party of Latvia. Yesterday, several drafts of program documents and draft statutes were published on behalf of these platforms. A number of public organizations are putting obvious pressure on the public and legislative power to adopt a unilateral decision, although this could lead to severe consequences for all of society, in the creation of a new monopoly on power, government, and ideology, thus leading to an extreme exacerbation of political and social confrontation.

Giving a critical appraisal of the activity of the republic's party organization, Jan Yanovich Vagris noted that the 19th party conference was a step forward toward implementing glasnost and the processes of democratization in our society. However, there has so far been no success in carrying out the measures thought up for restructuring the party itself. The colors of national awakening have brightened the dawn of perestroyka in Latvia, but the republic's Communist Party, as a united political organization, and as the leading and the single political force, has come too late. It is precisely here that the party's loss of initiative is based, and in practice, said Jan Yanovich Vagris, we have become convinced of the importance of the party's links with the masses as a condition of the party's successful activity. Only having obtained support for its views and activity from the masses can the party be sure that the people need it. The preservation in the present situation of a cardinally revitalized, but organizationally united, Communist Party of Latvia is a most important condition of political stability and of the democratization of society.

I am deeply convinced, said Jan Yanovich Vagris, that for the republic's communists, for the people of Latvia as a whole, and for its future, the preservation of unity is more necessary than anything else. This is too crucial a moment to allow a split to occur. It is essential to consistently continue the course, outlined in the program of action of the republic's Communist Party, toward sovereignty.

So, it is up to the congress. In two days, the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia will begin its work.

Latvian Plenum Debates Draft Program, Rules

LD0304173890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1530 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Riga, 3 Apr (TASS)—Documents of the forthcoming 25th Congress of the Latvian Communist Party were discussed today by those attending a Central Committee plenum.

components in the center and locally, we need to recognize as not devoid of reason the misgivings expressed by the communists regarding the unconstructive nature of such a measure, in any event for the immediate period.

Firmly established in the consciousness of many of us, including those present in this hall, is the cliche that the obkom decides all questions: from regulation of the municipal economy, the supply of food and consumer goods, to the organization of the work of industry and agriculture—that is, it deals with regulation and not merely the formulation of strategic directions. This had become natural and customary, and therefore when difficulties arose here, we always went to the party committee and, it has to be said, in the majority of instances met with understanding and support there in the solution of questions. Today complaints on all matters are, as before, being addressed chiefly and primarily to the party authorities.

The decisions of the plenum say otherwise. From now on, all managerial functions must be assumed by the soviet authorities. It is entirely a question of whether the soviets have been endowed with the necessary authority and whether measures precluding anarchy have been thought out here.

Power is primarily knowledgeability and responsibility; power is an ability to solve problems competently. Competent authority must be claimed and perceived and have a real base, including both legislative and financial. It is necessary to prepare for this thoroughly and in earnest.

Meanwhile I am convinced that we cannot and do not have the right, in the difficult period in which we find ourselves, to distance ourselves from the concerns about people's day-to-day needs and requirements.

A certain confusion and loss of initiative and perseverance in the advancement of the restructuring processes on the part of the obkom, gorkoms, raykoms, and lower party committees, which has been manifested particularly clearly in the last year, has already cost us much in both the economic and social spheres.

We are entering an entirely new period, I would even say an era, which will require each of us to rethink not only our place in society but also to revise our attitude toward the party's past and future and our state as a whole.

Much could be said also about other provisions of the draft platform. But you have, I believe, had a chance to familiarize yourselves with them. However, one point must be mentioned: the broadest diversity of viewpoints at the Central Committee plenum. You know this from newspaper publications. I have to assure you that all the speeches (I judge primarily from my own, naturally) were carried in the press without any excisions or cuts. The debate that took place showed once again that the polarization has reached a point where we have squarely approached the principle of a multiparty system. These events are coming to a head.

We must today clearly recognize that other political structures could soon emerge together with the CPSU. This also is an entirely new situation in which we find ourselves.

What changes await us in this connection?

The CPSU will have to switch to political methods of work, more precisely, to political methods of struggle for its influence in society. And this means that we must fully reexamine all our programs and approaches and find the mobility and dynamism, both in decisions and in practical action, which have to a considerable extent been lost.

Such in our view is the principal conclusion from the decisions and the main results of the plenum. I am sure the evaluations that have been expressed will be developed and made more specific in subsequent speeches and debate.

About the political situation in Leningrad. As a whole, it is not giving rise to particular concern. Nor, equally, is it inspiring unwarranted optimism. The transitional state of society is being accompanied by manifestations of instability and a growth of people's dissatisfaction and concern for the fate of the country and socialism.

Everyone can see corroboration of such conclusions. Nor has our region escaped these phenomena. The economy that has lost its dynamism, the half-empty store shelves, the frequently artificially spurred threat of interethnic conflicts, the absence of elementary order and the general decline in responsibility, the marked rise in crime—all these, unfortunately, are palpable signs of our times.

At this difficult time for the country and the party, the unity of all progressive forces on the basis of democratization of the party and society and civil harmony, which can alone counter lawlessness, anarchy and chaos, are needed more than ever.

I will say right away that the concept of "democratization" does not for me mean permissiveness. It means primarily inclusion in social processes of those positive, constructive directions and movements that could improve make man's life and which have as their ultimate goal giving the free individual an opportunity to freely develop.

The agenda of our plenum incorporates a question on the approach contained in the report and election conference of the Leningrad party organization and the procedure of delegate election. You have drafts of all the documents. These are important problems, which require thorough discussion.

First of all, it is essential that we fundamentally alter our approaches to the formation of the elective and executive authorities of the obkoms, gorkoms, raykoms, and primary party organizations. They have traditionally been formed purely according to the party-schedule principle: with a fixed quota of secretaries of raykoms,

primary party organizations, workplace managers, scientists, artistic officials, and so forth. And the role of members of the elective party authorities has in fact frequently been confined to representative functions, and to their having attended plenums, sometimes having spoken and sometimes having been enlisted in the work of this commission or the other. All this has generally not required great effort and, accordingly, has not imposed particular responsibility for adopted decisions prepared by the apparatus.

But the present times demand fundamentally different approaches. We must even now say plainly that we need professional politicians, that is, people who consciously devote their life to precisely this sphere of activity. It cannot be ruled out that after a certain while, possibly in quite a short time, a certain part of the elective party committee will be professional. That is, they will perform only this work, but this will be of a new quality.

The role of the party apparatus proper in its traditional understanding here is changing radically. Whereas previously it prepared decisions and implemented them "autonomously" to a certain extent, now it must be under the daily supervision of the elective authority.

I shall not venture to determine the specific timeframe of such a reorganization, but we will evidently arrive at this point shortly. We need to think and speak about this even today because the report and election campaign is on the doorstep here.

A few words about its salient features.

Considering the numerous proposals by party activists and also the great workload of the party committees and bureaus concerning the preparations for and organization of the elections to the soviets of people's deputies, the report and election meetings and conferences in the primary and city and rayon party organizations of Leningrad and the oblast could mainly be held after the 28th CPSU Congress. If the party committees decide to do so before the congress, I believe this is their right.

However, it is proposed that the oblast report and election conference be held 25-26 April this year and that in mid-April convening conferences of city and rayon party organizations be held to examine the following questions:

the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress;

delegates to the joint 29th oblast and 27th city report and election conference of the CPSU's Leningrad organization;

the election of members of the executive bodies of the Leningrad party organization.

The fundamental question is what the nature of the executive bodies should be.

We polled the communists—hundreds of thousands of people. And the fact that the absolute majority of those polled advocated the creation of a single party committee should for us be decisive. We cannot fail to heed the opinion of the primary party organizations.

The creation of a single party committee by no means signifies that questions of the oblast party organization or of the communists who work in the countryside will be relegated to the background. It will, I believe, be just the opposite. In the new structure of the Leningrad party organization rid of sectoral and territorial "barriers," the members of the CPSU working in the oblast will participate more actively in the solution of all problems troubling our Leningrad region as a whole.

New people, who may be found only given a different election mechanism, are required. I have already mentioned the party-schedule approach: it did work, justifying itself for a time. I will say this. We are not among those who maintain that previously all was bad and that now we have finally found a panacea against all our troubles in sweeping criticism.

Nonetheless, this means that we must radically change the system of elections of the party committees. What is meant by "radically?" Simply put, we need to return to the correct, logically dictated selection of candidates, the basis of which is the direct, secret and multiple-choice election of delegates to the conference with the participation of any number of candidates, and to the formation of party districts and elections resulting in the election of delegates who have received instructions from their electorate, who have convictions, and who are prepared to defend them. These are the people we need now.

Of course, this is quite problematical. And we have already sensed this at the elections for people's deputies of the union and now also, in the course of the election campaign for the republic and local soviets.

Leningraders must not allow victory to go to skilled orators who know how to voice slogans loudly but who lack sufficient competence to implement them, even if they even have the desire to.

We know from experience, from material we have studied, and from contacts with many people that only competence, only a sincere devotion to the cause afford a person the right to occupy a particular responsible office. If he feels that he is incapable of tackling tasks in depth and responsibly, with a knowledge of what is to come, he should honestly declare this. And he needs to be accorded the right to quit the elective body or the apparatus without, as we are now accustomed to saying, social consequences for the individual.

Thus direct elections of delegates to the report and election conference and the recommendations of rayon

meetings—where, first, the authority of the elected delegates might be confirmed and, second, a recommendation from the rayon as to whom to nominate for the Leningrad party committee given—should be of decisive significance.

Of course, a large part in the life of the party organization is assigned to the first secretary of the party committee. He also should be elected on the basis of a precise and well-considered democratic procedure. Clearly, it is necessary to have several nominations. The candidates should have balanced and definite platforms. It would most likely be expedient to conduct the elections initially at a full conference, although it is not ruled out that this subsequently could be a direct ballot of all communists of the Leningrad party organization. And this would be correct, just, and democratic. This would serve as a dependable support for the person who is elected first secretary.

We have no such analogies in the Soviet Union as yet. Nonetheless, while recognizing the seriousness of the matter, personal included, and the entire complexity of the problem, I believe that Leningrad should go this route. Who knows, perhaps this precedent will be used subsequently at the time of the formation of the party Central Committee and the Politburo and at the election of the general secretary?

These, essentially, are the main problems regarding which we are assembled here today.

There are, of course, many other urgent problems also: the economic development of the region, conversion of the defense sectors, housing. There are questions connected with interaction with the new movements emerging in Leningrad and gradually gaining momentum. Problems of the Leningrad countryside require increased attention. But it would seem to be expedient to study them at sessions of the Leningrad City Soviet and the oblast soviet of people's deputies, at which the deputies—communists and nonparty people—would express their own viewpoints and make a political evaluation of the situation concerning providing Leningrad and the oblast with food and consumer goods, the introduction of ration cards, and much else that is troubling people.

An unusual situation, I realize. I have heard many reports at plenums, and they have all begun with a set of problems connected with Leningrad's economy. This really is important. But we should even now be accustoming ourselves to the idea that this is the prerogative of the Leningrad oblast and city soviet ispolkoms [executive committees] and that we may participate there as deputies and as communists.

In conclusion, a question with extensive public repercussions.

Recently a number of primary party organizations and some communists of Leningrad and the oblast have been advocating the creation of a party organization of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. An action committee has been formed to prepare for a constituent congress of a republic Communist Party, and has begun work on the nomination and election of congress delegates. We consider such a position correct and timely. In turn, the obkom and the Leningrad gorkom are prepared to render this movement the utmost support and assistance.

Comrades! I wish to emphasize once again the particular importance of the decisions that will today be adopted by the joint plenum of the oblast and Leningrad city committees of the CPSU. In developing the party's democratization, it is essential to place paramount importance on concern for the organizational and ideological unity of its ranks. It is this that is the guarantee of the consolidation of all healthy forces of our society. Relying on the wide spectrum of opinions and viewpoints, it is now essential that the communists perform comprehensive work on the CPSU Central Committee draft platform, utilize for this the entire intellectual potential of the Leningrad party organization, and contribute our position at the 28th CPSU Congress.

New Leningrad Soviet Holds First Session

LD0304231190 Moscow TASS in English 2251 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Leningrad April 4 TASS—The newly-elected Leningrad Soviet (Council) of People's Deputies began its deliberations on Tuesday. Its deputies won their seats during democratic elections in March when each seat was contested by several candidates.

A characteristic feature of our times is information bulletins on sociological studies during the elections, the situation in Lithuania, free sale of opposition newspapers, including those published in Vilnius.

Science desk editor of the EKO magazine Petr Filippov who represents the Leningrad Popular Front, was elected co-chairman of the session.

On the eve, the main party newspaper in the city, LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, carried a large interview with Filippov headlined "Power Without 'Corridors of Power'."

Filippov claims in the article that it is inadmissible to make decisions behind the closed doors, affecting the interests of thousands of Leningraders.

Small doubt, he writes, that the development of political differentiation in society will inevitably result in political factions in soviets at all levels.

His idea is corroborated by an announcement made at intervals between sittings, inviting to join the faction called "Democratic Russia." The faction suggests that communists and non-party deputies should unite.

Communists in the session's organising committee make up less than 50 per cent of the total. It was decided not to form a party group in the soviet for the first time.

Later in the day the Leningrad Regional Soviet also sat in session.

Udmurt, Tatar Electoral Commissions Reported

LD0603110190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 6 Mar 90

[Summary] A sitting of the Central Electoral Commission has taken place in Izhevsk today. The voters turned out to be as passive as never before: Slightly more than 76 percent took part in elections. None of the contenders got into the Russian parliament. Only 65 people were elected into the Udmurt Supreme Soviet, although there are 200 deputies seats. In two weeks time run-off elections will take place in 111 constituences, and repeat elections with the new candidates—in 24 constituencies.

Elections to the Tatar local soviets brought considerable surprises. Of the 250 contenders for the autonomous republic's Supreme Soviet there were only 97 winners. In the 193 constituences of the Avtozavodskiy Rayon of Naberezhnyye Chelny elections did not take place because the voters did not turn up.

Commission To Examine Radioactive Waste Pollution

PM0903105790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 p 1

[S. Smirnov report: "The 'Nuclear' Techa"]

[Text] A significant proportion of the population of Chelyabinsk Oblast is feeling alarmed in connection with the construction of the South Urals AES [nuclear electric power station]. There are grounds for this. Large-scale production of plutonium for nuclear weapons was started in the oblast in the postwar years, as a result of which great damage to the natural environment was caused. So the construction of a new plant does not cause any joy.

The CPSU obkom [oblast party committee] and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] appealed to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to adopt measures for a highly qualified assessment of the prevailing ecological situation in order to ensure future safety in the region. The letter says, in part, that the Techa River basin has been polluted by radioactive waste in the past few decades.

The USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to create a competent commission made up of scientists and specialists, as well as representatives of the public. The results of the commission's work will be examined in the third quarter of 1990.

New Publication Appears in Ivanovo

LD0903211290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 9 Mar 90

[Text] A new publication has appeared in Ivanovo. Up until now, this major industrial and cultural center of Russia has not had its own city newspaper. And well, now, the city party committee and the city soviet have started to publish the newspaper VPERED [Forward]. It is published on the principle of self-financing and that means that its fate will depend entirely on its popularity with the reader.

Western Republics

Moldavia Rescinds Housing Privileges for Outsiders

PM0304150590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Eduard Kondratov report under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Newcomers Lose Privileges"]

[Text] The Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has suspended certain USSR Government resolutions on the republic's territory.

They all apply to certain privileges with regard to the acquisition and construction of housing which, under USSR Council of Ministers normative acts, were enjoyed by certain categories of citizens arriving in Moldavia from other parts of the country. These were primarily servicemen: extended-service men and officers who have been discharged to the reserve or retired, to whom soviet organs were obliged to provide apartments within three months. This privilege is now being retained purely for those originally drafted from Moldavia itself. The resolution on housing construction cooperatives—namely, that part which entitled Soviet citizens working in the Far North to construct cooperative housing in the Moldavian SSR—has also been suspended. And finally, the Moldavian Supreme Soviet Presidium has decided to annul the resolution whereby workers in the national economy invited to Moldavia under contract were guaranteed preferential housing provision.

All these measures have been prompted by the exceptional acuteness of the housing problem in the republic, which has the largest population density in the country.

Democratic Bloc To Rule Ternopol City Council

LD0304140390 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1845 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Correspondent Yevhen Barov report from Ternopol]

[Excerpts] Following the elections, representatives of the Democratic Bloc which encompasses such organizations as Rukh, Ukrainian Language Society, Memorial, Green World, and other informal public and political organizations are in a majority at the Ternopol city council. [passage omitted] This majority will pursue fundamental

and rapid changes in the city's political, economic, social and cultural life. [passage omitted]

Great tension reigned at the council's first meeting when the proceedings reached the election of mayor. However, in the secret balot the candidate from the Democratic Bloc became victorious. His name—Vyacheslav Nehoda. [passage omitted]

Odessa Obkom 1st Secretary Replaced

LD0304190390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Odessa Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party was held today. It considered an organizational matter. Comrade Kryuchkov was released from his duties as first secretary of the oblast party committee [obkom] in connection with his retirement. Comrade Bodelan, who worked as the secretary of this obkom, was elected first secretary of the Odessa Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party from a choice of candidates.

Creation of Green Party Discussed in Ukraine

LD0304124190 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The sitting of the Green Council, the governing body of the Green World Association, has ended in Kiev. The agenda included the registration of many new collective members of this organization. It was decided to create in the republic seven regional centers of the Green World Association, since it is expected that its membership will rapidly increase.

Afterwards, Volodymyr Tykhyy, member of the Association's secretariat, told our correspondent:

[Begin Tykhyy recording] The main question under discussion at this meeting was the creation of Green Party. It will not replace the Green World Association. The latter will remain as a popular grass root movement, while the party will join the parliamentary struggle for improving the ecological situation in Ukraine. [passage omitted]

It was decided to turn 26 April into a day of mass actions. A mourning meeting will be held in Kiev as an apex of All-Ukrainian Chernobyl Week. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Kiev, Zhitomir Inhabitants Resettlement Speeded Up

LD0204090690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0200 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The resettlement of inhabitants from rayons of Kiev and Zhitomir Oblasts of the Ukraine, which are infected with radiation, has been speeded up by two years. This resettlement was planned for 1993 but by a government decision of the Ukrainian Republic it will be conducted already this year. In all, 15,000 people are to be resettled. Houses with all conveniences are already being built for them in healthy areas. This autumn the new settlers will be welcomed there.

Troops Withdrawn From Hungary Assigned Near Kiev

LD0304121990 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, a considerable proportion of which will be deployed within the Kiev military area, was positively evaluated by participants of the press conference for foreign reporters held in Bucharest.

As is known, nearly 50,000 servicemen, over 800 tanks, and 1,500 armored vehicles and other equipment are to be removed from Hungarian territory. The last Soviet serviceman will be out of Hungary by 30 June 1991.

Caucasus

Armenian CP Election Appeal Published

LD0304174490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] In Yerevan a pre-election address of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee to all citizens has been published. Contained in it is an analysis of the social, economic, and political situation in the republic; it confirms the adherence of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee to the ideals of perestroyka, to a frank dialogue with the people, and to the solution of all complicated interethnic relations from Leninist positions of a nation's right to self-determination. The successful solution of the problems that have come to a head, it says in the address, will depend on those who take a place in the Supreme Soviet, and in the town and rayon soviets of people's deputies. These should be people completely devoted to nationwide interests, active, and honest people who will put their every effort, all their knowledge, and energy into the cause of serving the people.

Further on Armenian, Azerbaijan Border Situation

LD0304220190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 3 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] We are going over to reports on the situation in the Azerbaijan and Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. As the mass media has already reported, a few days ago armed clashes on an interethnic basis took place on the two republics' borders. The two republics' leaders and the leadership and command of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] interior troops took timely and effective measures to defend the peaceful population. Our correspondents report from Azerbaijan and Armenia.

[Correspondent Parfenenkov] It is warm in Azerbaijan. The time has come to work the vineyards. The flocks of sheep want to go the mountain pastures. There is a lot to be done, but these people are forced to be apart from their usual peasant concerns. [video shows flocks of sheep and countryside] We shot these still scenes on the way to the village of Kermechatakh, Babeksiy Rayon, Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. Exit from and entry into are not without danger. [video shows men standing, talking]

[Unidentified male] Apart from small-bore rifles they are also firing from submachine guns. It is impossible to go any further; not possible at all. [indistinct remarks heard directed away from microphone]

[Parfenenkov] Is your house there?

[Unidentified male] Yes, it is already been burned down. It has already been burned down. Where will I live?

[Parfenenkov] No, that destroyed peasant dwelling speaks eloquently enough of how disturbing is the situation on the border of the two republics. [video shows destroyed building with broken furniture, a dead dog, and two boys crying]

[Parfenenkov] For instance, all women, children, and old people have been evacuated from the Azerbaijan village of Kermechatakh. As was noted at the plenum of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee, villages in the Nakhichevan ASSR of the Kazakhskii, Ayuskii, Kedabekskii, (Mlachinskii), and (Ubatlinskii) Rayons were fired upon. There are casualties among the peaceful population.

[Yu.F. Popov, chief of the USSR MVD Military Operational Group] After the attack of the 29th by Armenian extremists on the village of Kermechatakh, interior troops were set the task of guaranteeing the safety of local inhabitants, which we are doing now. There are enough forces and means to guarantee that security. I think we will fulfil that task and the inhabitants can be calm. [video shows Popov and men in combat dress.]

[Correspondent Nazaryan] These flags on the map are the painful points in Armenia, regions bordering Azerbaijan where shots once again rang out for almost a whole week. Homes burned and people were wounded and died. [video shows map, aerial view of desert terrain, a tank and soldiers in same terrain; a soldier looking through sights of his rifle as he crouches in sandy soil in area overlooking a settlement]

[G.G.Grigoryan, deputy minister of the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Armenian SSR] As a result of measures that have been adopted, with the active support of subunits of internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and of the Soviet Army, there has to some extent been a drop in that tension in the last few days. A reassuring point in that work are meetings between representatives of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Tbilisi and the Nakhichevan republic. [video shows Grigoryan, seated, speaking into a microphone set on a desk]

[Nazaryan] [video shows more arid terrain, soldiers in the area; military vehicle on an asphalt road, men in distance; freight train on the move, wagons mostly empty] On Sunday here in the village of Sadarak in the Nakhichevan ASSR in Azerbaijan, the last meeting of representatives of the two republics took place. The main point of the agreement is that along the entire border, a five-kilometer zone, no one has the right to be there with weapons. Accord was also reached there to ensure, over a two-day period, movement along the railway. Alas, not one train has passed through to Armenia today via the station of Norashen.

[S.M.Sarkisyan, chief of the Masis railway station] We have a collection of 11 trains. Each comprises 50 railcars drawn up for travel on the Azerbaijan railway and there is no way we can send them along. [video shows Sarkisyan, in uniform, talking near stationery freight cars]

NKAO Oblast Soviet Challanges Azeri Position

NC3003121890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] The USSR state flag flies over the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] Soviet Executive Committee building. [Word indistinct] the 20th convocation of the NKAO Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies resumed its deliberations here.

The Azerbaijan mass media rushed to declare that allegedly the latest session of the oblast soviet was held in violation of the procedures, said Shmavon Petrosyan, the deputy who chaired the extraordinary session. The arguments put forward by the Azerbaijani mass media do not conform to the fact. In early March, the oblast soviet's 59 deputies, who formed more than one-third of the entire number of the deputies at the oblast soviet, appealed to the oblast executive committee apparatus suggesting the convening of an extraordinary session. Based on that appeal it was originally decided to hold that session on 23 March.

However, at the request of the USSR people's deputies of NKAO—who were at the time in Moscow and wished to participate in our session—the convening of the session was shifted to 27 March 1990. All the oblast soviet deputies, including the deputies from Shushinskiy Rayon, were informed of the change. However, Mikhail Gozalov, chairman of Shushinskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee, sent us a cable from the Shushinskiy Rayon deputies informing us that the Shusha deputies are declining to participate in the session. Eventually, out of 148 deputies of the oblast soviet, 109 deputies participated in the session; that is, more than two-thirds of them. Therefore, the oblast soviet session, held at the Stepanakert City Soviet Executive Committee building, did not violate any procedural norms. Despite this, it is incomprehensible why the Azerbaijani leadership was

trying to prevent the effective restoration of the Soviet authority in NKAO. It is clear that NKAO does not consider itself outside this authority.

Yesterday, 28 March, a meeting of the (?seniors) took place with the participation of Semyon Babayan, chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee. They discussed the issue of restoring work in view of the call by the oblast soviet session. Considerable work is being done now in work collectives in this area. During the meeting with the people the USSR people's deputies of NKAO, who are now in the oblast, are also urging the resumption of work. There are grounds to hope that the people will heed their call.

2 Apr Situation in NKAO 'Relatively Good'

NC0404094090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Industrial establishments in Stepanakert have started operating, the public transport services have begun operating at full capacity, and [words indistinct] offices have resumed work after a two-month interruption. The amount of oil that has not been extracted, the apartments that have not been handed over, and the school subjects that have been missed will be assessed and calculated later. Restoring work is more essential.

According to the command headquarters of the region which is in a state of emergency, the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] is relatively good. The USSR Internal Affairs Ministry units are controlling the situation.

Bus Service to Mountain Towns Resumes

NC0304180990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Text] Regular bus service from Khanlar to Kazakh, Kamu, and [name indistinct] towns, located in the mountains, and to [name indistinct] border town, have been resumed. Bus service to these places was suspended because of Armenian extremists' (?threats) in 1989. Bus service in [name indistinct] town, in which the majority of the population is Armenian, is not operating because of the activities of the Armenian extremists. The section of the water supply canal between Aksu and Gendzha, that armed Armenian bandits destroyed, has not yet been repaired.

Preparations for Georgian CP Congress Reported

PM0104133990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[GRUZINFORM-TASS report: "Before the Congress"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 29 Mar—Just over a month has been set aside for the report and election meetings and conferences which will be held in the republic's party organizations before the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress. The decision to convene it on 15 May this year is stated in the resolution, published today, of a Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum which discussed issues connected with preparations for the republic communists' forum.

The precongress campaign—so compact in terms of time—has been prompted by the difficult sociopolitical situation in the republic. At their meetings and conferences, communists will have to carefully study the situation that has developed, define the role and place of party organizations in the complex renewal processes, and draft proposals designed to consolidate communists and establish new approaches in their work in the conditions of a multiparty system.

Communists will have to resolve difficult tasks within the framework of the congress preparations. The policy of constructive dialogue adopted by the republic party organization coincides with the mood of the broad public. A demonstration involving thousands was held in the Georgian capital the other day: Its participants called for unity and accord.

Public attention is centered on questions of Georgia's national development, the ways and means of achieving the republic's economic independence, environmental problems, and the development of traditional sectors of the national economy. The large discussions clearly confirm people's desire to find the optimum solution to these problems. In this respect one invariably hears the idea that the traditional interethnic relations in Georgia must remain as sacred and pure as they have been for millennia, and it is stressed that these relations must be one of the foundations of independent development. [The 30 March PRAVDA Second Edition omits the words "and it is stressed that these relations must be one of the foundations of independent development."]

Rallies 'Likely'

LD0404100590 Moscow TASS in English 0926 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 4 TASS—The first round of the pre-election campaign in Soviet Georgia was won by new political organisations, the MOSCOW NEWS weekly writes today, referring to the postponement of elections scheduled for March until October-November, 1990, under the pressure from the new groups.

An extraordinary session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, which took this decision, did not explain the reasons for the delay. But it is clear that few voters would participate in March elections, MOSCOW NEWS noted.

On April 9 the republic will mark the first anniversary of tragic events in Georgia. Several parties and political associations have called for ten days of civil disobedience to commemorate the victims near the government house.

Strikes, mass rallies and hunger strikes are likely.

Not everyone supports these tactics, the newspaper pointed out. Some leaders of political movements believe that rally passions should be abandoned and that the republic is not so rich to solve all problems with general strikes. Otherwise, extremes, chaos and opposition will flood Georgia.

"Unfortunately, none of these leaders agreed to be named. And this is also a special sign of the times," MOSCOW NEWS stressed. "But all leaders, who oppose extremes, are unanimous that the issue of Georgian independence should be solved by the parliament rather than by violence."

Recalling the stand of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, which began a direct dialogue with then-unofficial associations last year, the newspaper noted that it was a dialogue of the deaf.

There were calls for wisdom and cooperation, but there was no further rapprochement. Even opinions on Georgian self-determination appeared diametrically opposed. The Communist Party recognised the right of all new political organisations to their special opinion, but the later denied the party the right to power.

The newspaper cites the opinion of Georgian public figure Professor Merab Mamardashvili, who opposes the solving of important issues during rallies.

"I am again deprived of freedom of action. We are again toys of a new totalitarian despotism. We are again forced to think differently than we do," he said.

At the same time, Mamardashvili noted that "social and political issues are discussed during rallies, which are sometimes lacking common sense, morals and adjusted thoughts, only because they are too slow in being solved in the places where they should be solved in a normal civilised society."

Central Asia

First Round of Kazakhstan Polling Summarized

LD0304141190 Moscow TASS in English 1354 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Alma-Ata April 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Gennadiy Kulagin:

A total of 131 people's deputies were elected as a result of the first round of polling in Soviet Kazakhstan. A repeat ballot will be held in 126 electoral districts because none of the candidates polled more than half of all votes, a spokesman at the republican Central Electoral Commission told TASS.

The elections of people's deputies in Kazakhstan were held on March 25, with 1,031 candidates running, four candidates per seat on average.

Party and local government officials—about 30 per cent—are leading the field among deputies so far, followed up by workers and collective farmers—21.2 per cent, and factory, collective and state farm directors—about 16 per cent.

The overwhelming majority are members and candidate members of the Soviet Communist Party—96.7 per cent. The deputies represent 13 nationalities inhabiting the republic.

The elections were notable for a high voter turnout, with 84 per cent of people casting their votes.

Final results of elections will become known after April 29 when the final round of polling will be held.

'People's Militia' Established in Tajikistan

LD0304223190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1431 GMT 3 Apr 90

[Text] Dushanbe, 3 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva reports:

In the capital of Tajikistan, a municipal militia has been set up as an alternative service for the protection of public order. It has been formed on the initiative of local parliamentarians with funds provided by industrial and construction firms, a number of charitable organizations, as well as the donations of private individuals. In contrast to the state forces for maintaining law and order, the candidates for the post of municipal militiamen were discussed publicly—at meetings of labor collectives, and gatherings of the residents of each makhalla [city district].

The question of the need to set up a new type of "internal security" service, has, according to Maksud Ikramov, chairman of the city soviet, been long debated, but the tragic events of February in Dushanbe accelerated its solution. In those days, the main forces of the state service for keeping order were channeled into protecting from pogrom perpetrators the central pat of the city, where party and government institutions and other administrative institutions are located. All that remained for the residents of outlying districts to do was to organize collective protection for their families and dwellings themselves. Thus, the self-defense detachments came into being, which have become the prototype for the future subunits of the municipal militia, the head of the city soviet stressed. It is no accident that the very activists of these detachments have formed the nucleus of the alternative service for keeping order. Besides them, the "Afghans," demobilized servicemen from the Soviet Army and the internal forces troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, readily try on the uniform of the people's militiaman.

The staff of the municipal militia undergo special training at the instruction and training ground of the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs and at the state militia school under the supervision of experienced

professionals. The course on the theory of crime detection, ethnics, and other sciences are read to them by specialists of the Faculty of Law of the Lenin National University.

Uzbekistan's Future Role in Federation Defined

PM0304153190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Andrey Orlov report: "Uzbekistan on Threshold of Autonomy"]

[Text] Tashkent—Following the election of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] president and the leaders of the republic's Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, deputies have embarked on discussing the problems of switching to regional economic accountability, self-management, and self-financing.

"Today we have firmly embarked on the path of shaping political and economic autonomy [samostoyatelnost]," Sh. Mirsaidov, the new chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, who was elected on a contested basis, noted. "At the same time, I want to stress that the Uzbek SSR, unlike the Baltic republics, sees its future within a renewed Soviet federation. The government intends to extensively and openly resolve in a spirit of democracy and glasnost all the vitally important questions of our economic, cultural, spiritual, and political development."

There are indeed many questions. For instance, output worth a total of R9 billion is annually shipped out of the republic, while output worth R13 billion is annually shipped in. This disparity has largely been brought about by the low prices for exported raw materials and the high cost of finished items. But the republic does not receive any turnover tax breaks for output produced from local raw materials in other regions.

It was stated at the session that "the Uzbek SSR will henceforth base its relations with the center and other parts of the country on a full, equal, equivalent, and mutually advantageous basis. On the same principles the republic is setting up and developing economic and cultural links with foreign countries within the renewed federation, making its contribution to the all-union and international division of labor."

The report at the session by Sh. Mirsaidov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, stressed in particular: "As we understand it, the republic's resources are not all-union property. If such a formula is supported by people's deputies, we will uphold it and strive for it to be recognized at union level."

The Supreme Soviet session ratified the republic's new government.

The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet session ended 31 March. The deputies adopted a resolution on the report of the republic's government.

Uzbek Supreme Soviet proposals to change and amend the USSR law "On Universal Military Service" were studied and discussed. A resolution was adopted on this issue. Deputies elected the members of the Supreme Court and oblast courts the same day.

Uzbek Minister Cited on Organized Crime Issues

90US0651A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 21 Feb 90 p 3

[Report on interview with V.M. Kamalov, Uzbek minister of internal affairs, by G. Figlin, chief of the department of mail of PRAVDA VOSTOKA; date and place not specified: "What Will We Counter Organized Crime With?"]

[Text] The development of a program for combating organized crime in our country has caused a stream of letters to the editorial office. Readers have asked to be told about the situation in our republic in more detail. Chief of the PRAVDA VOSTOKA Department of Mail G. Figlin has met with V.M. Kamalov, Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Minister of Internal Affairs.

[Figlin] Vyacheslav Mukhtarovich, let us begin by comparing facts. On the one hand, a legal reform is under way, while on the other, the crime rate goes up. In legislation, the legal protection of citizens is reinforced. In reality, the number of homicides, serious bodily injuries, rapes, robberies, and burglaries increases with every passing year.

[Kamalov] To my mind, these facts are interconnected in a different manner. Let us look at this.

Indeed, in recent years a higher incidence of all the types of crimes which you have enumerated has been registered in the republic. We may also add to the list a considerable increase in the number of bandit attacks, theft of state and public property, cases of hooliganism, and other unlawful actions. Given this gloomy background, enhancing the legal protection of citizens appears to many people to be no more than an escape from solving the problem realistically. However, let us not forget that developing and perfecting the base of norms is just one of the directions of legal reform.

It was the crime wave sweeping our country that made us talk about legal protection out loud and take charge of reinforcing it urgently. In essence, the legal reform amounts to a healthy response by our society taking aim at crime, corruption, and arbitrariness. This is how the facts are connected.

As far as fundamental changes in the legislation are concerned, I will give you just one example—judge for yourselves how important it is. It is exactly the loopholes in the criminal and criminal-procedure legislation that allow "the fathers" of organized crime to evade responsibility for now. The most brazen crimes are committed on their orders; however, they do not take part in them personally and thus remain in the shadow. Under the

legislation in effect, films, pictures, and videotapes, and tape-recorded conversations in which the actions of the leaders of the criminal underworld may be registered are virtually not taken into account. A vicious circle develops which may only be broken by abandoning obsolete approaches.

As the head of a law-enforcement organization, I may say that right now the law does not provide adequately reliable measures for legal protection for the militia employees themselves. A lot has been said in the press to this effect, but thus far more has been said than done.

[Figlin] As you have stressed, the current program of crime control is comprehensive in nature. However, there was no dearth of universal plans before either. Hence the doubts in readers' letters: Is this program going to be more effective than the previous ones? Certainly, they are interested in this as far as our republic is concerned.

[Kamalov] At the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the need for a serious influx of funds to the sphere of law enforcement, no matter how difficult it is to come up with the funds at present, was openly mentioned for the first time. The material and technical supply calls for outlays. We should create conditions which would make it possible to raise the level of requirements when people are hired to work in the law-enforcement organs. It is necessary to improve facilities for the professional training and retraining of cadres. In the absence of all of this, a victorious anti-crime drive is out of the question at present.

All the complications which are at issue on the all-union scale are acutely felt in our republic. In Uzbekistan, the "density" of militia employees compared to the number of inhabitants is the lowest in our country. If we are to proceed from the average union standards, we lack more than 17,000 employees. Also, our technical materiel leaves a lot to be desired.

A constructive, businesslike approach to the issues of law-enforcement organs has now taken shape in the supreme organ of power of the country, and, personally, I am optimistic about the course which has been set. The course does not promise instant, magical results; it requires intensive long-term work. It is possible that everything will not be successfully implemented. However, this course is realistic, and this is the main point.

[Figlin] At the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR minister of internal affairs referred to the planned reorganization of the entire system of internal affairs organs of our country in keeping with the reinforced status and sovereignty of union republics. How do you expect to take advantage of the opportunities which open up in this field?

[Kamalov] The message about the forthcoming reorganization did not come as a surprise to us. As early as 1988, the Uzbek SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] submitted such proposals. They are necessitated by the need to counteract the increase in organized crime and large-scale unlawful activities in the course of which criminal schemes are carried out over large territories. After all, the criminals do not restrict themselves to the administrative and territorial boundaries of rayons, oblasts, and republics. The militia likewise needs interdepartmental and interregional units for combating the drug business, economic crime, and so on. It is very important to speed up the introduction of a unified interregional information and reference system.

I must say that the process of regrouping forces is marked by our characteristic delays. However, the internal affairs organs of the Central Asian republics have been taking certain steps to pool their efforts on their own initiative for a long time now. Working meetings of the MVD and UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] leaders are held. In a number of oblasts of Uzbekistan, the organs of internal affairs cooperate successfully with militia units from Kirghizia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenia. This has led to considerable success in our struggle with bandit, robber, and thief groups and various entities of the "shadow economy" which are interregional in nature.

The planned creation of interdepartmental and interregional units does not by any means presuppose the reinforcement of centralization in the country's system of internal affairs organs. On the contrary, these units are expected to be set up to a considerable degree with the resources and funds secured due to the decentralization of the management apparatus and the transfer of considerable powers to the field. It is expected that an entire array of law-enforcement functions will be transferred to the so-called "municipal militia" thus ensuring greater specialization, professionalism, and dispatch in militia units.

[Figlin] The line beyond which crime becomes organized, the content of the very term "organized crime," and its characteristic features are causing arguments among experts at present. Be that as it may, organized crime is not isolated, it does not exist alone. It is closely tied to the criminal underworld as a whole, and it adjusts to the economic and socio-political processes in society; it takes advantage of these processes. What can you say about the extent and nature of organized crime in our republic? What sources does it "draw on" for manpower and material resources? What tasks do you consider to be the most important in combating organized crime at present?

[Kamalov] Right now, the law does not specify the attributes of organized crime. As you have observed, theoretical debates are under way. Meanwhile, the phenomenon is spreading. As I see it, organized crime in our country is akin to "white-collar" crime abroad. Neither could exist without corruption in individual organs of power and administration. This is how I would define organized crime: this is activity by a stable group of persons who consistently violate criminal law for the

purpose of receiving material or other benefits for themselves and who secure unlawful protection from officials.

The peculiarities of the crime-causing situation in our republic are associated primarily with its climate. Warm areas have always attracted the criminal element, be it the Black Sea area, Caucasus, or Central Asia. In recent years, all-union "congresses" of the leaders of criminal underworld of various stripes have been registered in the republic. I have already explained why the path between registering their activities and filing criminal charges against them is so long.

The influx of parasitic individuals, vagrants to Uzbekistan has been traditionally high—tens of thousands a year, all of this in the environment of a considerable shortage of jobs and housing to begin with. Incidentally, the labor surplus also exacerbates the crime-causing situation perceptibly. People who are unsettled, even those who apparently behave in a non-criminal manner, are frequently drawn into the orbit of unlawful activities eventually. This is the kind of reserve which the criminal underworld may, and in many cases does, count on.

As is known, the prospects opening up now that the economic reform has gotten under way and economic units have acquired greater independence have also attracted the criminal underworld. Cooperatives have turned out to be even more lucrative for them. The growth of the cooperative sector and the concentration of considerable amounts of money in the possession of certain persons have brought about the spread of extortion. In 1989 alone, more than 100 cases of extortion were registered in Tashkent. As a rule, money is extorted; the amounts range from R500 to 0.5 million. Quite recently, three persons were caught in the act of receiving money in Tashkent; they demanded that the chairman of a cooperative give them R50,000 threatening to kill him. In Andizhan Oblast, a group consisting of six persons extorted 100,000 from a cooperative chairman. This group was apprehended as well.

I would like to stress that successfully putting an end to the criminal activities of racketeers is only possible with the vigorous cooperation of citizens, primarily the victims themselves. We recommend that they immediately report cases of extortion to the militia. As a number of these cases suggest, attempts to protect yourself on your own are unsuccessful.

It is important to understand that fighting organized crime and crime in general cannot be successful at all if it is only performed by the law-enforcement organs. Eliminating the causes and conditions responsible for the growth of crime is the task of our entire society, and it should be accomplished through our joint efforts.

[Figlin] The increasingly frequent civil disobedience has been recognized as one of the main sources of social tension in the country. As a rule, direct acts of violence against defenseless people and serious crimes are committed under the cover of mass disturbances. This was the case in Baku, in Dushanbe, and in our republic during the tragic Fergana events. Has the militia learned these bitter lessons?

[Kamalov] Certainly. Grave miscalculations and omissions have been found in the work of law-enforcement organs to prevent and block mass antisocial manifestations which have occurred in various parts of the country, including the Fergana Valley in our republic. The employees of internal affairs organs got lost in tense situations. The necessary measures were not taken promptly. The system of information did not always reflect the scale of the events under way fully and objectively.

At present, the personnel of the internal affairs organs of the republic have different instructions. It is important to detect in a timely manner the unlawful designs of organizing mass disturbances and the individuals hatching such schemes, and to put an end to their actions.

Law enforcement during authorized rallies, demonstrations, processions, and so on is being improved.

We are attempting to upgrade the preparedness of our employees for actions in an emergency to a qualitatively new level. The leaders of all levels are held increasingly accountable for maintaining the due preparedness of the internal affairs organs reporting to them. In professional training, we emphasize mainly the ability of personnel to anticipate the actions of instigators and organizers of disturbances in extreme situations. To this end, exercises and training sessions are conducted. The supply of active means of protection to the internal affairs organs has been improved. Preventive activities have been stepped up; attempts to disseminate inflammatory leaflets and rumors aimed primarily at increasing interethnic discord are resolutely brought to an end.

An important role is to be played by a decree adopted in the republic which provides for administrative penalties for inflammatory activities and instigation and creating a mood of panic.

I must say that the adoption of this decree is not at all a far-fetched measure; there are real and weighty grounds for this undertaking. Recently, telegrams with distorted information on events in the cities of Azerbaijan and inflammatory appeals were sent from there to post offices in a number of regions of the republic. In Tashkent, Namangan, and Kashka-Darya Oblasts, leaflets were disseminated calling on Moslems to prevent the resettlement of refugees from Azerbaijan in the territory of the republic. I am not going to discuss here the ethical aspect of these leaflets and their compliance with, say, religious precepts. However, there were no grounds at all for such appeals! The issues of resettlement and job placement of the refugees in our republic have not been raised at all. The provocateurs are trying to circulate a new wave of the same idle rumors about refugees in conjunction with the Dushanbe events.

Leaflets have also appeared with calls to sabotage the elections of candidate deputies from among the leaders of the party and soviet apparatus.

The very content of the leaflets shows clearly who is behind them—unscrupulous individuals who are prepared at any moment to play on dissatisfaction for the purpose of their personal gain or other purposes, and to promise a quick solution to all problems while not having an actual clear program or objective potential for that.

Taking into account the emerging situations, the leadership and political organs of the militia perform explanatory work among the populace. This responsibility also devolves on block inspectors. However, we should say that an overwhelming majority of the population of our republic has itself figured out by now who is who without additional explanations. Extremist attitudes are not gaining the support of a majority of the population. Assistance is given to the militia in detecting the individuals who whip up such attitudes. The people do not want anymore repeats of the tragedies, another crime spree, or economic destabilization which would cause a further decline in the standard of living.

[Figlin] What can you say about volunteer aid to militia, its traditional forms, such as people's detachments and Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] operations detachments, and new forms, such as the participation of large enterprises in improving the technical equipment of militia units?

[Kamalov] The activity of volunteer formations has decreased recently. I believe that the reasons for this are many. One of the main reasons is that the old forms of organizing volunteer aid to the militia are obsolete and are not in line with the current conditions. An organizational arrangement is needed which is new in principle. Among other things, it is feasible to entrust the organizational leadership of the volunteer people's detachments to the managers of enterprises, to introduce the position of chief of the volunteer law-enforcement station which will coordinate the interaction of the militia and volunteer forces on the beat. A decree of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers adopted last December authorized the introduction of additional positions of militia block inspectors at the expense of enterprises, state farms, and cooperatives. Many labor collectives have responded; they are prepared to provide funds for these and other purposes. For example, the council of directors of the Chirchik City executive committee allocated R700,000 to the city department of internal affairs. Citizens have been asking the Uzbek SSR MVD to communicate the number of an account to which they may donate money in order to step up the fight against crime. I will take advantage of this occasion. The number of the account is 000140566; it is with the operations department of the Uzbek Republic Office of the USSR State Bank.

Summing up our conversation, I would like to stress once again that all forms of participation by the public in enforcing the rule of law and stepping up crime prevention are very important at present, and primarily the performance of the most elementary civic duty—observing the law and obeying it.

Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Not To Adopt Summer Time

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[Text] To end this review, a report relating to summer time. On 25 March when this comes into force in our country, the hands of the clocks will not be altered in three Union republics. Their governments have adopted appropriate decisions to this effect. It has emerged that a move of one hour forward was of no use to the residents of Uzbekistan. An extra hour of daylight, convenient in northern regions, meant an extra hour of intense heat in the south. The working people complained that a midday that did not fall at midday hindered the age-old rhythm of work and rest.

The new procedure for measuring the time is being introduced as an experiment in Belorussia, one hour behind Moscow. The government of Tajikistan has also asked the USSR Council of Ministers not to alter the time in the territory of the republic. A decision has been adopted transferring the Republic, on an experimental basis, to zone time from 25 March to 28 September of this year. This means that on the day the country transfers to summer time, the residents of this mountainous area will retain winter time and will not move the hands of their clocks one hour forward.